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Abstract: Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war, neue theoretische und empirische Ansätze zum geringen
Zusammenhang zwischen selbstbezogenen Gedächtniseinschätzungen und Gedächtnisleistungen in älteren
Erwachsenen zu finden. Drei Aspekte wurden deshalb genauer untersucht: (1) Die Invarianz im Mass
zur Erfassung von selbstbezogenen Gedächtniseinschätzungen, (2) der Zusammenhang zwischen Gedächt-
nisselbsteinschätzungen und Lernen, sowie (3) der Zusammenhang zwischen Monitoring und Lernen bei
älteren Erwachsenen. Als erstes wurde zum Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), ein Fragebogen
zur Erfassung selbstberichteter kognitiver Fehlleistungen, eine Faktorenstruktur präsentiert welche an-
schliessend auf Invarianz in sechs Altersgruppen geprüft wurde. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass der CFQ
mit der vorliegenden Faktorenstruktur altersinvariant ist. Im zweiten Schritt wurde eine Möglichkeit
aufgezeigt, wie mittels nicht-linearen latenten Wachstumsmodellen Lerndaten analysiert werden können.
In diesen Modellen ist es möglich, jeder Person drei Lernparameter zuzuordnen, welche die Lernleistun-
gen beschreiben. Dadurch können verschiedene Aspekte der Lern- und Gedächtnisleistung erhoben und
mit subjektiven Einstellung in Beziehung gesetzt werden. Der dritte Aspekt wurde in zwei empirischen
Arbeiten untersucht: Junge und ältere Versuchspersonen wurden in ihrer Monitoringleistung verglichen.
Hier zeigte sich, dass die ältere Gruppe die eigene Lernleistung überschätzte, die junge Gruppe hinge-
gen unterschätzte ihre Lernleistung nach dem ersten Lerndurchgang. Diese Überschätzung könnte dazu
führen, dass ältere Erwachsene zu wenig kognitive Ressourcen für den Lernprozess zur Verfügung stellen
und so ihre Leistung noch zusätzlich vermindern. Abschliessend lässt sich festhalten, dass Metakognition
als einer der wichtigsten psychologischen Faktoren in der Kompensation von altersbezogenen Gedächtnis-
defiziten angesehen werden kann. The aim of the present thesis was to find new theoretical and empirical
accounts for the low correspondence between memory self-reports and memory performance. More specif-
ically, the present work addressed three research questions regarding (1) the invariance in a questionnaire
of memory self-reports, (2) the relation between memory self-reports and learning, and (3) the relation
between monitoring and learning. The first research question pertained to whether the measures used to
operationalize memory self-reports are invariant across age. In order to test for measurement invariance
(MI) a newly presented factor structure of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) was tested and
compared across six age groups. The CFQ proved to be measurement invariant across all age groups. The
second research question addressed the relation between memory self-reports and memory performance
with the focus on learning as a more informative memory measure. Here a methodological approach to
formalize and relate learning to other variables of interest was demonstrated using non-linear functions in
conjunction with structured latent curve models. The third research question concerned age differences
in the relation between monitoring and learning by means of a cross-sectional design. Monitoring was
operationalized by Judgments-of-Learning (JOLs). That is, older adults overestimated their recall per-
formance whereas younger participants underestimated their recall performance from the second trial on.
The persistent overestimation in older adults may result in insufficient allocation of cognitive resources
to the learning process. In summarizing, this thesis demonstrated that metamemory has the potential to
be the most important psychological mechanism to compensate age-related memory decline.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aging and memory performance 
Research on cognitive performance across the adult lifespan has highlighted a broad 
point of consensus, namely the decline in performance. Among different domains of 
cognition, memory has certainly been one of the best researched (e.g., Craik, 1977; Craik, 
Anderson, Kerr, & Li, 1995; Kausler, 1994; Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens, 1993). 
Experimental and psychometric findings indicate, on average, age-related decrements in the 
ability to learn and remember (for an overview see Horn & Hofer, 1992; Salthouse, 1991; 
Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000). The decline can be described by a curvilinear trajectory: After a 
rapid performance increase during adolescence and a plateau phase during early adulthood, 
decline sets in that becomes negatively accelerated after onset of very old age (Baltes & 
Lindenberger, 1997; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1995; Rönnlund, Nyberg, Bäckman, & Nilsson, 
2005; Schaie, 2005). Hence, age-related decline in cognitive performance is smallest from age 
of 35-60 years (Martin & Zimprich, 2005), and increases after age 60 (Rönnlund et al., 2005), 
and is even more pronounced in 85+-year-olds (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997).  
Reasons for the onset of decline around the age of 60 years may be linked to decline in 
biological functions (Prull, Gabrieli, & Bunge, 1999), expressed, for example, by diminishing 
brain weight (e.g., Greenfield et al., 1967), reductions in hippocampal volume (Raz, 
Rodrigue, Head, Kennedy, & Acker, 2004), and decreasing integrity of the dopamine system 
(e.g., Antonini et al., 1993; Bäckman & Farde, 2004). Rönnlund and colleagues (2005), 
however, noted that reductions in biological functions may have an earlier onset already at the 
age of 20 or 30 years. A similarly early onset of decline has been observed in working 
memory and perceptual speed both in cross-sectional (Park et al., 2002) and in longitudinal 
samples (Schaie, 1994, 2005).  
Not all types of memory seem to be affected by decline in the same manner or to the 
same extent, though (Zacks et al., 2000). A typical finding is that different domains of 
memory follow different patterns of decline across the adult lifespan (Horn & Hofer, 1992; 
Rönnlund et al., 2005; Salthouse, 1991; Schaie, 2005). That is, decrements are typically slight 
in implicit memory tasks (e.g., test performance in priming tasks) in which a stimulus that has 
been presented previously affects current behavior when presented again, often without the 
person realizing that the stimulus was encountered beforehand. In contrast, age-related losses 
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are substantial in explicit memory tasks (e.g., performance in free or cued recall in a memory 
test) as well as in working memory tasks (Grady & Craik, 2000). Especially newly learned 
material seems to be affected by decline resulting in poorer performance when measured in 
laboratory settings (Baddeley, 1990; Salthouse, 1991). Rönnlund and colleagues (2005), for 
example, have examined the trajectory of semantic and episodic memory functioning in ten 
age cohorts ranging from 35 to 80 years. They reported a differential aging pattern of episodic 
and semantic memory performance between ages of 60-80 years with substantially more 
decline for the episodic memory measure. The discrepancy between the findings of a late 
onset of decline in declarative memory and an early onset of decline for more basic functions 
may have several explanations. 
The negative influence of reductions in basic functions may be counterbalanced by 
compensatory mechanisms both at the neural and at the psychological level. In fact, at the 
neural level McIntosh and colleagues (1999) found evidence in a fMRI study that older adults 
showed additional activations in the left prefrontal cortex during a perceptual memory task 
compared to younger adults. This can be interpreted as representing recruitment for 
compensatory purposes in the “aged brain” (e.g., Grady & Craik, 2000). At the psychological 
level a protective factor against decline in cognitive functions could be age-related increase in 
knowledge with advancing age. That is, knowledge about cognition and memory may be seen 
as part of crystallized intelligence which comprises accumulated knowledge and experiences 
an individual has made (cf. Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2006; Horn & Cattell, 1966). 
Following Horn and Cattell’s classification of intelligence, crystallized abilities are less prone 
to age-related decline compared to fluid abilities such as reasoning or processing speed.  
An important aspect of the knowledge domain which might prove to be the basis for 
compensating mechanisms in old age is metamemory, that is, metamemory entails the 
knowledge people hold about their own memory. In this thesis I will focus on the relation 
between metamemory and memory performance across the adult lifespan because it probably 
represents the most important psychological mechanism to compensate age-related memory 
decrease. 
1.2 Aging and metamemory 
Interest in the individual knowledge about general memory functioning may be 
explained by the hope that memory performance can be enhanced by improving individuals’ 
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fundamental knowledge about how the different memory domains work and how they are 
interconnected. To investigate this relation people are asked to provide self-reports about their 
own memory functioning. This approach to examining beliefs people hold about themselves 
is not new to scientific psychology (e.g., Hertzog & Dixon, 2005). In fact, it bears on the 
concept of introspection which, for some time, was considered the best way to examine 
psychological states and processes which defied external observation. But already early in 
time critique emerged on the validity of self-reports and it was pointed out that introspection 
would potentially be unreliable (Compte, quoted in James, 1890). As a consequence, 
introspection was marginalized in the later behavioristically based psychology and its 
methods were radically rejected (Dunlop, 1912; Watson, 1913). However, the concept was 
recast and refined and gained back some influence in psychology (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). 
In his monograph on consciousness and metacognition, Nelson (1996) argued that 
“introspective reports … can be related to other empirical observations and thereby can help 
investigators draw inferences about the participants’ psychological processing” (p. 103). The 
quality and usefulness of measures based on introspection might be taken with a grain of salt, 
given that people may “be treated as an imperfect measuring device of [their] own cognitions, 
in which the individual's metacognitive monitoring is assumed to sometimes contain errors or 
distortions” (Nelson, 1996, p. 106). 
The basic idea of introspectionism, that is, asking subjects about their own beliefs 
about a certain psychological process is still used in the investigation of metacognition, which 
can be defined as cognitions about cognition (Wellman, 1983). The focus is not on how the 
person carries out these processes, but rather on what the person knows and beliefs about 
these processes (Wellman, 1985). In other words, people think about thinking, and this self-
awareness includes beliefs about how and how well their mental activities function (cf. 
Lovelace, 1990). To measure metamemory it is best framed as consisting of three elements: 
Knowledge about memory and memory functions, the monitoring of the current state of the 
memory system, and beliefs about memory (cf. Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). The latter element, 
beliefs about memory, can be further subdivided into beliefs about one’s own memory and 
beliefs about others’ memory. In the present thesis I will focus mainly on monitoring and the 
beliefs about one’s own memory functioning, the latter also having been termed self-referent 
memory beliefs and as such are purely subjective self-reports in terms of introspection 
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(Hertzog & Dixon, 2005). Note that in the remainder of this thesis I will subsume monitoring 
and self-referent memory beliefs under the heading of memory self-reports.  
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the correspondence between memory self-
reports and their behavioral counterpart, that is, memory performance, across the adult 
lifespan. The thesis is structured in three parts: In the first part I will present main findings 
concerning the relatedness between memory self-reports and objective memory performance. 
These findings are discussed in the light of a lifespan perspective and three open issues 
regarding measurement properties of metamemory, the relation between metamemory and 
memory performance, and monitoring processes in relation to learning are presented. In the 
second part, three studies are presented which aim at clarifying the aforementioned open 
issues. In the third part of the thesis, I will evaluate the three studies and give an outlook for 
future research in the domain of metamemory aging.  
1.2.1 Memory self-reports 
As defined in the previous section, memory self-reports comprise monitoring and self-
referent memory beliefs. Monitoring is defined as a function which allows us to evaluate our 
cognitive processes. The assumption in models using a meta-level is one of a hierarchical 
system with at least two levels. In metamemory, the lowest or object-level is memory 
functioning in a given situation. As an example one might imagine that a person learns a word 
list to subsequently recall it. Through monitoring this person informs herself about how well 
this list is memorized and if she has to expend more time or cognitive resources to attain the 
desired level of mastery (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). The 
next level is the meta-level, which is both controlling and monitoring the object-level (cf. 
Metcalve & Shimamura, 1994), that is, monitoring informs the meta-level about the state the 
object-level is in and controlling processes inform the object-level what to do next. In short, 
the object- and the meta-level together with monitoring and controlling processes form a 
feedback loop which aims at reducing the discrepancy between a desired and the actual level 
of the object-level (e.g., memory performance). The desired level is conceptualized in a model 
within the meta-level. A schematic representation of the flow of information is given in 
Figure 1.1, which is a modified reproduction of Metcalfe and Shimamura’s (1994) model of 
metacognition. 
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of the hierarchical organization of meta-level and object-level and the hypothesized flow 
of information (following the illustration by Metcalve & Shimamura, 1994). 
 
Optimally, it seems highly desirable that monitoring does provide the exact or 
adequate information about the level of mastery. This would allow to achieve the desired 
level and to avoid unnecessary overlearning which costs time and cognitive resources. Hence, 
based on their metacognitive judgments individuals should be able to efficiently control and 
regulate their strategies for learning and retrieving information from memory (Schneider & 
Pressley, 1989).  
The importance of a well-functioning memory monitoring may gain even more weight 
when memory performance is declining, as it is the case with older adults (cf. Kausler, 1994). 
The usefulness of monitoring is underlined by findings regarding the changes in memory and 
metacognitive monitoring across the lifespan which evidence that even though memory 
performance is impaired in the aging process, monitoring functioning appears to be spared 
from cognitive decline (Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-
Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Shaw & Craik, 1989).  
The second metacognitive concept discussed in this thesis is one of self-referent 
memory beliefs. Different from monitoring, which delivers information on-line about a 
current state, self-referent memory beliefs are available independently of a certain situation. A 
further important difference is that monitoring is best seen as a process which takes place for 
some time and which is specifically calibrated to a given task. Self-referent memory beliefs, 
in turn, represent beliefs about the state of one’s own memory functioning in general and are 
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retrievable upon request. For example, if a person is asked about her general memory capacity 
or about the perceived change in memory performance in the last five years this person will 
access self-referent memory beliefs to answer the query. Other than monitoring, these beliefs 
do not appear to regulate memory functioning directly (but see McDonald-Miszczak, Hunter, 
& Hultsch, 1994) but may be seen as part of the person’s self-concept (Silvia & Gendolla, 
2001). Hence, memory beliefs are probably more prone to bias regarding self-consistency and 
more susceptible to incorporating implicit theories about general memory functioning than 
monitoring (Cavanaugh, Feldman, & Hertzog, 1998). Notwithstanding, these beliefs represent 
a source of information people rely on when estimating their memory functioning. Especially 
in the case of memory complaints, which become more pronounced as people age (Zimprich 
& Kliegel, in press), the “self-diagnosis” is usually based on self-referent memory beliefs. 
Again, a realistic appraisal of one’s own memory functioning appears desirable because a 
diagnostic benefit could be drawn from these self-reports – given that they reflect the true 
state. That is, experienced changes would be related to true changes in memory performance. 
Furthermore, knowing its own strengths and weaknesses enhances the effective use of 
memory strategies which may be used to improve one’s own memory functioning or to 
compensate memory decline due to deminishing cognitive resources in old age. One could 
argue that a realistic appraisal of one’s own memory may support an optimal allocation of 
resources during a memory task and to the best possible strategy use, which, in turn, should 
lead to a maximization of memory performance. Consequently, the essence in both subjective 
measures discussed – monitoring and self-referent memory beliefs – is the degree of 
correspondence, that is, accuracy, between self-reports and objective memory performance. 
1.2.1.1 Measurement of memory self-reports 
In the measurement of monitoring three different meta-level statements can be 
obtained based on a distinction drawn by Nelson and Narens (1994): Ease-of-learning (EOL) 
judgments, which occur in advance of acquisition, are largely inferential and pertain to items 
that have not yet been learned. These judgments are predictions about what will be 
easy/difficult to learn, either in terms of which items will be easiest or in term of which 
strategies will make learning easiest. Judgments-of-learning (JOL) occur during or soon after 
acquisition and are predictions about future test performance on recently studied items. These 
recently studied items may be items for which there has not been a recall test or for which a 
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recall test occurred (irrespective of the correctness of the answer). Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) 
judgments occur during or after acquisition and are judgments about whether a given 
currently nonrecallable item is known and/or will be remembered on a subsequent retention 
test. When, for example JOLs are examined, respondents estimate the probability on a percent 
scale of recalling a learned item in a later memory test (e.g., Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & 
Narens, 1994; Perlmutter, 1978; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). To determine the degree of 
accuracy these predictions are then related to the actual recall performance in a subsequent 
memory test. Hereby, two conceptualizations of accuracy are typically calculated: 
Calibration, which refers to the correspondence between mean JOLs and mean actual 
performance, and resolution, which is commonly indexed by a within-participant Goodman–
Kruskal gamma correlation (hereafter, gamma correlation) between JOLs and actual memory 
performance (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Nelson, 1984; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). 
In the case of self-referent memory beliefs verbal reports are usually measured by 
administering a memory questionnaire which inquires about different facets of memory 
comprising memory capacity, experienced memory change in a given period of time or 
experienced anxiety in a memory demanding situation and other domains. For example, an 
Item inquiring about experienced memory change might be formulated as follows “I’m less 
efficient at remembering things now than I used to be” (Item 14 from the Metamemory in 
Adulthood Quesionnaire (MIA); Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1988).  The verbal reports in 
form of sum scores from questionnaire data are then related to a test performance stemming 
from, for example, a free or associate recall memory test.  
1.2.2 Age-related changes in memory self-reports 
When inquiring about cognitive performance in general and about memory 
performance in particular, a predominant finding is that older adults report more negative 
beliefs and expectations compared to younger adults (Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990; 
McDonald-Miszczak, Hertzog, & Hultsch, 1995). This can either be due do experienced 
decline in memory performance or it can be due to a bias older adults’ hold about memory 
performance in old age – or both. Cavanaugh, Feldman, and Hertzog (1998), for example, 
argued that beliefs about memory may be seen as part of a common self-theory of aging: 
When asked about personal memory beliefs older adults are more likely to access memory-
failure concepts and to make dispositional evaluations relative to young adults or to one’s 
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own past. That is, in old age, subjective judgments of one’s own memory performance might 
be clouded by a general loss or decline expectancy. Similarly, McDonald-Miszczak, Hertzog, 
and Hultsch (1995) proposed a social-cognition framework, which posits that implicit 
knowledge about a general decline of cognitive functioning in old age might bias judgments 
of the elderly about their own cognitive functioning toward the general expectation of decline. 
Hence, memory beliefs change across the adult lifespan resulting in older people reporting 
more memory complaints compared to younger adults. However, how closely the reported 
decline truly reflects individually experienced decline in memory remains an open issue. 
McDonald-Miszczak and colleagues (1995) argued that the correspondence of memory 
beliefs and memory performance should increase into adulthood because older adults 
experience more memory failures, and hence, are more aware of the memory decline. It is 
important to note that age-related decline represented in memory self-reports is considerably 
smaller than change in memory performance. Given that self-referent memory beliefs show a 
less pronounced decline compared to actually measured memory performance suggests that 
the relation between the subjective and objective domain is not very strong. In fact, Devolder 
and Pressley (1991) compared perceptions about memory functioning in younger adults 
(mean age: 28 years) and older adults (mean age: 69 years). Whereas memory performance 
was better in the younger sample, perceptions about memory varied little as a function of age, 
and subjective memory was unrelated to objective memory performance in both age groups. 
Zelinski, Burnright, and Lane (2001) found that in a sample of 6,446 participants aged from 
70 to 103 years the association between memory self-reports and memory was unrelated to 
age.  
Other than self-referent memory beliefs memory monitoring may be less affected by 
implicit theories and expectations regarding its functioning because it is integrated in the 
feedback loop between the object- and the meta-level. Hence, one would argue that sources of 
bias become smaller as monitoring on a certain task advances leading to increasing accuracy 
(see also Chapter 2.3). Regarding its development the same question as for self-referent 
memory beliefs can be posed: Is the accuracy of memory monitoring subject to change across 
the adult lifespan? Results from two early studies suggest little age differences in the accuracy 
of monitoring as operationalized by JOLs. Lovelace and Marsh (1985) presented groups of 
young and old adults 60 high-frequency paired associates. Participants had to give JOLs of 
subsequent recall on a Likert-type scale. The authors concluded that there were no age 
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differences in memory monitoring accuracy during learning. Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, 
and Hinchley (1982) studied monitoring accuracy by modifying the learning instruction. One 
half of young and old adults were given an intentional learning instruction whereas the other 
half received an imagery instruction. Further, JOLs were grouped into three levels (high, 
medium, and low confidence) and participants evaluated the probability of recall at each level. 
Older and younger adults given intentional learning instructions showed stronger relationships 
of JOLs to recall than did adults in the imagery instruction condition. More important, there 
were no age differences in these relationships which implied that monitoring was not related 
to chronological age. The methodological approach used in these early studies on monitoring 
accuracy has been criticized, though. The items presented in the experiments were not scaled 
in the same metric as the predictions elicited by the participants, and it is not clear what the 
conversion of ordinal Likert-type scale ratings to expected percentage of recall should be (see 
Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). In a more recent study older participants reported different JOLs 
than young participants: Connor, Dunlosky, and Hertzog (1997) compared the metamemory 
accuracy of younger and older adults in a single experimental task. A mixed list of high- and 
low-association pairs was created to enable the evaluation of whether there were age 
differences in the sensitivity of predictions to the level of relatedness. Participants were able 
to differentiate high- and low-association pairs producing lower mean JOLs for the latter. At 
the same time older participants predicted, on average, higher levels of recall than younger 
adults did which led to a substantial overestimation of performance. In fact, the tendency for 
older adults, compared to younger, to overestimate their own performance proved to be a 
rather stable finding not only for monitoring but for metamemory judgments in general 
(Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 1982; Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & 
Nelson, 2000).  
1.3 Relation between memory self-reports and memory 
performance 
Early research on the relation between subjectively assessed and objectively measured 
memory performance was based on the straightforward hypothesis which stated that there 
should be a strong association between memory self-reports and actual memory performance 
(Kail, 1990; Schneider, 1985). Thus, memory self-reports were expected to directly reflect 
actual memory performance – an assumption which resembles strongly the original idea of 
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introspectionism. In order to estimate the accuracy of memory self-reports, a simple approach 
is to compare the metamemory reports with the actual memory performance. In fact, this is a 
frequently used method to examine the relation between subjective and objective memory. 
More technically it has been formulated by Nelson (1996) who stated that:  
…the metacognitive approach is to formulate verbal reports as meta-level statements about what is 
occurring at the object-level, to operationalize what is occurring at the object-level through some kind 
of observable criterion response, and then to asses empirically the degree of relationship between the 
verbal report and the criterion response. (p. 106).  
However, as has been demonstrated in a number of studies, the relation between self-referent 
memory beliefs and actual memory performance is moderate, at best (Arbuckle, Gold, & 
Andres, 1986; Barker, Carter, & Jones, 1994; Hänninen et al., 1994; Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000; Sunderland, Harris, & Baddeley, 1983). As pointed out in Chapter 1.2.2, on average, 
metamemory does not follow the same decline trajectory as memory performance implying 
that both measures are only weakly related. McDonald-Miszczak and colleagues (1995) tested 
this assumption in two samples comprising adults ranging in age between 22 and 86 years and 
concluded that the overall pattern resembled earlier findings where, despite significant 
changes in both memory performance and metamemory, the two sets of variables did not 
show a high degree of correspondence in change at either the mean or the individual level. In 
the majority of studies self-referent memory beliefs correlated between .2 and .3 with actual 
memory performance (Hertzog & Dixon, 2005; Niederehe & Yoder, 1989; Pearman & 
Storandt, 2004). The same holds for monitoring, where the correspondence between memory 
performance predictions and actually measured memory performance is rather low at first 
(Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004; Schneider et al., 2000). In a 
related vein of research, where self-referent memory beliefs are conceptualized as memory 
complaints, similar results have been reported: A consistent finding is that memory 
complaints are only weakly related to actual memory performance, indicating a lack of 
correspondence between memory complaints and actual memory performance (Derouesné, 
Lacomblez, Thibault, & LePoncin, 1999; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Kliegel & Zimprich, 
2005; Zimprich & Kliegel, in press). In fact, memory beliefs can be, from a correlational 
perspective, grouped with other self-related reports. For example, affective states and 
personality variables seem to play a major role in forming memory beliefs. A number of 
studies indicate that depressive and anxious symptomatology or other personality factors such 
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as neuroticism and conscientiousness may be much stronger related to self-referent memory 
beliefs than actual memory performance is (Hänninen et al., 1994; Niederehe & Yoder, 1989; 
Pearman & Storandt, 2004; Zimprich & Kliegel, in press). In a sample comprising 1,007 
participants from the Interdisciplinary Study on Adult Development (ILSE; Martin, 
Grünendahl, & Martin, 2001), Zimprich and Kliegel reported a correlation between memory 
complaints and depressive affect of r = .49. One interpretation of this relation suggests that a 
person's affective state or personality colors the subjective evaluation of their cognitive 
performance, for example, with negative affect resulting in an amplification of subjective 
cognitive complaints (cf. Williams, Little, Scates, & Blockman, 1987). In turn, measures of 
memory performance fit in with other cognitive measures as, for example, processing speed, 
that is, those high in speed tend to recall more items in a memory test than those low in 
processing speed (Zimprich et al., in revision). 
To summarize, the results from studies examining the relation between memory self-
reports and objectively measured memory performance suggest two weakly related domains. 
In fact, the low correspondence between the subjective and the objective domain is not 
proprietary to the memory domain but is found in almost all sorts of self-reports, such as 
knowledge of attitudes (e.g., honesty in reports of self-relevant information), interoception of 
somatic states (e.g., perception of caffeine and alcohol symptoms), perception of self as a 
causal agent (e.g., assessing the own role in a given situation), and others (for more examples 
see Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). By and large, then one might agree with Wicklund and Eckert 
who stated that “people generally are not able to introspect accurately about their attitudes or 
other behavioral potentials” (1992, p.24). 
1.3.1 Explanations for the low relation between memory self-reports and 
objective memory performance 
In an attempt to explain the low correspondence between self-referent memory beliefs 
and actual memory performance and, at the same time, maintain the straightforward 
hypothesis of memory beliefs reflecting memory performance, Herrmann (1982) questioned 
the usefulness of questionnaires measuring subjective memory complaints. As later studies 
have shown, however, the measurement properties of questionnaires designated to measure 
self-referent memory beliefs are more than adequate, at least with respect to content validity, 
internal consistency, and factorial validity (Crook & Larrabee, 1990; Dixon et al., 1988). The 
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moderate correlation between memory beliefs and memory performance does not appear to be 
due to psychometric characteristics of questionnaires measuring self-referent memory beliefs. 
However, criterion validity which determines the degree of how well the questionnaire items 
capture the behavioral criterion, that is, memory performance, is rather low.  
The psychometric properties of monitoring measures are less evident: A measure 
which best describes the degree of correspondence between JOL and recall performance is the 
within participant gamma-correlation (Nelson, 1984). Studies using this conceptualization of 
accuracy indicate that the relation between subjective and objective measure is moderate 
(Koriat, 1997; Koriat et al., 2002; Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Scheck et al., 2004; Schneider et 
al., 2000). However, if JOLs are repeatedly elicited in several study test trials the gamma-
correlation increases steadily with every additional trial to high levels of correspondence. For 
example, Koriat (1997) administered in four study and recall trials 70 word pairs to a group of 
young university students. The gamma correlation after the first trial was .75 but steadily 
increased across the remaining three trials to .97. Another way to increase accuracy of JOLs is 
achieved if JOLs are given with a certain delay after the presentation of the stimulus. In that 
case the gamma-correlation increases markedly: Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) administered 60 
test items to 33 university students. Half of the items received immediate JOLs, that is, right 
after the presentation of the item the subject was asked to rate the probability of recalling that 
specific item later and the other half received delayed JOLs. The gamma-correlation for 
immediately elicited JOLs was on average r = .36 but the gamma-correlation for delayed 
JOLs was on average r = .90. The authors termed this finding as the delayed JOL effect. 
Hence, the criterion validity of memory self-reports appears to be generally low at the first 
measurement occasion – but for monitoring, the measurement design can increase the 
correspondence between subjective and objective measures significantly. 
Regarding validity, also the specificity of the self-referent memory beliefs 
questionnaires was investigated: Hertzog, Park, Morrell, and Martin (2000), for example, 
examined a cross-sectional sample of 121 adults, aged between 35-84 years, by administering 
questionnaires measuring depressive affect, memory complaints, and other variables, a set of 
cognitive tasks, and an interview about problems with remembering to take medications as 
prescribed. The highest correlations (ranging from r = .29 to r = .42) were found between 
subjectively reported failures in taking medications and the actually measured omissions or 
commissions concerning medication intake. The results of the study may be interpreted in 
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terms of behavioral specificity, implying that adult’s self-reports of memory problems are 
valid when they focus directly on specific memory-related behaviors in everyday contexts. 
Thus, one way to increase the associations between self-referent memory beliefs and actual 
memory performance might be the examination of more specific domains of memory beliefs 
and to match these with corresponding memory tasks. Note, however, that the correlations 
increased only slightly and they are still smaller compared to the correlations between self-
referent memory beliefs and other self reports as, for example, depressive affect.  
Monitoring measures show per se a very high degree of behavioral specificity. Given 
that judgments are always elicited regarding a specific item, monitoring benefits already from 
higher correlations due to the specificity of the judgment. Hence, behavioral specificity is not 
an issue in monitoring measures.  
In order to give an additional explanation for the lack of correspondence between 
memory beliefs and memory performance, researchers have begun to ask how subjects form 
self-referent memory beliefs. Commonly, memory beliefs questionnaires neither offer criteria 
for determining what constitutes memory problems or failures nor do they provide standards 
or anchors for scaling subjective memory problems (Hertzog et al., 2000). Respondents then 
might adopt very different criteria for what they consider weak or strong memory 
performance. Some persons might use a social comparison (cf. Festinger, 1954) by 
contrasting their performance with other people's performance, for example, people appearing 
brighter or less bright. Others might use an estimation of their own performance in earlier 
years, that is, a temporal comparison (cf. Albert, 1977). Still others might refer to how they 
performed in a particular, cognitively challenging situation (cf. Smith, Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 
2000). Although preference of temporal comparisons appears to increase with age, all types of 
comparisons are existent in older adults (Brown & Middendorf, 1996; Robinson-Whelen & 
Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997; Suls & Mullen, 1983-1984).  
For monitoring, the formation of JOLs has been discussed in three models, (1) in the 
cue-utilization framework, (2) in the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis, and (3) in the 
dual-factors hypothesis. Koriat (1997) proposed the cue-utilization framework, which 
distinguishes three types of cues for JOLs: Intrinsic, extrinsic and mnemonic. Intrinsic cues 
involve characteristics of the study items pertaining to its perceived difficulty (e.g., degree of 
associative relatedness between the members of a pair). Extrinsic cues relate to the conditions 
under which stimuli are learned and to the encoding operations applied by the learner (e.g., 
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the number of times an item was studied and the amount of time the item was presented). The 
third type of cue comprises internal, mnemonic indicators that signal to the person the extent 
to which an item has been learned and will be recalled in the future (e.g., cue familiarity). 
According to the cue-utilization approach, in making JOLs participants do not monitor 
directly the strength of the memory trace of the item in question, but use a variety of cues that 
are generally predictive of subsequent memory performance. Because JOLs are based on 
inferences and heuristics, accuracy judgments depend on how the learner weights the 
importance of the cues for decision-making. A different perspective was adopted by Scheck 
and Nelson (2005). They hypothesized JOLs are resulting from an anchoring-and-adjustment 
effect. Briefly, anchoring may be described as a pervasive judgment bias in which decision 
makers are systematically influenced by arbitrary starting points (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). 
After having examined earlier studies where participants were required to judge recall 
probabilities for paired associates (Connor et al., 1997; Richards & Nelson, 2004), Scheck 
and Nelson (2005) concluded that a possible anchor is located around JOLs of 30% to 50%. 
Other than the cue-utilization approach, Scheck and Nelson assumed JOLs to be mostly 
unaffected by item difficulty, that is, no matter how easy or difficult items are, people tend to 
locate JOLs between 30% and 50%. In order to test their assumptions, the authors conducted 
an experiment with two learning and recall trials using easy and difficult items. The JOLs 
indeed seemed to be influenced by an anchor. Another, recently presented approach is the 
dual-factors hypothesis, which bears on both the anchoring and the cue-utilization approach 
(Scheck et al., 2004). The hypothesis states that the magnitude of JOLs derives both from an 
anchor point and from the on-line monitoring of items. The magnitude of JOLs is expected to 
change according to item difficulty, but not to the same extent as the corresponding recall 
level. The authors compared the adjustment process with the notion of the regression-toward-
the-mean. In fact, JOLs given immediately after the presentation of paired associates resulted 
in large anchoring effects (Scheck et al., 2004). Conversely, delayed JOLs changed directly 
with item difficulty and were minimally affected by the anchor. Hence, for immediate JOLs 
the results were consistent with the anchoring hypothesis. In turn, delayed JOLs seemed to 
relate more on monitoring processes which means that participants rely more on cues 
pertaining to the ease with which the target can be retrieved than on an anchor.  
In summarizing, the moderate correlations reported in most studies might 
underestimate the “true” relation between memory beliefs and actual memory performance 
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due to individually different comparison processes or criteria in forming memory beliefs. In 
line with this assumption, the longitudinal association between changes in memory beliefs 
and changes in memory performance is much stronger than the cross-sectional association, 
presumably because individual differences in criteria for forming memory beliefs are 
controlled for when people are examined longitudinally (Zimprich & Martin, 2002; Zimprich, 
Martin, & Kliegel, 2003). Hence, in order to enhance the relation between subjective and 
objective measures, one might formulate specific questionnaire items which closely 
correspond to the actual objective measure. For monitoring, one might delay JOLs or use 
repeated presentation of stimuli to enhance accuracy. Further, the use of longitudinal designs 
can help solve the problem of individually varying scaling criteria in memory questionnaires.  
1.4 Open research questions on memory self-reports and memory 
measures 
Based on the straightforward hypothesis that memory reports do reflect memory 
performance, a vast number of studies have been conducted to verify this relation (cf. Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 2000). The most replicated finding over the last years, however, was that 
metamemory and memory performance correspond only marginally (cf. Hertzog & Dixon, 
2005; Nelson, 1996; Zimprich & Kliegel, in press). Up to this point, several factors have been 
identified which might be responsible for the low relation between self-reports and memory, 
such as low criterion validity and low specificity of memory questionnaires. Further, the 
social cognition framework and implicit theories about aging were developed to explain the 
lack of correspondence (Cavanaugh et al., 1998; McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1994). In the 
more specific domain of monitoring, several theories were developed to explain the formation 
of monitoring reports and to account for the lack of correspondence (Koriat, 1997; Scheck et 
al., 2004; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). These explanatory approaches, however, were never 
tested in a lifespan framework. Hence, little is known about age-related change in monitoring.  
Most of the interest and effort to explain or overcome this lack of relation, was on the 
subjective measure, that is, memory questionnaires were criticized to be too general and more 
specific items about memory functioning were advocated (e.g., Hertzog et al., 2000). There 
was some success in reducing the low correlation between self-reports and objective memory 
performance, but the increase in correspondence hardly outweighs the loss in generalizability 
of the results. Hence, the advantage of behaviorally specific over general memory 
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questionnaires appears rather limited. In sum, one might agree with Wicklund and Eckert 
(1992) who stated that people are not able to report correctly about their attitudes or behavior.  
Still, the straightforward hypothesis that memory reports do reflect memory 
performance is a valuable assumption which, in my opinion, has not been falsified entirely 
yet. In what follows, I will address three neglected topics in metamemory research which 
might help clarify the findings of the differential trajectories of memory-self reports and 
memory performance across the adult lifespan and I will offer a new approach by relating 
memory self-reports with memory performance.  
1.4.1 Research question I: Measurement properties of memory self-
reports across age 
The first research question pertains to the measurement properties of self-reports. A 
common well documented finding is that memory self-reports reflect only moderately 
memory performance (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Zimprich & Kliegel, in press). Age-related 
decline in self-reports appears to follow a different trajectory compared to age-related decline 
in memory performance (McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1995). Whereas there is consensus about 
the low relation between memory self-reports and memory, the investigation of age-related 
change in self-reports may be biased due to methodological artifacts. That is, self-referent 
memory beliefs are typically measured by questionnaires which were gauged on a certain age 
group or cohort. In order to examine age-related change in memory, a questionnaire might be 
administered to other age groups as well, for which the questionnaire has not been validated 
yet. Most of the times when different groups are examined researchers are interested in the 
comparison of a specific variable across these groups. Thus, an important precondition when 
comparing results from memory questionnaires across different groups, cross-sectionally or 
longitudinally, is the establishment of measurement invariance (MI) to demonstrate that a 
given test measures the same underlying factors across groups. The use of the expression 
“same factor” indicates that a factor has exactly the same conceptual interpretation across 
groups (cf. Lubke, Dolan, Kelderman, & Mellenbergh, 2003). For example, age differences in 
the structure of the MIA (co-)variances and MIA factor means can only be unambiguously 
examined if the measure of self-reports is unbiased with respect to age. Implicitly, most 
measurements of psychological constructs are conducted using tests assuming that the scores 
are an expression of an underlying latent trait or a common factor. When test scores are to be 
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compared across groups, it has to be ascertained that indicators (e.g., items of a memory 
questionnaire) of an underlying latent construct (e.g., memory capacity) mean the same thing 
to members of different groups. In many studies, however, it is implicitly assumed that the 
measures utilized to assess memory self-reports be invariant, an assumption that, if it goes 
untested, may lead to an over- or underestimation of age-related differences in memory-self 
reports. For example, in their research on adjectives selected to assess the Big Five 
personality factors (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and 
Culture) Zimprich, Allemand, and Huber (2007) identified an item which was not invariant 
across three age groups. More specifically, the adjectives “vulnerable – hardy” appeared to 
measure something different in the oldest group than in the two younger groups. The authors 
argued that a possible explanation might be that the bipolar adjectival marker “vulnerable - 
hardy” was interpreted from a more physically-oriented perspective by the old group, thus 
measuring rather subjective health, while in the young and middle-aged groups it was 
understood as it was intended, that is, as a description of emotional stability or morale. As a 
consequence, this specific item is not invariant with respect to the selection variable and a 
meaningful comparison across age groups can not be conducted. The items for which MI does 
not hold are said to be “biased” or to show “differential item functioning.” 
 Hence, a main issue when comparing data across different age groups (or other 
selection variables as gender, cultural groups, racial groups, etc.) is one of accurate 
operationalisation. The operationalization calibrates manifest indicators to theoretical 
constructs, which are latent in the sense that they are not directly observed. Consequently, a 
measure is only interpretable and comparable across groups when it accurately and invariantly 
operationalizes the construct it purports to measure across the selection variable. The 
definition of MI states that, conditional on the factor scores, observed scores do not depend on 
group membership. This means that members of different groups who have the same score on 
the factor (e.g., the same level of ability) have on average the same observed scores. The 
definition of MI implies that groups may differ only with respect to the means and 
covariances of the factors that are measured by the observed scores (Lubke et al., 2003).  
If the measures used so far in the investigation of memory self-reports prove to be 
measurement invariant with respect to age, the conclusions drawn to date are valid and the 
differential trajectory of self-reports and memory performance receives additional support. In 
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turn, if the measures are not invariant across age the conclusions drawn so far may be 
spurious and need to be revised.   
In order address the issue of MI, I investigated the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982) across six age groups comprising a 
total of 1,303 adults obtained from the Maastricht Aging study (MAAS; Jolles, Houx, van 
Boxtel, & Ponds, 1995). The objective was to establish strict measurement invariance which 
represents the strongest degree of MI across a large sample covering the adult lifespan in three 
factors, Forgetfulness, False Triggering, and Distractibility. The factor Forgetfulness 
comprises memory failures whereas False Triggering pertains to failures in cognitive or motor 
actions and Distractibility reflects mainly absentmindedness in social situations. The study is 
described and discussed in Chapter 2.1. 
1.4.1.1 Measurement invariance in the confirmatory factor analytic 
approach 
Given that MI is an issue of degree, which, borrowing from Meredith’s (1993) 
terminology, ranges from configural invariance over weak and strong invariance to strict 
measurement invariance, it is important to distinguish between these different degrees. Some 
measures might be invariant at the configural level whereas others are strictly measurement 
invariant. Hence, when it comes to interpreting differences/similarities across the selection 
variable it is important to identify the degree of MI in order to draw adequate conclusions. 
In this subsection, the different degrees of MI are discussed. Before I turn to the 
meaning of these degrees, the theoretical basis for MI is shortly revised. That is, MI is 
reviewed in the confirmatory factor analytic approach using continuous variables.  
Mathematically it is possible to estimate the degree to which a measure is invariant 
regarding a certain selection variable. A formal definition of MI can be given as follows: 
Suppose a set of n measurements Y, has been obtained on a random sample of subjects. 
Further suppose that these measurements are a statistical function of another set factor scores 
η. Now consider a variable indicating group (here: age group) membership, denoted by V=s. 
The set of measurements Y is invariant with respect to s if 
 
)(),( ηYηY fsf = , (1.1) 
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where Y are observed scores and η are factor scores. Given a subjects factor scores η, the 
subject’s observed scores Y do not depend on group membership. This definition of MI has 
gained widespread consensus (see Meredith, 1993; Millsap & Everson, 1993). In practice, MI 
can be investigated by fitting multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models to a 
given data set. To represent MI, certain model parameters are restricted to be equal across 
groups. Both, the restricted model and the less restricted model are fitted to the data. The 
models may be compared by means of a likelihood ratio tests which can provide evidence that 
MI is tenable across the selection variable (Lubke et al., 2003). 
Assuming that one has applied the same items (or scales) measuring different memory 
constructs in different groups defined by a selection variable, for example, age, MI may be 
evaluated by examining invariance in factor loadings, latent intercepts, and residual variances 
by means of a confirmatory factor analysis of memory questionnaires across these groups. 
Examining different degrees of MI is, thus, accomplished by employing multiple group 
confirmatory factor models with increasingly severe across-group restrictions on parameters 
(Allemand, Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007; Zimprich et al., 2007). Before turning to the different 
degrees of MI, the confirmatory factor analytic model is shortly revised.  
The factor analytic model with non-zero means of manifest and latent variables is 
specified as follows in the multigroup factor model: 
 
ss
t
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where τ represents a vector of intercepts, Λ  is the factor loading matrix, η is the vector of 
scores on the latent variables, and δ is the vector of residual terms. From this model the 
covariance structure can be derived:   
 
s
t
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ΘΛΨΛ +=Σ , (1.3) 
 
which expresses the variance and covariance matrix in group s with Σ denoting the 
covariance matrix of the items, and Ψ  representing the covariance matrix of the factor scores 
with the variances of the residuals expressed as Θ .  
The mean structure is captured in the following equation: 
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with α denoting the factor means in group s.  
Meredith (1993) has elaborated the relation between MI and the multigroup factor 
model. More specifically, he has shown how the parameters of the multigroup model have to 
be restricted such that the model represents MI. 
The most basic level of measurement invariance is configural invariance or pattern 
invariance, which requires that the same item must be an indicator of the same latent factor in 
each group (Horn & McArdle, 1992). This model implies that similar, but not identical, latent 
variables are present and, hence, the regression intercepts, τ in Equation (1.4), have to be 
invariant in the s groups. Configural invariance suggests that the factors represent the same 
theoretical constructs, but these constructs can not necessarily be compared directly across 
groups because of possible inequalities of measurement (Bauer, 2005). If configural 
invariance is not supported, the evidence argues against even similar factor patterns across 
groups. In practice, the model of configural invariance serves as a baseline model against 
which more restrictive models are tested. 
To achieve weak invariance, the factor loadings, Λ  in Equations (1.3) and (1.4), are 
constrained to be equal across groups, but no other equality constraints are imposed. This 
model implies that the same latent variables are being measured across groups. If this level of 
invariance holds, an unambiguous comparison of the factor (co-)variance matrices is 
warranted. That is, differences in relationships among manifest variables are attributable to 
differences in relationships among latent variables. If weak invariance is not supported, one 
might consider identifying and deleting problematic indicators so that weak invariance is 
supported. Note, however, that altering the nature of a standardized scale might be also 
suscpetible to capitalization on chance characteristics of the observed samples (Byrne, 
Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989).  
The next level is strong invariance which is specified by constraining factor loadings, 
Λ  in Equations (1.3) and (1.4), and intercepts, τ in Equation (1.4), to be equal across groups. 
Equal factor loadings imply that the measurement of the latent variables is the same in all 
groups. Further, the invariance in the intercepts allows evaluation of mean differences in 
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latent variables. Consequently, factor mean differences are scale invariant and interpretable, 
that is, all s groups have the same intervals and zero points (Lubke et al., 2003). 
The model of strict invariance extends the previous model by invoking residual 
variances, Θ in Equation (1.3), to be equal in all s groups. The difference between strong and 
strict invariance concerns the formation of the variance structure inΣ . In the strong 
invariance case, group differences in the Σ -variance could be attributable to two sources, 
namely, to variances of the latent variables (i.e., group differences in the diagonals of Ψ ) or 
to error variances (i.e., group differences in the diagonals of Θ ).  In the model of strict 
invariance, group differences in variances of manifest variables are only attributable to group 
differences in variances of the latent variables, since error variances are invariant across 
groups (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005; Widaman & Reise, 1997).  
Summarizing, MI is a matter of degree and, hence, the investigation of questionnaires 
inquiring about memory beliefs might not imply that factors are un- or ambiguously 
interpretable across a given selection variable. Instead, dependent on the degree of MI 
researchers are given a bandwidth of warranted interpretations of group differences. 
1.4.2 Research question II: Relation between memory self-reports and 
individual differences in memory performance measures – an 
emphasis on learning 
In the first section of this thesis, the methodological appropriateness of assessing 
memory beliefs by means of questionnaires was discussed. The majority of studies concerned 
with the problem of relatedness between self-reports and memory aimed at the subjective 
measure (Herrmann, 1982; Niederehe & Yoder, 1989; Zimprich & Kliegel, in press). For 
example, Hertzog and colleagues (2000) advocated a behavioral specificity approach, which, 
however, reduces generalizability with respect to the measured self-reports.  
Another perspective is to ask if the “objective” memory-measure itself is an adequate 
behavioral counterpart of the typically used self-report questionnaires? Hence, I propose a 
different approach to explain the low association between memory beliefs (the emphasis here 
is mainly on self-referent memory beliefs) and memory performance: If the relation between 
beliefs about memory and their respective behavioral correlates is to be examined, it has to be 
ascertained that both measures are actually covering the same construct. As mentioned earlier, 
the most common way to assess the accuracy of memory self-reports is to compare 
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questionnaire data with the performance in a laboratory memory test which typically 
comprises one learning trial with subsequent free recall (e.g., Arbuckle et al., 1986) or cued 
recall (e.g., Hänninen et al., 1994). As pointed out in Chapter 1.3, the correspondence 
between both measures is only moderate even though there are some ways to increase the 
correlations between questionnaire data and memory performance. But, instead of formulating 
behaviorally specific items (Hertzog et al., 2000) to increase the correspondence between both 
measures, one might try to enhance the generalizability of the objective memory measure. 
Relating a single trial memory tests to questionnaires inquiring about general memory 
performance may be regarded as unbalanced: Only part of the acquisition process is covered 
by the objective measure, that is, only the recall performance after the first trial can be related 
to memory self-reports. But what happens “with the kind of memory that remains after a 
single study trial” (Nelson & Narens, 1994, p. 22)? If a single trial memory task is the 
behavioral correlate of the questionnaire items then, in turn, people ought to respond to the 
items, as if they were merely considering single trial memory experiences; this is, at least, 
arguable. In order to increase the overlap between subjective and objective measures it has to 
be clarified what lay adults mean by “memory” when they are answering memory belief 
questionnaires (Parr & Siegert, 1993). Considering naturalistic situations, a person’s goal is to 
master a certain body of information, for example, a list of foreign language vocabulary or 
new text material (Nelson & Narens, 1994). Note that “master” does not necessarily imply 
that a person wants to reproduce all stimuli but maybe there are some specific items this 
person wants to recall whereas others are negligible. The desired level of mastery might be 
achieved after one presentation or, more probable, after a certain number of presentations and 
rehearsals (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1994). Hence, the whole acquisition process until the desired 
level of mastery is attained, may be apprehended by lay persons as constituting memory 
performance (Tulving, 2001). If people are inquired about their own memory performance, 
they might base their judgment on recall performance and the acquisition process. From this 
mastery-perspective, one crucial factor influencing self-referent memory beliefs is learning, 
apart from recall alone. Here, the amount of learning necessary is a crucial factor leading to 
the desired level of mastery. For example, imagine a participant in a longitudinal study lasting 
over ten years who always remembers the same amount of items in a word list: In the first 
measurement occasion this person needed three trials whereas ten years later five trials were 
required to remember the same amount of items. Hence, total memory performance remained 
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stable across the years, the effort to achieve the goal, however, increased over the same time 
course. Consequently, this person may report change in memory performance because more 
effort had to be expended to achieve the desired level of mastery, at the same time a recall test 
may indicate no change at all. Hence, relating a recall score obtained from a memory test to 
memory self-reports may miss an important part, namely the effort one had to invest in 
learning to achieve the recall level.  
In summarizing, in everyday memory functioning, it seems unusual that people 
acquire information by single trials (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1994), therefore, the cognitive test 
may be adapted to that effect. The new approach here is to gain more information about the 
learning process without renouncing on the classical memory measure. To do so, an extension 
of the typical single-trial recall task to a learning task (e.g., a word list which is to be 
memorized during several trials) may represent a broader source of relations between the 
objective and the subjective measure compared to just one recall event. The main advantage is 
the possibility to model individual learning curves for each participant which can be related to 
self-referent memory beliefs. Hence, the correspondence between self-referent memory 
beliefs and memory performance is not just limited to one recall event, but now it is possible 
to further capture the learning rate and the performance after having administered a given 
number of trials.  
1.4.2.1 Formalizing learning 
In the following two subsections I will address the formalization of learning 
trajectories into learning parameters in order to relate these parameters to other variables of 
interest. The typical performance on a verbal learning task improves with repetition, but with 
every additional presentation the amount of performance improvement decreases. In 
consequence, the trajectory of recall performance follows a curvilinear form which constitutes 
the so-called learning curve (Ritter & Schooler, 2001). In order to relate learning to other 
variables of interest, for example, scores from memory belief questionnaires, it has to be 
made amenable to statistical analysis. In specifying the learning process by mathematical 
functions, a possibly large amount of variables and data points can be reduced to a few 
relevant parameters describing the learning process in a parsimonious way. These few 
parameters can easily be related to other variables of interest. Depending on the type of 
trajectory one wants to describe, different functions can be applied. That is, different 
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trajectories are best described by different functions. Apart from identifying the best fitting 
function, the approach of formalizing learning curves is the same as for any other curve. 
Hence, it is not limited to learning but can be applied to any repeatedly measured variable if 
certain preconditions are met.
1
 Given that the process of learning meets all necessary 
conditions, it can be framed by mathematical functions describing nonlinear trajectories. Two 
basic types can be distinguished on the basis on how parameters enter the equation: Linear 
and nonlinear functions.  
In polynomial functions all parameters enter the equation linearly and the curvature is 
achieved by adding or subtracting polynomials from each other or from constants. However, 
it has been recognized that low order polynomials do not always fit the data well. Higher 
order polynomials follow the data more closely but often fit badly at the extremes of the 
observed range of the axis of abscissae (Royston & Altman, 1994). A further disadvantage is 
that polynomials do not have asymptotes and can not fit when limiting behavior is expected 
(McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). For example, in the following function  
 
2*)( ttitf γ−+=  (1.5) 
 
where t denotes number of trials t = 0,1, 2, …t  in a test, i is the intercept, and γ is a parameter 
which determines the shape of the curvature, all parameters enter the equation linearly. If this 
function is applied to a learning experiment, i typically represents the recall performance after 
the first trial. With every consecutive trial, the polynomials t-γ*t2 adds (or subtracts) a portion 
from the intercept and the curve is shaped in dependence of γ. However, the second term, γ*t2, 
exceeds t at some point with the consequence that the test performance is getting smaller 
again and eventually ends at ∞− . This follows from the global behavior of polynomials 
which are determined by their leading terms, here -t
2
. Hence, with growing t, the function can 
be reduced to -t
2
 which resembles an inverse U-form having both extremes at ∞− . 
Consequently, the usefulness of polynomials in modeling nonlinear trajectories is restricted to 
the number of observed trials the function is based on, and interpolation to a larger number of 
trials will always lead to wrong estimates.  
                                                 
1
 The trajectories must be transponable in functions of the Richards-family (Richards, 1959). 
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Functions, where parameters enter the equation nonlinearly do nut suffer from this 
behavior because boundaries can be set by upper or/and lower asymptotes. Consider, for 
example, the exponential growth curve  
 
( ) ( )( ),expexp)( ttf γαβα −−+=  (1.6) 
 
with the three parameters α, β, and γ. α denotes the upper asymptote, β, denotes the 
performance at the first trial and γ determines the growth rate of the trajectory. At the first 
trial, t = 0 and the function reduces to β, the initial performance. With growing t, the term 
exp(exp(γ)t) approximates zero and at )(lim tf
t ∞→
 the function reduces to α, the upper 
asymptote. Extrapolations to any given number of t are now possible because the function is 
limited by the upper asymptote and the unrealistic situation where values grow to infinity, as 
in polynomial functions, can be controlled and avoided.  
If one considers nonlinear functions from a theoretical perspective, functions with 
asymptotic boundaries are compatible with, for example, verbal learning processes. That is, 
commonly verbal learning increases with every additional presentation of the stimuli but, as 
known for example from “testing the limits” studies (Baltes & Kliegl, 1992), after a certain 
number of trials the performance remains constant and increasing the number of trials will not 
improve performance. This behavior can not be modeled by polynomial functions because 
they grow to infinity. 
1.4.2.2 Relating learning parameters to memory beliefs 
Due to the aforementioned advantages, the focus in this thesis is on nonlinear 
functions. These can be recast in latent curve models which allow modelling both fixed 
effects and individual departures from these average effects (Blozis, 2004; Browne, 1993). 
Formally, an individual-specific approach requires expanding the fixed effects verbal learning 
curves as expressed in Equation (1.6) by random effects. If random effects are denoted by 
latin letters—as opposed to fixed effects, which are typically referred to by greek letters—the 
exponential learning curve of individual i becomes 
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which looks rather formidable. However, under standard assumptions about random effects 
(zero mean, normality), Equation (1.7) represents a model that belongs to a general class of 
estimable latent curve models (cf. Meredith & Tisak, 1990; Richards, 1959). Yet, to the best 
of my knowledge, growth curve-type models including random effects have not been 
employed in examining verbal learning curves. Part of the problem might be that learning 
curves usually are inherently nonlinear, which renders standard, that is, linear or quadratic, 
growth models inappropriate. Although nonlinear growth models have also been elaborated 
(see Cudeck & Harring, 2007; Davidian & Giltinan, 1995; Molenberghs & Verbeke, 2005, 
chap. 20), both the specification and estimation of such models become complex, especially 
so in large samples. As a viable alternative, Browne (1993; Browne & Du Toit, 1991) 
suggested to apply “structured latent curve models” for learning data, which impose specific 
nonlinear constraints on the pattern matrix of otherwise standard latent growth curve models. 
This more manageable and tractable approach was followed in the investigation described in 
Chapter 2.2 in order to model individual differences in verbal learning.  
Note that focusing on individual learning curves instead of drawing mainly from 
grouped data is not an entirely new idea. Heathcote and colleagues (2000), for example, fitted 
nonlinear functions directly to individual data. Such an approach, however, holds the 
shortcoming that it requires a two-step procedure if inferences about population parameters 
shall be drawn: In a first step, individual learning curves are estimated, which, subsequently, 
in the second step, represent the raw data of further analyses, for example, in modelling the 
average learning curve. By contrast, the approach presented here allows for simultaneously 
estimating individual parameters and parameters that characterize the whole sample. This 
does not only have the advantage to result in correct standard errors of parameters estimates. 
Also, in estimating the parameters characterizing one specific individual, it allows for 
borrowing strength, that is, use information, from other individuals whose trajectory of verbal 
learning is similar (see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Molenberghs & Verbeke, 
2005). This is not to say that the description of average changes is invaluable. To the contrary, 
like it is common for mixed effects models, the present approach relies on the assumption that 
individual learning curves follow the same functional form as the average learning curve (cf. 
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Davidian & Giltinan, 1995). At the same time, modelling the average learning curve above all 
provides a means to an end to bring the individual back into learning curves. 
In Chapter 2.2, this approach is demonstrated on the basis of a learning experiment 
with five trials. A number of models of verbal learning in old age which are based on different 
nonlinear functions are tested. The best fitting model is further extended by incorporating age 
and processing speed as explanatory variables.  
1.4.3 Research question III: Alternative approaches to examine self-
reports and memory performance – relating monitoring and 
learning 
An alternative approach, which combines high item or stimulus specificity with verbal 
learning experiments is proposed in this section. Compared to the way self-referent memory 
beliefs are typically measured (i.e., by means of memory questionnaires), judgments of 
learning represent highly specific reports about the probability of recalling a given item in 
future. Every judgment is based on one specific item in a determinate situation, for example, 
the respondent is giving JOLs in a laboratory setting and is informed that recall will occur in 
ten minutes. Hence, studies examining monitoring are benefiting from the advantage in 
accuracy of behavioral specific settings over studies examining self-referent memory beliefs 
by means of questionnaire data (cf. Hertzog et al., 2000). In addition, the memory measure 
can be expanded from a one-trial recall task to a learning experiment. By supplementing the 
procedure with additional learning and recall trials a more naturalistic learning and 
monitoring situation is approached. Comparable to the learning process, monitoring is hardly 
limited to one single monitoring event. That is, monitoring is a process which is integrated in 
the feedback loop between object- and meta-level which, in naturalistic situations, is not 
limited to one single trial (Metcalve & Shimamura, 1994; Nelson, 1996).  
In fact, the approach of administering more than one learning and recall trial is not 
new to the investigation of JOLs. Koriat (1997), for example, administered in four studies 
word pairs to a young group of university students across several study and recall cycles. In 
dependence of the metamemory accuracy conceptualization two rather different results 
emerged. While resolution or relative accuracy increased with every additional presentation of 
the stimuli, calibration or absolute accuracy did not increase steadily. That is, as memory 
performance increased with practice, absolute accuracy of JOLs decreased and became 
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underconfident after the second presentation. Koriat referred to this pattern as the 
underconfidence-with practice (UWP) effect. This effect has been replicated a number of 
times and it appeared to be robust against a number of experimental manipulations (Koriat et 
al., 2002). 
There have been several studies examining the UWP effect and JOLs in young 
populations but, to the best of my knowledge, older adults have never been investigated with 
regard to the UWP effect. There was some effort to examine JOLs in older populations, 
though (e.g., see Connor et al., 1997). In these studies, older adults appeared to be 
overconfident regarding their recall performance The experimental settings for testing JOLs in 
older adults, however, were limited to one presentation and recall cycle only which does not 
allow drawing conclusions about the learning process end even less so about the UWP effect 
in older adults. Hence, little can be said about the developmental aspect of monitoring or 
more specifically about the UWP effect.  
The investigation of monitoring in a learning setting in older adults is important for 
several reasons: Monitoring offers immediate information about the difficulty of a specific 
stimulus and it probably makes significant contributions to the success of learning, that is, 
monitoring informs the meta-level about the degree of mastery which, in turn, evokes more or 
less cognitive effort to attain the desired level. Given that monitoring is best seen as a process, 
it seems more fruitful to examine it in a multitrial context. This, however, has not happened 
with older adults yet, hence, almost no information is available about the evolvement and 
change in accuracy of monitoring in this group. As a further consequence nothing is known 
about the UWP effect in older adults. This effect might connote normal or successful memory 
functioning, that is, being underconfident keeps up the cognitive effort. With older adults 
being generally more prone to overconfidence in memory judgments, the UWP effect might 
be reduced which might also imply that older adults spend less effort on learning because they 
are too confident regarding their recall performance.  
In order to investigate the trajectory of JOLs during a learning experiment and the 
UWP effect in older adults, two experiments were conducted with young and old adults. The 
experiments are reported in Chapter 2.3. 
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2 Empirical evaluation of three research questions 
In this Chapter, three empirical approaches addressing the research questions are 
presented. First, a study on measurement invariance in memory self-reports utilizing the CFQ 
in a large sample is investigated. The aim is to establish strict measurement invariance in 
order to draw meaningful conclusions about age differences in the factor scores. Second, an 
approach to formalizing and relating learning to other variables of interest is presented. The 
main research question is addressed only indirectly by presenting the most appropriate 
technique to investigate data from learning experiments. Hence, the second study might be 
viewed as a demonstration of how learning and related variables of interest can be formalized 
using structured latent curve model. And third, JOLs and more specifically the UWP effect 
are examined and compared across young and old adults in order to gain more information 
about the development of monitoring into old age.  
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2.1 Measurement of cognitive failures2 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Slips and errors attract attention not only in everyday life - sometimes as comical 
mistakes such as putting flour in one’s own coffee, or as more serious lapses such as turning 
the wrong way in a one-way street - but also in psychology (Broadbent et al., 1982; Reason, 
1988; Wallace, 2004). A number of researchers have set out to examine the mechanisms 
underlying such everyday slips and failures, which are believed to originate from the 
cognitive organization of the individual. Norman (1981), for example, subdivided 
cognitively-based slips and failures into three categories of mistakes: errors in the formation 
of intentions, faulty activation of schemas, and false triggering of actions. By contrast, Reason 
(1988, 1990) attributed failures observed at the skill-based level of performance to two kinds 
of control deficits in automatic, noneffortful cognitive processing (cf. Hasher & Zacks, 1979): 
inattention and overattention. Inattention is considered to lead to capture slips, omissions 
following interruptions, reduced intentionality, perceptual confusions, and interference errors. 
In turn, overattention is regarded to result in omissions, repetitions, and reversals. 
Another prominent account of everyday slips and errors is that of cognitive failures as 
proposed by Broadbent et al. (1982). A cognitive failure “… may involve perceptual failures, 
failures of memory, or physical actions which are misdirected. The common element is that 
there is a departure from the normal smooth flow of function, and events do not proceed in 
accordance with intention” (p.1). The assumption underlying cognitive failures is that various 
perceptual, action, and memory failures are influenced by a general and rather enduring 
factor, which might be described as a general proneness or liability to cognitive failures and 
which should be relatively independent of traditional personality and intelligence measures 
(cf. Klumb, 2001). 
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) 
To assess the frequency of everyday cognitive failures, Broadbent et al. (1982) 
developed the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), which comprises 25 items derived 
from three areas of slips and errors: perception slips (e.g., fail to notice something relevant), 
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manuscript.  
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memory slips (e.g., absentmindedness), and slips in motor functioning (e.g., action slips). 
Respondents are offered examples such as “Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?”, “Do 
you read something and find you haven’t been thinking about it and must read it again?”, “Do 
you bump into people?”, and are asked to report the frequency of these incidents in the past 
six months on a five point Likert-type scale.  
A number of studies have shown that cognitive failures, as measured by the CFQ, are 
related to, for example, absentmindedness (Reason & Lucas, 1984), slow performance on 
focused attention tasks (Meiran, Israeli, Levi, & Grafi, 1994), automobile accidents and work 
accidents (Larson & Merritt, 1991; Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003), dissociative experiences 
(Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999), daytime sleepiness and boredom proneness (Wallace 
& Vodanovich, 2003), computing losses due to forgetting to save one’s data in human-
computer interaction (Jones & Martin, 2003), and reduced cognitive inhibition (Bloem & 
Schmuck, 1999).  Regarding its psychometric properties, the CFQ has more than adequate 
test-retest reliability, with stability coefficients being around rtt = .80 across six to 65 weeks, 
indicating a high degree of stability of individual differences (Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Merckelbach, Muris, Nijman, & de Jong, 1996; Vom Hofe, Mainemarre, & Vannier, 1998). 
The same authors provided coefficient alpha measures for the CFQ being around .90 although 
Merckelbach et al. (1996) reported somewhat lower alpha values in three samples, ranging 
from .75 to .81, implying more than adequate internal consistency. In an attempt to delineate a 
nomological network of cognitive failures, Wallace (2004) examined the associations 
between CFQ total scores and comparable constructs (e.g., neuroticism, absentmindedness, 
thought occurrence) as well as opposite constructs (e.g., conscientiousness, everyday 
attention, everyday memory, and action state orientation). In a sample of 386 undergraduate 
students he found that the frequency of self-reported cognitive failures correlated positively 
(rs = .50 to .53) with similar constructs, whereas the associations with opposite constructs 
were negative (rs = -.13 to -.41). The broad acceptance and usefulness of the CFQ are also 
reflected by the fact that the CFQ has been translated into several languages, for example, 
Dutch (Merckelbach et al., 1996), German (Klumb, 1995), Hebrew (Meiran et al., 1994) and 
Spanish (García Martínez & Sánchez-Cánovas, 1994). In summary, the CFQ is a commonly 
used questionnaire which has proved to be a useful instrument to identify individuals prone to 
cognitive failures. 
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Factor Structure of the CFQ 
In most applied studies the sum score across all CFQ items is used as a measure of 
being prone to everyday slips and errors, based on the assumption that the CFQ captures a 
general liability of cognitive failures. In accordance with this assumption, Broadbent et al. 
(1982) conducted a number of factor analyses in different samples and concluded that a 
single, general factor of cognitive failures adequately captured the dimensional structure of 
the CFQ, because apart from the “obvious general factor” (p. 5), results were rather variable. 
Subsequently, however, several investigators re-examined the factor structure of the CFQ and 
their results seem to question the notion of only one single and general factor (Larson, 
Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Pollina, Greene, Tunick, & Puckett, 1992; Wagle, 
Berrios, & Ho, 1999; Wallace, 2004; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002). Details regarding these 
models can be retrieved from Wallace (2004), where in the Appendix a tabular comparison of 
models is given. Thus, by contrast to the original surmise of Broadbent and colleagues, 
according to later findings the CFQ appears to be composed of more than one factor.  
A number of researchers aimed at finding a more adequate dimensional representation 
of the CFQ by means of factor analysis. However, almost all researchers used principal 
components analysis (PCA), which represents a procedure to reduce data and may not be 
considered as the best approach to identify latent factors (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). 
Matthews, Coyle, and Kraig (1990), for example, administered the CFQ to a sample of 475 
college students. They found two components, a general component and an additional 
component relating to memory for names, constituted only by two items, though. Larson et al. 
(1997) examined the structure of the CFQ in a sample of 2,379 American Navy recruits. By 
their own assertion, two components appeared to “incorporate a hodgepodge of different 
types of items” (p. 31) and, thus, were not meaningfully interpretable. In conclusion, the 
authors argued for a general component in terms of Broadbent et al. (1982) and a “memory 
for names”-component. In a recent study with 335 participants (223 undergraduate students 
and 112 US Navy personnel), Wallace and colleagues (2002) reported a solution that emerged 
from a PCA followed by varimax rotation, which yielded four components: Memory, 
Distractibility, Blunders, and Names. In a subsequent confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in a 
sample of 709 university students, these findings were replicated (Wallace, 2004). Pollina et 
al. (1992) examined the structure of the CFQ in a sample of 387 college students. A PCA 
yielded five components: distractibility, misdirected actions, spatial/kinaesthetic memory, 
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interpersonal intelligence, and memory for names. Only three components, however, were 
considered reliable, of which distractibility alone accounted for 27% of the variance.  
To summarize, with respect to the components underlying the CFQ, findings have 
been mixed: The structures of the presented solutions differed across authors both with 
respect to their content and complexity. Single-component to five-component solutions have 
been reported, but only few were replicable in independent samples. In fact, only the solution 
by Wallace et al. (2002) was retested and confirmed by means of CFA (Wallace, 2004). This 
heterogeneity in results may stem in part from the approach used to extract the alleged factors. 
By relying on PCA, the variance for discriminability of differences among possible factors is 
maximized, even more so, when varimax rotation is applied. Factors are forced to be 
independent which may not represent the factor structure best (Preacher & MacCallum, 
2003). Hence, rather than factors representing dimensions of the CFQ, independent 
components were extracted which may have masked interfactor relationships and, as a 
consequence, may also have contributed to the diversity of solutions. Furthermore, 
investigations of the factor structure of the CFQ have been mainly based on young, adult 
populations. Consequently, it is unclear whether any of the previously presented solutions can 
be generalized---both in terms of the general structure and with respect to measurement 
properties--- to other populations. In retrospective, then, one might say that Broadbent et al.’s 
(1982) assertion that every sample yields a new factor structure seems to be the most stable 
finding over the years. 
Cognitive Failures across the Lifespan 
An underrepresented aspect in previous research on cognitive failures is whether the 
frequency of self-reported slips, errors, and lapses changes across the lifespan (but see 
Boomsma, 1998). There are, however, reasons to expect that the self-reported frequency of 
some cognitive failures increases into old age. Lay impressions hold that older adults are 
more forgetful, absentminded, and clumsy than younger adults (Heckhausen, Dixon, & 
Baltes, 1989) all of which are attributes that form part of cognitive failures. More generally, it 
was found that attributes carrying negative connotations, such as being indicative of memory 
failures or cognitive failures, are believed to be more pronounced in older persons, both by 
younger and older adults (Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998). Consistent with these lay 
impressions, if older adults are asked to judge their own cognitive or memory functioning, 
usually a negative relation between age and self-reported cognitive or memory performance 
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emerges (Bolla, Lindgren, Bonaccorsy, & Bleecker, 1991; Derouesné et al., 1999; Hertzog, 
Hultsch, & Dixon, 1998). At the same time, individual differences in subjective assessments 
of one’s own cognitive or memory functioning are only weakly related to individual 
differences in one’s actual cognitive and memory performance as measured by psychological 
tests (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Ponds, van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000; Zimprich et al., 2003), 
implying that subjective judgments of cognitive functioning are, at best, partly based on 
objective performance. An explanatory account for these findings was offered by McDonald-
Miszczak, Hertzog, and Hultsch (1995), who proposed a social-cognition framework which 
posits that implicit knowledge about a general decline of cognitive functioning in old age 
might bias judgments of older persons about their own cognitive functioning towards the 
general expectation of decline. That is, in old age, subjective judgments of one’s own 
cognitive performance might be clouded by a general loss or decline expectancy. Similarly, 
Cavanaugh, Feldman, and Hertzog (1998) pointed out that memory failures may be seen as 
part of a common self-theory of aging: When asked about personal memory beliefs, older 
adults are more likely to access memory-failure concepts and to make dispositional 
evaluations relative to young adults or relative to one’s own past.  
Based on these arguments, one might hypothesize that the self-reported frequency of 
cognitive failures, especially those tapping failures associated with memory problems, is 
increasing into old age. Cognitive failures, although sometimes funny, carry a negative 
connotation and, as such, are believed to increase into old age, both by younger and older 
adults themselves. In addition, older adults are inclined to judge themselves based, in part, on 
a general cognitive loss or decline expectancy. Eventually, older persons appear to focus on 
failure episodes during the last six months instead of counterbalancing cognitive failures and 
success events. Together, these interrelated processes may lead to an increase in reported 
cognitive failures. 
Aims of the Present Study 
The aims of the present study were three-fold. First, we set out to find an adequate 
factorial representation of the CFQ in a large, representative sample covering the whole adult 
lifespan. To do so, we investigated previously reported factor solutions by means of 
confirmatory factor analysis. Additionally, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
followed by oblique rotation. Second, starting from a model based on an exploratory three-
factor solution, we tested for different degrees of measurement invariance of the CFQ across 
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six age groups in order to examine whether the CFQ is unbiased with respect to age. The third 
aim was to, after having established strict measurement invariance of the CFQ across age 
groups, investigate age differences in factor covariances, variances, and means.  
2.1.2 Method 
Participants 
The sample for this study comprised individuals from the Maastricht Aging Study 
(MAAS), a longitudinal study on the biological determinants and cognitive consequences of 
normal aging, stratified by age, sex and occupational achievement. In an early phase of 
MAAS, the sample was obtained through the registration network of family practices (RNH) 
supervised by the Department of General Practice of the University of Limburg. All 
participants were brain healthy; individuals with documented CNS pathology or MMSE 
scores below 24 were excluded (for a detailed description of inclusion criteria and sampling 
methodology refer to Jolles et al., 1995).
3
 The main study of MAAS consisted of four cross-
sectional panels, A1 to A4, sharing the same methodology with respect to sample frame, 
subject inclusion, stratification criteria, and basic measurement protocol. In the first wave of 
the MAAS study the CFQ was part of the assessment in three panels, A2 to A4, summing to 
1,354 participants. In the present study, participants ranging in age from 24 to 83 years (M = 
51.2, SD = 16.2) who had complete data records with respect to the CFQ were included. 51 
participants (3.8% of the total sample) were excluded from further analyses as they did not 
provide complete data records concerning the CFQ, constituting a sample size of N = 1,303 
participants, 49% of them female. Missingness of CFQ data was unrelated to age, gender, and 
educational level. The sample was split into six age groups, which, in the remainder of this 
study, will be referred to as Group 1 (Age: 24 – 33 years, M = 27.9, SD = 2.9) the reference 
group, Group 2 (Age: 34-43 years, M = 38.1, SD = 2.7), Group 3 (Age: 44-53 years, M = 
47.7, SD = 2.6), Group 4 (Age: 54-63 years, M = 57.9, SD = 2.7), Group 5 (Age: 64-73 years, 
M = 67.8, SD = 2.7), and Group 6 (Age: 74-83 years, M = 76.3, SD = 2.1) (for descriptive 
statistics see Table 2.1).  
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 A detailed description regarding the rationale, design and methods of the MAAS can be retrieved at the project 
homepage:  
http://www-np.unimaas.nl/maas/Moreinfo/MAAS_PB_intro.pdf 
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Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics 
 Age Groups 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 N 227   232 237 228 229 150 1303 
Age Mean 27.98 38.05 47.74 57.95 67.82 76.31 51.21 
 SD 2.86 2.66 2.55 2.74 2.68 2.09 16.22 
Gender % female 48.0 51.3 49.4 47.4 48.9 48.0 48.9 
Mean 4.66 4.26 3.81 3.08 2.92 3.16 3.68 Educational Levela 
SD 1.67 1.65 1.86 1.68 1.77 1.98 1.87 
aMeasured on a scale ranging from 1 = primary education to 8 = university education, based on the Dutch 
educational system.  
 
Across the six age groups, there were no differences in the proportion of female participants 
(χ2 = 0.88, df = 5, p > .97). Age groups, however, differed significantly in level of formal 
education (F = 35.83, df = 5, 1297, p < .01), indicating that, on average, younger age groups 
were better educated. According to Cohen’s standards (Cohen, 1988), this effect was of 
medium size and explained 12% of total variance in education. 
 
Measures 
At first measurement occasion in 1994/1995, part of the data collection protocol of 
MAAS was the Dutch version of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et 
al., 1982), a 25 item self-report inventory tapping different aspects of cognitive failures.
4
 For 
each item, participants were asked to assess the frequency of a specific cognitive failure event 
they had experienced over the last six months using a five-point Likert-type scale. The scale-
points of the 25 items are anchored by the descriptors very often (assigned the value 4) 
through never (assigned the value 0). The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) in the 
present sample was α = .89, which is comparable to earlier studies. Note, however, that the 
internal consistency measure implies a unidimensional structure, which might represent an 
inappropriate assumption for the CFQ. This cautionary note is substantiated by the moderate 
                                                 
4
 The English version of CFQ can be found at http://www.atkinson.yorku.ca/~psyctest/cogfail.pdf. 
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mean polychoric interitem correlation of r = .35. Due to the Likert-type scale response format, 
the observed variables were treated as ordered-categorical in all subsequent analyses. Because 
of a very low answer prevalence in the fifth answer category (‘very often’) and its complete 
absence in some of the 25 items in some age groups, this category was collapsed with the 
fourth category in order to make it amenable to the analysis of measurement invariance using 
Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2004), resulting in possible total scores ranging between 0 and 
75.
5
 A detailed description of the confirmatory factor analysis model of ordered-categorical 
variables is given in the Appendix. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
In all subsequent analyses we treated the items of the CFQ as ordered categorical and 
used WLSM to estimate confirmatory as well as exploratory factor solutions. Statistical 
modelling proceeded considering a sequence of nested confirmatory factor models based on 
previous findings. First, the general factor model by Broadbent et al. (1982), the two-factor 
models by Larson et al. (1997) and Mathews et al. (1990), the four-factor model by Wallace 
(2004), and the five-factor model by Pollina et al. (1992) were estimated in the MAAS 
sample. In addition to the confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) followed by oblique rotation was conducted in order to find an adequate and 
interpretable dimensional representation of the CFQ in the MAAS sample. A three-factor 
exploratory solution was, subsequently, re-estimated as a confirmatory model after having 
fixed non-significant factor loadings smaller than .15 to zero. Note that, contrary to earlier 
approaches, we used EFA and not PCA to find dimensions underlying the CFQ. In fact, EFA 
is considered widely as the appropriate approach for identifying dimensional structures 
underlying psychological constructs whereas PCA may be seen as a data reduction procedure 
(see Floyd & Widaman, 1995). 
The model of three correlated factors was subsequently tested for increasing levels of 
measurement invariance across six age groups (Meredith, 1993; Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004; 
Widaman & Reise, 1997). Measurement invariance was investigated as a series of nested 
models of first order factor solutions (Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Meredith, 1993; 
Vandenberg, 2002; Zimprich, Allemand, & Hornung, 2006)..  
                                                 
5
 Analyses including all 5 categories led to essentially the same results with respect to the analyses based on the 
total sample. 
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All analyses were conducted using Mplus, version 3.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2004), 
applying the WLSM estimator.
6
 As criteria for absolute model fit, the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the incremental Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are 
reported. Values of the CFI above .90 are considered to be adequate and values above .95 
indicate close model fit, whereas for the RMSEA values less than .08 indicate adequate model 
fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Moreover, goodness of fit was evaluated using a rescaled χ2-
test, namely, the *2T -statistic proposed by Yuan and Bentler (2000), because data did depart 
from the multivariate normal distribution. In comparing the relative fit of nested models, 
∆ *2T -differences were tested for statistical significance utilizing the procedure described by 
Satorra and Bentler (2001). Note that, due to its dependency on sample size, the ∆ *2T -
difference test provides rather high power for large sample sizes. We therefore complemented 
it by calculating the CFI difference. As Cheung and Rensvold (Cheung & Rensvold) have 
demonstrated, if ∆CFI between two nested confirmatory factor models is smaller or equal to 
.01, the null hypothesis of equal fit of the two models should not be rejected. One has to keep 
in mind, however, that the critical values recommended by Cheung and Rensvold are based 
on a simulation study using maximum likelihood estimation in two groups, whereas we used 
the WLSM estimator in an ordered categorical sample with six groups, hence, this criterion 
may not perfectly fit to our situation. Still, although not explicitly suited for confirmatory 
factor models of ordered-categorical variables, we chose the ∆CFI as the main criterion due to 
its independence of sample size (cf. Marsh, Balla, & Hau, 1996).  
2.1.3 Results 
Dimensionality of the CFQ 
Confirmatory factor analyses of the ordered categorical CFQ items started with the 
one-factor model arrived at by Broadbent et al. (1982). As indexed by the CFI and the 
RMSEA this general factor model evinced an acceptable absolute fit (see Table 2.2). On 
                                                 
6
 Apart from the WLSM estimator, which represents a mean adjusted Weighted Least Square estimator, Mplus 
also offers a mean- and variance- adjusted estimator (WLSMV). The WLSMV estimator does not allow for 
difference testing, however, because the degrees of freedom may vary within a given model specification. 
Furthermore, Asparouhov (2005) has demonstrated that WLSM and WLSMV performed equally well in medium 
to moderately large samples and both clearly outperformed WLS. 
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average, the single factor explained 30% of variance, ranging from 15% (Item 4) to 43% 
(Item 17).  
Subsequently, the two-factor model reported by Larson et al. (1997; cf. Matthews et 
al., 1990) was tested. In terms of absolute model fit, the two factor solution yielded virtually 
identical results as the one-factor model (see Table 2.2), with the RMSEA and the CFI 
indicating acceptable fit. As the two-factor solution was nested in the one-factor solution, 
model fit comparison based on the CFI was warranted. Compared to the one-factor model, the 
two-factor model did not represent a critical improvement in relative model fit due to the 
∆CFI value which was not exceeded (see Table 2.2). The two factors were strongly correlated 
(r = .77) and, on average, the model explained 31% of item variance, ranging from 15% (Item 
4) to 49% (Item 7). Due to the result from the relative fit index, this model was not judged to 
fit data substantially better than Broadbent’s (1982) solution. Given that both models were 
statistically not distinguishable, the more parsimonious unidimensional model was 
maintained. Note that, compared to the analyses reported by authors using PCA, here, factors 
were allowed to correlate. 
Afterwards, the four-factor model suggested by Wallace (2004) was examined. 
Similar to the preceding models, absolute model fit was adequate with respect to the RMSEA 
and the CFI (see Table 2.2). The relative fit index of the Wallace model, which was nested in 
the previous models, did not indicate neither a critical difference to the unidimensional model 
nor to the two-factor model because the ∆CFI did not exceed .01. The four factors were 
strongly correlated (mean interfactor correlation r = .84), indicating almost a collapsing of 
factors, that is, factors that, in the present sample, were not separable. On average, 33% of the 
variance was explained, ranging from 16% (Item 4) to 48% (Item 7). Given that the criterion 
for an increase in model fit was not met, this model was not judged to fit the data better than 
the unidimensional model.  
Next, the five-factor model of the CFQ arrived at by Pollina et al. (1992), which has a 
noncongeneric structure because Item 14 and Item 18 each load on two factors, was tested. 
Noncongenerity is given when at least one item is allowed to load on more than one factor, 
contrary to a congeneric structure where each item is associated with one factor only. Note 
that noncongenerity does not necessarily affect nestedness of models, in fact, this five-factor 
solution was still nested in the previous models. Absolute model fit indicated that the 
hypothesized model captured the observed data adequately (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2: Model Fit Indices for Single Group Models
 
Model 
No. of 
Factors 
*
2T  df CFI RMSEA ∆
*
2T  ∆df ∆CFI 
Broadbent et al. 1 2066.05* 275 .950 .071 - - - 
Larson/ 
Matthews 
2 2003.42* 274 .952 .070 46.14*. 1 .002 
Wallace 4 1816.64* 269 .957 .066 156.12*.  5 .005 
       203.97*
a
 6   .007
 a
 
Pollina et al. 5 1747.54* 263 .959 .066 60.60*. 6 .002 
      257.95*
a
 12   .009
 a
 
EFA Three- 
3 1168.21* 228 .974 .056 528.75*. 35 .015 
Factor Model 
     796.32*
a
 47   .024
 a
 
CFA Three- 
3  1293.35* 257 .971 .056 127.04*. 29 .003 
Factor Model 
     549.31*
a
 18   .021
a
 
 
Note.  
a
Compared to Broadbent et al.; 
*
2T = rescaled Chi-Square statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; ∆ *2T  = difference between two rescaled 
*
2T -statistics, 
calculated according to Satorra and Bentler (2001); ∆df = difference in degrees of freedom; ∆CFI = difference 
in CFI. *p< .01. 
 
Compared to Broadbent et al.’s (1982) unidimensional model, the relative model fit ∆CFI did 
not denote a better fit for the five-factor solution. Furthermore, it did not outperform 
Wallace’s (2004) four-factor model either. Factor inter-correlations were, in general, rather 
strong (mean interfactor correlation was r = .81). The five factor model explained 34% of the 
variance, ranging from 18% (Item 4) to 48% (Item 7). Again, the criterion for an 
 Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 41 
improvement of model fit was not met, therefore the solution of Pollina and colleagues was 
not considered to fit the data better than Broadbent et al.’s or any of the other models.  
To summarize, the fit of models reported previously in the literature met the 
recommended cut-off criteria for the CFI and the RMSEA for adequate model fit. At the same 
time, each model in the sequence improved slightly, but significantly, in absolute model fit 
indices. At first glance, this might imply that a multidimensional solution seems to more 
adequately capture the structure of the CFQ. However, in terms of both absolute fit indices, 
CFI and RMSEA, and the amount of explained variance, differences in fit between models 
were, at best, marginal. Furthermore, taking into account the ∆CFI-criterion, the difference 
across the four tested models never exceeded the cut-off value of .01, indicating no critical 
differences in model fit. Eventually, factor intercorrelations in multiple factor models were, 
partly, inflated, which made it almost impossible to separate them as different dimensions of 
the CFQ. Taking these findings into consideration, none of the conceptually rather different 
solutions clearly outperformed the original model by Broadbent et al. (1982) which was still 
the most parsimonious solution among the tested models.  
In order to arrive at a more consistent dimensional representation of the CFQ in the 
present sample, we conducted an EFA followed by an oblique promax rotation, with the 
number of factors ranging from one to five. With respect to both absolute and relative fit and 
in terms of interpretability of the factors, a model of three intercorrelated factors represented 
the data best (see Table 2.2, EFA three-factor model). The exploratory solution was re-
estimated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to obtain a more parsimonious solution. 
For the confirmatory analyses, only significant factor loadings (p < .05) were maintained in 
the model. Hence all factor loadings yielded by the exploratory analysis smaller than 0.15 in 
absolute value were set to zero, represented by empty cells in Table 2.3. The confirmatory 
three-factor model evinced a good fit, as indexed by the CFI and the RMSEA (see Table 2.2, 
CFA three-factor model). Note that this noncongeneric three-factor solution was nested in the 
solutions reviewed earlier. Compared to the one-factor model proposed by Broadbent et al. 
(1982), the confirmatory three-factor solution led to a substantively meaningful increment in 
relative model fit because the ∆CFI (.021) exceeded the critical value of .01. Factor 1, which 
was defined by high loadings of Items 1, 2, 5, 7, 17, 20, 22, and 23, may be interpreted as 
signifying “Forgetfulness,” that is, a tendency to let go from one's mind something known or 
planned, for example, names, intentions, appointments, and words.  
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Table 2.3: Factor loadings and explained variances of the CFA three-factor model for the 
whole sample 
CFQ Item Forgetfulness Distractibility False Triggering R
2
 
1 0.422  0.359 0.33 
2 0.612 -0.506 0.892 0.48 
5 −0.298 0.383 0.677 0.41 
6 0.234  0.576 0.36 
7 0.360 0.393  0.33 
13 0.265  0.537 0.35 
16 0.276 0.483  0.34 
17 0.518  0.502 0.46 
20 1.112  −0.268 0.49 
21 0.230 0.586  0.37 
22 1.031   0.52 
23 0.389  0.544 0.41 
8  0.575  0.25 
9  0.624  0.28 
10  0.566  0.24 
11  0.679  0.32 
14  0.722  0.34 
15  0.483 0.299 0.27 
18  0.328 0.598 0.44 
19  0.798  0.39 
25  0.635  0.29 
24   0.656 0.30 
12   0.881 0.44 
3   0.829 0.41 
4   0.519 0.21 
Factor Correlations     
Forgetfulness 1.00    
Distractibility 0.74 1.00   
False Triggering 0.62 0.77 1.00  
Note. Only significant factor loadings (p < .05) are reported. Factor loadings smaller than 0.15 were set to zero. 
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Factor 2, which incorporated Items 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 19, 21, and 25, reflected “Distractibility,” 
mainly in social situations or interactions with other people, such as being absentminded or 
easily disturbed in one’s focused attention. Factor 3, which comprised high loadings on Items 
2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 18, 23 and 24, mirrored “False Triggering,” that is, interrupted processing of 
sequences of cognitive and motor actions. In sum, the three factors explained 36% of the total 
variance in the sample. Factor 1 correlated with Factor 2 (r = .74) and Factor 3 (r = .62). The 
correlation between Factor 2 and Factor 3 was slightly higher (r = .77). Due to its improved 
fit, we decided to examine different degrees of measurement invariance for the three-factor 
model.  
 
Measurement Invariance Across Age 
The baseline model, configural invariance, requires that the same item must be an 
indicator of the same latent factor in each group hereby factor loadings can differ across 
groups. This model yielded an acceptable absolute fit (see Table 2.4), implying that configural 
invariance of the CFQ holds across the six age groups. Next, factor loadings were constrained 
to be equal across groups to test for weak invariance. According to the absolute fit indices, the 
model represented the data adequately, with the CFI remaining stable whilst the RMSEA 
improved to some degree. Relative model fit did not show a practically important difference 
to the preceding model because the ∆CFI did not exceed .01. In sum, one might conclude that 
weak invariance of the CFQ holds across the six age groups. In the following model, 
thresholds of the 25 items were constrained to be equal across groups to obtain strong 
invariance. As indexed by the CFI and the RMSEA, the fit of the strong invariance model was 
adequately capturing the data. The relative fit index, ∆CFI, did not indicate a change of 
substantive interest in fit compared to the weak invariance model. On balance, fit indices 
suggested that strong invariance of the CFQ holds across the six age groups. Next, strict 
measurement invariance was obtained by constraining residual variances to be equal across all 
age groups. Again the absolute model fit indicated adequate fit with a stable CFI and slight 
improvement in the RMSEA. The relative fit index did not denote a practical difference to the 
preceding model.  
In summary, we concluded that there were no important differences in the relevant 
parameters between the six age groups across the configural throughout the strictly invariant 
model (see Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4: Model fit Indices for Multiple-Groups Models of the three-factor model
 
Model *2T  df CFI RMSEA ∆ 
*
2T  ∆df ∆ CFI 
Configural Invariance 3332.73* 1587 .957 .071 - - - 
Weak Invariance 3530.03* 1742 .957 .068 249.62* 155 .000 
Strong Invariance 3723.48* 1962 .957 .064 284.06* 220 .000 
Strict Invariance 3817.92* 2087 .958 .062 182.51* 125 .001 
Strict MI, ϕ21, ϕ31, ϕ32 4043.39* 2102 .952 .065 041.51*
a
 15 .006
a
 
Strict MI, ϕ11, ϕ22, ϕ33 3996.13* 2102 .954 .064   49.94*
a
 15 .004
a
 
Strict MI, µ  4252.85* 2102 .947 .069 102.34*
a  
 15 .011
a
 
Strict MI, Φ 4119.75* 2117 .951 .066 . 81.81*a 30 .007a 
Strict MI, Φ, µ  4470.83* 2132 .943 .071 157.77*a 45 .015a 
Note.  
a
compared to the Strict Invariance Model; 
*
2T = rescaled Chi-Square statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; ∆ *2T  = difference between two rescaled 
*
2T -
statistics, calculated according to Satorra and Bentler (2001); ∆df = difference in degrees of freedom; ∆CFI = 
difference in CFI. *p< .01 
 
Considering the general guidelines by Cheung and Rensvold (2002) and the small fluctuation 
in the RMSEA, strict measurement invariance for the first order factors for the CFQ can thus 
be assumed to hold, implying that a comparison of factor (co)-variances and factor means 
across the six age groups is unbiased. 
 
Age Differences in Cognitive Failures 
First, age differences in factor covariances were compared across groups. To do so, 
the covariances between Forgetfulness, Distractibility, and False Triggering were constrained 
to be equal across the six age groups. Doing so did not lead to a substantively important 
decrement in absolute or relative model fit (see Table 2.4; Model Strict MI, ϕ21, ϕ31, ϕ32). 
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Hence, one might conclude that the associations between the three factors Forgetfulness, 
Distractibility, and False Triggering are of the same magnitude in all six age groups.  
Subsequently, to further investigate age invariance in measurement of cognitive 
failures, variances were held constant in each factor. Analyses again started from the strictly 
measurement invariant model. The absolute and relative fit indices did not yield a 
substantially worse model fit compared to the strict measurement invariant model (see Table 
4; Model Strict MI, ϕ11, ϕ22, ϕ33). Consequently, Forgetfulness, Distractibility, and False 
Triggering variances were interpreted as being stable across the present sample.  
The next step was to constrain factor means to be equal across all age groups. We 
started again from the strict measurement invariant model: In this case, however, model fit 
indices deteriorated as a result to the constraints imposed (see Table 2.4; Model Strict MI,µ ). 
Notably, the CFI value dropped below .95, which, at the same time, led to a substantial 
increment in the ∆CFI. In fact, the critical value of .01 was exceeded, indicating that this 
model fitted the data worse compared to the strict invariant model. As a result, the means in 
Forgetfulness, Distractibility, and False Triggering can not be regarded as being equal across 
the six age groups. 
Next, the models with equal covariances and equal variances were combined to a 
single model which evinced an excellent fit and, compared to the strict measurement invariant 
model, did not lead to a substantial decrement in model fit (see Table 2.4; Model Strict MI, 
Φ). According to the ∆CFI criterion, this model was not distinguishable from the strict 
invariance model indicating that variances and covariances remained equal across all age 
groups. Note that equal variances and equal covariances necessarily imply equal correlations 
between factors across age groups. These correlations were r = .74 (Forgetfulness and 
Distractibility), r = .62 (Forgetfulness and False Triggering), and r = .77 (Distractibility and 
False Triggering).  
Finally, all covariances, variances and means were constrained to be equal. As a 
result, model fit indices deteriorated substantially suggesting that factor means need to be 
freely estimated in order to avoid misfit (see Table 2.4; Model Strict MI, Φ, µ ).  
It thus seemed appropriate to further investigate factor means in the six age groups. In 
order to do so, 84% confidence intervals (CI’s) were calculated, based on the model of strict 
measurement invariance and equal covariances and variances across age groups. Non-
overlapping 84% CI’s indicate that factor means are significantly different at the p < .05 level. 
46      Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 
In turn, if the 84% CI in one age group overlaps with the 84% CI of another group, factor 
means are not significantly different at the p < .05 level (cf. Goldstein & Healy, 1995; Tryon, 
2001). Given that equal factor variances can be assumed to hold across the age groups, 
differences in factor means can be readily interpreted as effect sizes in term of Cohen’s (1988) 
standard: 0.2 stands for a small, 0.5 stands for a medium, and 0.8 for a large effect between 
the factor means of a given age group and the reference group, that is, Group 1. For ease of 
interpretation, the factor means in the reference group were set to zero. Figure 2.1, which is 
split in three panels, shows factor means and 84% CIs of the three factors Forgetfulness, 
Distractibility, and False Triggering across age. For example, the factor mean of 
Forgetfulness in Group 3 is 0.394, with its 84% CI ranging from 0.256 to 0.533, whereas the 
84% CI of Group 1 ranges from -0.136 to 0.136. Because the two CI’s do not overlap, Group 
3 differs significantly from Group 1 in Forgetfulness, implying that participants in Group 3 
rate themselves, on average, as more forgetful than participants in the youngest, the reference 
group.  
In terms of statistical significance, the general picture that emerged with respect to 
means in the cognitive failures domain was: (I) Forgetfulness followed a roughly linearly 
increasing trajectory, implying that older persons rated themselves, on average, as more 
forgetful than younger adults. Group 1, the reference group, differed significantly from all 
other groups. In addition, Group 2 (mean: 0.275) showed a significantly lower mean than 
Groups 4 through 6 (means: 0.598, 0.629, 0.840). Eventually, the Forgetfulness mean in 
Group 3 (mean: 0.394) was smaller than in Group 6. Accordingly, effect sizes ranged from 
small (Group 1 versus Group 2: d = 0.275) to large (Group 1 versus Group 6: d = 0.840). (II) 
Distractibility means tended to remain stable in the first four age groups, followed by a 
decrease in the two oldest groups. Groups 1, 2 (mean: 0.086), and 3 (mean: 0.100) differed 
significantly from those of Groups 5 (mean: -0.294) and 6 (-0.310). Effect sizes were small 
(Group 1 vs. Group 5: d = 0.294) to medium (Group 3 vs. Group 6: d = 0.410). (III) False 
Triggering did not show a pronounced age trend and all factor mean differences were 
statistically non-significant. Effect sizes were all in the small range, with the difference 
between Group 1 and Group 3 (d = 0.190) marking the largest effect. 
 
 Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 47 
 
Figure 2.1: Factor means with associated 84 % confidence intervals (CI’s) based on the strict invariant three-
factor model with equal (co-)variances. Group 1 is the reference group with the factor mean 0. CI’s, within a 
panel, not overlapping with the CI of the reference group indicate statistically significant differences at the 5% 
level. The left panel represents Forgetfulness, the middle panel represents Distractibility, and the right panel 
represents False Triggering. Due to equal variances, the factor means can be read directly as effect sizes, 
following Cohen’s (1988) standard: 0.2 stands for a small, 0.5 stands for a medium, and 0.8 for a large effect 
between the factor means of a given age group and the reference group, i.e., Group 1. 
 
2.1.4 Discussion 
The present study pursued three aims. The first aim was to find an adequate 
dimensional representation of the CFQ in the sample of the Maastricht Aging Study (MAAS). 
The second aim was to test this solution for different degrees of measurement invariance to 
eventually, as a third aim, compare age-effects in the factors underlying the questionnaire.  
A special feature of this study was the treatment of the CFQ items as ordered-
categorical, which has not been taken into consideration in previous examinations of the CFQ. 
It has been shown that when analyzing Likert-scaled data as if they were continuous two 
Forgetfulness False Triggering Distractibility 
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types of errors might occur: (1) Categorization errors from cutting continuous data into 
ordered categories and (2) transformation errors resulting from categories of unequal widths 
(O'Brien, 1985). Both types of errors attenuate the estimated relation between the latent 
construct(s) and observed items (DiStefano, 2002), even more so in the multiple-groups case 
(Lubke & Muthén, 2004). Considering the skewed distribution of the answer patterns in the 
items, which lead to the collapsing of the answer category “very often” with “often”, and the 
multiple-groups analyses used in this study, treating ordered categorical variables as if they 
were continuous would have considerably biased the standard errors of parameter estimates in 
the factor analyses and distorted χ2 -tests of measurement invariance (Finney & DiStefano, 
2006). By treating Likert-scale data as ordered-categorical, an important source for parameter 
estimate bias can be minimized. 
To investigate the dimensional representation of the CFQ in the MAAS sample, 
previously presented models were analyzed by means of confirmatory factor analysis 
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Larson et al., 1997; Matthews et al., 1990; Pollina et al., 1992; 
Wallace, 2004). For all tested solutions the fit of the models indicated a good representation 
of the data. However, it was found that previously reported multifactor models were afflicted 
by very strong factor correlations, which made it almost impossible to separate different 
dimensions of the CFQ. Furthermore, from a conceptual perspective one might consider 
previously reported multifactor solutions as unbalanced, because the number of indicators per 
factor/component is highly variable. This disproportion becomes obvious when considering, 
for example, the Larson et al. (1997) and Matthews et al. (1990) solutions, which consist of 
two components, one comprising 23 items and the other two items. In balance, none of the 
solutions previously reported in the literature managed to clearly outperform the other models 
with respect to model fit and distinctness.  
The CFA solution we presented was derived from an EFA followed by oblique factor 
rotation. Note that re-estimating a factor structure by means of CFA from an EFA solution in 
the same sample may appear unwarranted, because, strictly speaking, doing so would usually 
require two samples, one for the calibration of parameters and the other for the cross-
validation. However, as Floyd and Widaman (1995) pointed out, confirmation of an EFA 
solution will most likely fail if sample size is small and/or if the EFA solution fails to account 
for most of the systematic variance in the data. Both conditions were absent in our analyses. 
What’s even more, in our opinion the fact that the same model showed strict measurement 
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invariance across six samples of different age (see below) may serve as providing sufficient 
support against spurious factor structures (see Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993). The three 
resulting factors were interpreted as representing Forgetfulness, Distractibility, and False 
Triggering. In view of the fact that each of these three factors have emerged in previous 
studies (Meiran et al., 1994; Pollina et al., 1992; Wallace et al., 2002), they might be 
tentatively considered as being inherent to the CFQ. The oblique factor rotation and the 
noncongeneric structure of the three-factor solution lead to an attenuation of interfactor 
correlations up to a point where the three dimensions of the CFQ were distinguishable from 
one another. Furthermore, the noncongeneric structure of the model lead to a balanced 
solution regarding the number of items per factor which, at the same time, appears to imply 
that not all individual items of the CFQ are factor-pure in the sense that they measure one 
underlying latent variable only. That is, some items tap more than one factor, which one 
would expect, when considering the intertwinement of the three cognitive failure domains. To 
illustrate, see Item 2 of the CFQ: “Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the 
house to the other?” A respondent might agree to the item because he simply forgot his task 
or because he was distracted with something else and consequently could not remember why 
he went to the other part of the house or, a stimulus may have triggered another intention and 
the respondent subsequently ended up in the cellar instead of the washing room. Accordingly 
the Item can be associated to different domains of cognitive failures. On average, 36% of the 
total variance in the 25 items was explained. Although this might not seem too impressive, 
one has to take into consideration that factor analysis was conducted on the item level, where 
unsystematic influences tend to be more pronounced than in sum scores, where they tend to 
cancel out. Moreover, compared to previous analyses of the CFQ, our accepted model 
explained a relatively strong proportion of variance in the individual items. Still, however, 
this does not rule out the possibility that some systematic influences remained unaccounted 
for, for example, method effects like item wordings (Zimprich, Perren, & Hornung, 2005). 
Although Pollina et al. (1992) presented a noncongeneric solution as well, and Wallace 
(2004) allowed factors to be obliquely rotated, the combination of both, as presented here, has 
not been examined earlier.  
The second aim of the study was to examine the measurement properties of the three-
factor model of the CFQ. Specifically, we aimed at ensuring that the CFQ behaves 
equivalently across different age groups, that is, is free from age-related measurement bias. 
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For this purpose, measurement invariance (MI) across groups was tested in a sequence of four 
different hierarchical levels (cf. Meredith, 1993), which ultimately yielded strict MI to hold 
for the three-factor solution across the six age groups. Conceptually, establishing MI indicates 
that the meaning of Forgetfulness, Distractibility, and False Triggering is similarly 
comprehended by subjects throughout the six age groups. Taking into account the severity of 
restrictions that are consecutively imposed on the model, and the fact that an interpretable 
three factor solution was obtained, the finding of strict MI with respect to the CFQ across six 
age groups appears remarkable. Moreover, the size of the MAAS-sample implies 
considerably large statistical power (cf. MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). 
Furthermore, the good representation of the data justified the implementation of a 
noncongeneric model for the sake of a stable and well fitting and measurement invariant 
solution. This point of view is supported by Meredith and Horn (2001) who argued that, with 
regard to measurement properties, measurement invariance ought to be taking precedence 
over meta-theory (such as that of congeneric simple structure). 
Instead of applying confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of ordered categorical 
variables, as a viable alternative we might have used item response theory (IRT) models. As 
outlined by Reise, Widaman, and Pugh (1993), in principle, it is possible to examine different 
degrees of measurement invariance across groups by specifying according IRT models (see 
also Meade & Lautenschlager, 2004). However, from a practical side of view, there are some 
drawbacks in utilizing IRT models: First, setting up a model for a set of data using IRT seems 
much more advanced and less user-friendly---and, hence, more error-prone--- than CFA 
models. Second, the χ2 measure of model fit results as a function of the difference between 
observed and expected response proportions, whereas the associated degrees of freedom are a 
function of the number of different response patterns minus the number of parameters 
estimated. As a consequence, model fits are not directly comparable between CFA and IRT 
models. Third, in IRT modeling, the only standard measure of fit is a likelihood ratio χ2-
variate, which is highly dependent on the sample size, whereas goodness of fit indices known 
from the SEM tradition have not been widely developed yet. Considering that goodness of fit 
indices represent the main basis to accept or reject a model, their absence in the IRT approach 
limited its applicability for our study. 
The third aim of the study was to investigate age-related differences in covariances, 
variances, and means of the three factors. As strict measurement invariance across age held, 
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group differences in the three factors were meaningfully and unambiguously interpretable as 
reflecting only quantitative shifts in invariant measures. First, the covariance patterns of the 
three cognitive failure factors were compared across the age groups: Constraining covariances 
to be equal did not lead to a substantial decrement in model fit. This implies that there was no 
indication of any practically important age difference in the associations among the three 
factors. The association strength between Forgetfulness, Distractibility and False Triggering 
may tentatively be seen as remaining stable across the lifespan. Next, constraining factor 
variances to be equal across age groups did not lead to a relevant change in model fit. This 
finding implies that the amount of interindividual variability in the three factors was constant 
across the six age groups. Note that, the equality of factor or “true” variances and strict MI, 
that is, equality of “error” variances, in addition implies equal reliabilities of the manifest 
indicators across the six age groups (cf. Bollen, 1989). Due to the cross-sectional nature of the 
data analyzed in the present study, however, strong conclusions about perfect cognitive failure 
variance stability across the lifespan are to be drawn with caution. One ramification of age-
invariant factor covariances and age-invariant factor variances is, however, that correlations 
among the three CFQ factors were also equal across the six age groups. This is a 
comparatively strong finding which implies that the structure of the three factors is scale 
invariant, that is, insensitive to change in scaling of the CFQ factors (Cudeck, 1989; 
Swaminathan & Algina, 1978). Eventually, factor means were constrained to be equal across 
the six age groups, which lead to a relevant decrement in model fit. The most apparent age-
effect was observed for the Forgetfulness Factor, where a roughly linear trajectory of means 
indicated increasing self-reported Forgetfulness for older participants. Notably, the increase of 
Forgetfulness-means between the youngest and the oldest groups was large in terms of effect 
size. This finding is consistent with results from studies examining metamemory across the 
adulthood, where the relation between self-reported memory performance and age is negative 
(Bolla et al., 1991; Derouesné et al., 1999; Hertzog et al., 1998). Also, this result provides 
support for the assumption of implicit theories about aging and cognitive decline (McDonald-
Miszczak et al., 1995) and the self-theory of aging (Cavanaugh et al., 1998), which predict an 
increase in reported memory complaints for older persons. The means of the Distractibility 
factor followed a different pattern: the mean response remained relatively stable across the 
first four age groups, comprising adults from 24 to 61 years. The two oldest groups, however, 
reported significantly less Distractibility than the younger groups. An explanation for the 
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sudden decrease might be that Distractibility is interacting with environmental factors, that is, 
factors not originating within a person as age-related, but as social or age-graded changes. 
Considering the sudden drop in the Distractibility mean, beginning in the early sixties, might 
suggest a linkage to a normative event, such as retirement from the job. Items loading on 
Distractibility like, “Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?” or “Do you find 
you forget appointments” might be answered by a retired person with “Rarely”, simply 
because she has more time “to do things that work had precluded” (Nuttman-Schwartz, 2004, 
p. 235) compared to a person highly involved in work life or, she might answer the questions 
referring to their duties at work, which, after retirement, are not pertinent anymore. Some 
people might feel less distracted after retirement, because daily demands decrease in their 
number and hence the plentitude of tasks to be accomplished during the day diminish after 
retirement (Gall, Evans, & Howard, 1997; Quick & Moen, 1998). The third factor, False 
Triggering, did not show any significant mean-level changes across the six age groups. In 
addition, effect sizes were all marginal to small, which suggests that False Triggering taps a 
domain of cognitive failures that remains relatively stable across the lifespan. This finding is 
surprising because False Triggering may be seen as resulting from loss of activation in 
attentional resources (cf. Norman & Shallice, 1986). Lower levels of attentional resources for 
older persons have been documented in different research fields, for example, visual attention 
(Bedard et al., 2006), and dual task performance (Riby, Perfect, & Stollery, 2004). Norman 
(1981), however, remarked that subjects identify their cognitive failures only when they 
recognize a mismatch between their intentions and actions. Therefore, respondents may not 
regard their triggering errors as failures. Alternatively, the absence of an age effect in those 
items measuring False Triggering might also be due to the fact that they describe cognitive 
failures for which an increase across age is not expected by lay persons. Hence, even with 
implicit theories about aging being present in older persons, it might be that for some, 
possibly less frequent or less salient cognitive failures, age stereotypes are less clear-cut. 
Altogether, these findings highlight the diversity of cognitive failures, and importantly, they 
identify differential developmental trajectories of these three domains across the lifespan.  
In conclusion, this study provides further evidence that the CFQ assesses multiple 
dimensions of cognitive failures, which proved to be strictly invariant over age groups 
comprising the adult lifespan. At the same time, strict MI with respect to age allows for 
extrapolations to other selection variables, because it almost certainly implies weak 
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measurement invariance for all selection variables correlated to age, for example, health status 
(Lubke et al., 2003). Whereas the three-factor model remains to be replicated across different 
samples, more work is needed to validate the three factors by relating them to similar 
constructs, for example, absentmindedness (Reason & Lucas, 1984), self-referent memory 
beliefs and memory complaints (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). If the factor solution presented in 
this paper proves to be stable, a potentially fruitful direction for future research is the 
investigation of age-related change in the three factors, as suggested by the Forgetfulness and 
Distractibility means. Note that an approach with one general factor only, as suggested by 
Broadbent et al. (1982), would have disguised age differences in cognitive failures because 
the underlying dimensions proved to be changing in opposite directions (Forgetfulness & 
Distractibility). As the three factors show, self-perception of cognitive failures is not a unitary 
system, but a composition of different dimensions changing in different rates and following 
different patterns of change over the life course.  
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2.2 Individual differences in verbal learning in old age7 
Not too long ago, the psychological study of how people learn and remember verbal 
material has kept a number of eminent thinkers, scholars, researchers, and students occupied. 
Beginning in the 1950s, a variety of rather formalized statistical models of verbal learning 
emerged that were doing relatively well in capturing empirical data, mostly average learning 
curves (e.g., Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Estes, 1950). Despite their success, the work of these 
scientists by and large now stands there, unread, gathering dust on the shelves of many 
university libraries. The main reason for this might be that most of these models were 
formulated in a Stimulus-Response framework, which went out of style at the end of the 
1960s and was replaced by the concepts and vocabulary of information processing. With this 
replacement, also the term“learning” lost much of the popularity it had in conjunction with 
verbal memory phenomena, while, at the same time, “memory” became the more often used 
notion (Nelson & Narens, 1994). However, because verbal learning necessarily entails 
acquisition, storage, and retrieval, verbal learning and memory research are, in fact, so closely 
connected that any distinction between these two parts of a bipartite field might be considered 
arbitrary. As Tulving and Madigan (1970) pointed out already at the beginning of the 
cognitive era of psychology, verbal learning and memory research might be described as two 
intertwined subcultures that share a common goal, but talk different languages and use 
different methods. Similarly, Craik (1977, p. 385) has argued that research into memory 
mainly utilizes once-presented material and one single recall trial, whereas examining verbal 
learning usually requires multiple presentation of material and several or multitrial recall 
cycles. With a grain of salt, then, one might assert that verbal learning captures the “dynamic” 
aspects of memory, that is, systematic changes in verbal memory performance due to repeated 
practice. 
Taking up such a working distinction between verbal learning and memory, one has to 
diagnose that the bulk of research on verbal memory phenomena today is conducted using 
single recall trials, that is, it represents memory research. This holds also and is especially true 
for the investigation and comparison of memory performance in different age groups. A 
glimpse into the references section of Kausler’s (1994) benchmark monograph on learning 
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 A similar version of this chapter was submitted for publication elsewhere (see Zimprich, Rast, & Martin, in 
press) 
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and memory in older adults shows that the majority of research on age differences in verbal 
learning, that is, multitrial free recall, was performed before 1980. And although we do not 
present any exact numbers here, we suspect that this situation has not changed very much 
since the publication of Kausler’s book. This is to say that the interest in examining verbal 
learning in younger and older adults - as opposed to investigating their verbal memory -, 
appears to have become minimal, apart from, for example, issues in diagnosing dementia 
(Schoenberg et al., 2006). Such an unbalanced situation might not be without reasons (see 
above), but appears unwarranted in light of the fact that many naturalistic learning situations 
do not only comprise one study cycle, but rather involve several trials until a desired level of 
mastery is reached (cf. Nelson & Narens, 1994). This is even more true with respect to older 
adults, where the importance of learning for maintaining cognitive performance has been 
frequently stressed as providing an enormous preventive potential (e.g., Hultsch, Hertzog, 
Dixon, & Small, 1998; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Stern, 2002; Willis & Schaie, 2005) and is 
becoming more and more of an issue in cognitive aging research (e.g., Willis et al., 2006). 
Facing this state of affairs, we felt it timely to revive the interest in verbal learning in 
old age. Such an effort should, of course, not be interpreted as discrediting memory research 
in the elderly, but rather to complement and enrich it by taking a closer look on individual 
differences in learning in old age. However, our approach to verbal learning in old age differs 
from previous ones that have demonstrated that older adults show decrements in verbal 
learning (cf. Kausler, 1994). Instead of focusing on group-based data and, thus, the average 
learning curve, our goal was to reinstate the individual into the learning curve. More 
specifically, we aimed at modelling individual differences in learning in old age. Such an 
individual-centered perspective represents a fundamental shift from and extension of 
“traditional” verbal learning research, because it is less focused on the question of why older 
people learn at all, but rather asks why different older people learn differentially, that is, why 
older people differ in their amount and rate of verbal learning. Note that a similar shift from 
group-based to indiviudal-specific approaches has taken place in developmental aging 
research, where, during the last ten years, a number of studies began to emerge that provided 
new insights into cognitive aging by taking into account individual differences in change 
(e.g., Hofer & Sliwinski, 2006; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Zimprich, 2002; Zimprich & 
Martin, 2002). After having thus clarified the setting and aims of our research, to begin with 
we introduce some formal models of the learning curve. 
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Representing learning in old age by means of nonlinear functions 
Typically, performance on a task improves with repetition. However, with every 
repetition the amount of performance improvement decreases. In consequence of these two 
constituents, performance improvement or learning of a task may be described as a process 
that benefits from investing in further practice, but with diminishing returns. If performance is 
diagrammed as a function of the number of practice repetitions, the so-called learning curve 
emerges that follows a gradually increasing, albeit negatively accelerated trajectory (cf. Ritter 
& Schooler, 2001). The relation between performance improvement and repeated practice as 
described in the learning curve is so ubiquitous that it applies to a broad variety of 
performance increments in human behavior, for example, acquisition of new skills (e.g., 
Ackerman, 1988), gaining knowledge of statistics (e.g., Smith, 1998), and, of course, verbal 
learning (Tulving, 1964). 
As noted above, learning curves describe the change in performance over trials t (t = 
1,…, n). More formally, if learning is monotonically increasing, learning curves can be 
described using the following equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )tgtf ⋅−−= βαα  (2.1) 
 
where α is the upper asymptote of the curve and β is the initial value of performance.8 These 
two parameters act as boundaries, because the lower performance limit is given by β and the 
upper performance limit is given by α. The function g(t) describes the type of curvature 
present in the learning curve across the n trials. As such, g(t) might be called the core of the 
learning curve and is usually a function of a third parameter, a learning rate parameter γ (cf. 
Paul, 1994). A psychological interpretation of the three parameters is straightforward. The 
parameter β represents performance after the first trial, that is, after the first learning cycle is 
finished. Thus, it may be interpreted as initial performance level that closely resembles the 
performance that is measured using typical, one-trial memory tasks (cf. Hultsch et al., 1998). 
The presence of an upper asymptote (α) in Equation (2.1) suggests that learning tasks have 
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 As an aside, we note that counterexamples to a smooth, monotonic, concave-upward function predicted by this 
general model are abundant. If learning, for example, occurs in bursts of insight, there may be “jumps” in the 
according learning curve, a phenomenon typically occurring in problem solving (e.g., Jones, 2003). Also, for 
example, learning curves for copying Morse code often contain plateaus, where little progress is made, only to 
be followed by new increases in learning rate with further practice (e.g., Wisher, Sabol, & Kern, 1995). 
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natural ceilings or limits on performance. These asymptotes may be determined by the 
experimenter’s choice of task material, for example, list length in free recall. Note that the 
asymptote is not necessarily reached within a given range of trials, but rather, as a limiting 
value, should be interpreted as potential maximum performance, that is, a prediction of a 
subject’s performance after an infinite amount of training (cf. Browne, 1993; Browne & Du 
Toit, 1991; Mazur & Hastie, 1978; cf. Meredith & Tisak, 1990; Richards, 1959). Eventually, 
the learning rate γ denotes the rate of approach from initial level to potential maximum 
performance. Larger values of γ correspond to faster rates of learning, that is, higher 
quantums of improvement in performance. 
As candidates for g(t), different authors have suggested different core functions. For 
example, Heathcote, Brown, and Mewhort (2000) have advocated the exponential curve, the 
core function of which is given as gex(t) = exp(−(t − 1)γex), which, after substituting into 
Equation (2.1) leads to 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )exexexexex ttf γβαα 1exp −−−−= . (2.2) 
 
As a viable alternative, Mazur and Hastie (1978) have proposed a hyperbolic function, the 
core function of which is ( ) 1
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As a third function describing learning, a power curve has been forwarded by, for example, 
Logan (1988, 1995) and, in its more general form, Newell and Rosenbloom (1981). The core 
function of the simple power curve is ( ) pottg po
γ−= , while for the general power curve it is 
( ) ( ) gpottg gpo
γδ −+= , where the additional parameter δ takes into account learning prior to the 
beginning of the task. If the core function of the simple power curve is substituted into 
Equation (2.1), we have 
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( ) ( ) pottf popopopo γβαα −−−= . (2.4) 
 
The different core functions mentioned above do not only affect the curvature of learning 
trajectories, but they also have important theoretical implications. For example, as detailed by 
Restle and Greeno (1970), the exponential curve may be interpreted as being based on a 
“replacement model” of learning. It suggests that learning is a process through which 
incorrect response tendencies are replaced by more and more correct response tendencies. As 
an exponential curve, the replacement model implies a constant learning rate relative to the 
amount left to be learned, that is, the replacement process is assumed to occur at a constant 
rate. As such, the exponential learning model fits nicely into the theories of Estes (1950) and 
Bush and Mosteller (1955). By contrast, as Restle and Greeno (1970) pointed out, the 
hyperbolic curve is based on a “accumulation model” of learning. According to the 
accumulation model, learning is a process by which correct response tendencies increase 
steadily with practice and compete with incorrect response tendencies, which remain constant 
across trials. Unlike the exponential model, the amount of accumulation per trial is considered 
a constant proportion of the amount or duration of the study. The accumulation model was 
first introduced by L. L. Thurstone (1919) in his monograph on the learning curve. Finally, 
the power curve is based on the assumption that “. . .some mechanism is slowing down the 
rate of learning” (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981, p.18). Thus, if learning follows a power law, 
learning slows down across trials. This slowing, however, is not proportional to the amount 
left to be learned or the duration of study. ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) and SOAR 
(Newell, 1990), two cognitive architectures, generally predict a power law of learning, albeit 
for different reasons. ACT-R posits that rules and memory traces are strengthened across 
trials according to a power law based on the assumption that the cognitive system is adapted 
to the statistical structure of the environment (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). Several models in 
SOAR have been created that model the power law (e.g., Nerb, Ritter, & Krems, 1999; 
Newell, 1990). These models explain the power law as arising out of mechanisms such as 
hierarchical learning (i.e., learning parts of the environment or internal goal structures) that 
initially comprises low-level actions being very common and, thus, useful. With further 
practice, even more valuable, larger patterns of actions that occur less frequently are learned. 
The task of the present chapter is not, however, to decide which type of learning curve 
is the “true” one for verbal learning in old age. In the end, the issue of which core function 
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describes learning most adequately—be it in the elderly or other age groups—is still 
controversial (e.g., Heathcote et al., 2000; Logan, 1995; Mazur & Hastie, 1978; Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981; Newell, Liu, & Mayer-Kress, 2001).
9
 Rather, we aimed at extending the 
examination of learning curves in old age by a thus far neglected dimension: While 
previously, learning curves have almost exclusively been investigated using averaged data 
(e.g., Logan, 1988), we wanted to bring the individual back into the investigation of learning 
curves. Specifically, we intended to model individual differences in the three parameters 
governing learning curves in old age as described in Equations (2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). In our 
opinion, it seems unwise to leave information regarding individuals unused in examining 
learning curves, a point that has similarly been made with respect to developmental changes 
in the elderly (cf. Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001, 2006; Zimprich, 2002; Zimprich & Martin, 2002). 
Assessing the amount of verbal learning across a number of practice trials necessarily 
requires repeated measurements. In this respect, the examination of systematic performance 
changes due to learning bears similarities to investigating developmental changes over time. 
However, while the study of developmental changes has benefited from novel statistical 
analysis techniques that reach beyond the traditional analysis of variance approach, for 
example, growth curve models that distinguish between “fixed” or average effects and 
“random” or individual effects (cf. Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992, chap. 6; Goldstein, 1995, chap. 
6; McArdle & Anderson, 1990), the same has not happened regarding learning curves. 
Notably, a key feature of these comparatively recent statistical approaches is that by including 
random effects they allow for modelling interindividual differences in intraindividual change 
and the inclusion of explanatory variables that may account for the diversity in longitudinal 
trajectories (e.g., Zimprich, 2002; Zimprich & Martin, 2002). By contrast, the analysis of age 
differences in learning curves is still dominated by statistical approaches relying mainly on 
means, that is, average performance changes, where individual differences in memory 
performance increments are treated as nuisance (cf. Davis et al., 2003). 
In what follows, we try to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the individual-centered 
approach on verbal learning in old age outlined in Chapter 1.4.2.2.  
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 During the 1950s, different models of learning (Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Estes, 1950) oftentimes fit the data 
almost equally well. The reason for this was that empirical predictions derived from the various models were 
rather similar. A similar problem may be observed in distinguishing among the exponential, hyperbolic, and 
power functions using only limited amounts of data. 
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2.2.1 An empirical analysis of verbal learning in old age 
The data used in the sequel come from the Zurich Longitudinal Study on Cognitive 
Aging (ZULU), an ongoing longitudinal study on cognitive and learning abilities of elderly 
persons in Switzerland (Zimprich et al., in revision). At first measurement occasion (T1: 
2005), the sample of the Zurich Longitudinal Study on Cognitive Aging (ZULU) comprised 
364 participants who where between 65 to 80 years of age (Mean age: 73 years, SD = 4.4 
years; 46% women). The majority of the sample was married and resided with others. On 
average, participants reported about 13 years of formal education. For the sample, there were 
no signs of cognitive impairments or pronounced depressive affect. The majority of 
participants judged their health as ”good” and, in addition, no participant reported any severe 
hearing or vision difficulties. Part of the cognitive testing protocol in ZULU were three 
measures of processing speed (Number Comparison, Identical Pictures, Letter Digit 
Substitution), a verbal learning measure that comprised five trials of a word list recall task, 
and three measures of memory (Paired Associates, Story Recall, Picture Memory). 
Number Comparison (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) required 
participants to compare as rapidly as possible whether two numbers presented on the 
computer screen were identical or not. Scored was the number of correct answers, which 
could range between 0 and 60. After two practice items during the instruction phase, the time 
to work on the task was 90 seconds. Identical Pictures (Ekstrom et al., 1976) required 
participants to choose one out of five objects that was identical to a reference object as rapidly 
as possible. Scored was the number of correctly answered items, which could range from 0 to 
60. After two practice items during the instruction phase, the time to work on the task was 90 
seconds. Eventually, Letter Digit Substitution consisted of 75 items. For each item, a table 
that assigned five different letters to the numbers one to five was displayed on the top of the 
computer screen. Below the table, a single letter was presented together with a question mark. 
Participants were supposed to press the number that belonged to the single letter according to 
the presented coding table. For each item, there was a different coding table. Scored was the 
number of correctly answered items, which could range from 0 to 75. After two practice 
items, participants had 90 seconds to work on the task. 
Verbal Learning was assessed by five consecutive trials of a word list recall task. The 
task comprised 27 meaningful, but unrelated words that were taken from the German Version 
of Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Helmstädter, Lendt, & Lux, 2001). The 27 words 
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appeared on a computer screen at a rate of two seconds each and participants were required to 
read them aloud. After the presentation of all 27 words, participants were asked to recall as 
many words as possible in any order. This procedure was repeated five times, with the order 
of words being different for each trial. At each trial, the number of correctly recalled words 
was scored, ranging between 0 and 27. 
Paired Associates comprised 12 semantically unrelated word pairs taken from the 
German version of the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R: Härting et al., 2000) and 
from the Munich Verbal Memory Test (MVGT: Ilmberger, 1988). After two examples during 
instruction, word pairs were presented for four seconds each and participants had to read them 
aloud. Following a pause of one second, the next word pair was displayed. After presentation 
of all 12 word pairs, only the first word of a pair appeared on the screen as a cue and the 
second one was replaced by a question mark (e.g. salad - ?), using a different order than 
during encoding. Scored was the number of correctly recalled target words, which could 
range from 0 to 12. Story Recall consisted of story A of the Logical Memory subtest of the 
German version of the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Härting et al., 2000). The 66-word 
story was read by the experimenter during 60 seconds. Participants were asked to listen 
closely and, when the story was finished, to immediately recall as many details as possible. 
Scored was the number of correctly recalled propositions, which could range from 0 to 25. 
Finally, Picture Memory encompassed 12 pictures taken from the Nuremberg Age Inventory 
(Nürnberger-Alters-Inventar: Oswald & Fleischmann, 1999). For each item, a picture of a 
simple object for 2.75 seconds and participants were required to name the shown object aloud 
(e.g., “apple”). Followed by a pause of one second, the next picture was displayed. 
Immediately after presentation of all 12 pictures, participants were asked to verbally recall as 
many of the seen objects as possible. Scored was the number of correctly recalled objects, 
which could range between 0 and 12. 
All analyses reported below were conducted using Mx (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 
2003). Nonlinear learning models were specified as structured growth models (Browne, 1993; 
Browne & Du Toit, 1991). The absolute goodness-of-fit of models was evaluated using the 
χ2-test and two additional criteria, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Values of the CFI above .95 are considered to be 
adequate, whereas for the RMSEA values less than .06 indicate an acceptable model fit (cf. 
Hu & Bentler, 1999). In comparing the relative fit of nested models, we used the χ2-difference 
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test where appropriate. Due to its dependency on sample size and due to the fact that we also 
wanted to compare non-nested models, we mainly relied on calculating 90% RMSEA 
confidence intervals for the models estimated (MacCallum et al., 1996). Because the RMSEA 
is virtually independent of sample size, the comparison of RMSEA confidence intervals, that 
is, whether they do or do not overlap, provides an effective, alternative method of assessing 
relative model fit of nested and non-nested models. Throughout, we refer to a significance 
level of p < .05 if a parameter estimate is denoted as statistically significant. 
2.2.2 Emprirical findigs 
Descriptive statistics of the 11 manifest cognitive variables and age together with their 
intercorrelations are shown in Table 2.5. For the means of the verbal learning indicators, a 
typical learning curve emerged, that is, a gradually increasing, but negatively accelerated 
trajectory. Raw data were checked for departures from both univariate and multivariate 
normality. Skewness and kurtosis estimates of the 11 manifest cognitive variables did not 
exceed 1 or −1 (average skewness 0.08; average kurtosis 0.25), whereas the distribution of 
age, for which the sample had been stratified, was platykurtic. The normalized estimate of 
Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis was 0.65. Thus, with the limitation that the 
distribution of age was inconsistent with univariate normality, the multivariate distributional 
properties of the 11 manifest cognitive variables and age warranted the use of maximum 
likelihood parameter estimation. 
Models of Verbal Learning in Old Age 
In a first model (VL1), changes in verbal learning performance were fitted by a 
growth curve comprising level, linear slope, and quadratic slope. As can be seen from Table 
2.5, Model VL1 evinced a satisfactory fit as indexed by the CFI, although not so as judged by 
the statistically significant χ2-value and the RMSEA. On average, 82% of variance were 
explained in the verbal learning indicators. For the latent level variable, a mean of 5.34 was 
estimated, while for linear slope and quadratic slope they were 4.43 and −.45, respectively. 
Variances were estimated as 3.93 (level), 4.46 (linear slope), and 0.06 (quadratic slope). 
These variances were all statistically significant, implying that there were reliable individual 
differences in initial performance level, linear change across trials, and negative acceleration 
of performance changes across trials.  
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics and sample correlations 
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Level and linear slope were significantly related (r = .29), as were level and quadratic slope (r 
= −.30), and linear and quadratic slope (r = −.91).
10
 Thus, those starting out at a higher level 
had a somewhat higher linear performance increase and a more pronounced negative 
acceleration in performance changes. Also, those with a high linear performance increase 
showed a much stronger flatting out of performance improvements. In sum, the quadratic 
growth model appeared to capture important aspects of verbal learning, but did not fit 
acceptably.  
In a second model (VL2), exponential learning curves as described by Equation (2.2) 
in the introductory section were imposed. Model VL2 had an acceptable fit (see Table 2.5), 
with the χ2-value indicating no statistically significant differences between the moments 
predicted by Model VL3 and actual moments of the data. Albeit a χ2-difference comparison 
of Model VL2 with Model VL1 is impossible due to both models having the same degrees of 
freedom, the CFI as well as the RMSEA clearly favored Model VL2. Note, however, that the 
RMSEA confidence intervals overlapped somewhat, indicating that difference in fit was not 
statistically significant. The amount of explained variance in the verbal learning indicators 
was 84%, on average. The latent variable representing initial performance level (βex) had a 
mean of 5.29, while the latent variable reflecting potential maximum or asymptotic 
performance (αex) was 19.23, on average. Mean rate of learning (γex) was estimated as 0.358. 
The statistically significant variances (with standard errors in parentheses) were 4.11 (0.69) 
for initial performance, 29.35 (7.60) for potential maximum or asymptotic performance, and 
0.029 (0.012) for rate of learning. The correlation between initial performance level and 
potential maximum performance reached statistical significance (r = 0.43), implying that 
those starting out at a higher level of memory performance also tended to show a higher 
asymptotic memory performance after five learning trials. By contrast, the associations 
between initial performance level and rate of learning (r = −.22), and between rate of learning 
and potential maximum performance (r = .15) were statistically not significant. Taken 
together, the exponential learning curve model seemed to adequately describe the verbal 
learning data. 
 
                                                 
10
 Note that the strong correlation between linear and quadratic slope represents a statistical necessity and could 
be reduced by using, for example, orthogonal polynomial contrasts. Biesanz et al. (2004), however, have 
cautioned against doing so, because interpretation of parameters then may become meaningless. 
 Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 65 
 
Table 2.5: Sequence of Estimated Models and Fit Statistics 
 
Model
a
 χ2 df p CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
VL1 (Quadratic Learning) 30.90 6 < .05 .984 .107 .071–.145 
VL2 (Exponential Learning) 8.37 6 > .20 .999 .033 .000–.081 
VL3 (Hyperbolic Learning) 3.28 6 > .77 1.000 .000 .000–.046 
AVL1 (VL3 & Age) 5.64 8 > .69 1.000 .000 .000–.048 
AVL2 (VL3 & equal Age) 9.23 10 > .51 1.000 .000 .000–.054 
SVL1 (AVL1 & Speed) 21.73 22 > .47 1.000 .000 .000–.043 
SVL2 (SVL1 & equal Speed) 28.88 27 > .36 .999 .014 .000–.044 
SVLM1 (SVL1 & Memory) 56.26 47 > .17 .996 .023 .000–.043 
SVLM2 (SVLM1 - direct eff.) 62.05 49 > .10 .994 .027 .000–.046 
Note. N = 364. df = degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation, CI = Confidence Interval. 
a
 See text for a more detailed description of the estimated models. 
 
As an alternative to exponential verbal learning, we also fitted a hyperbolic model (VL3) of 
verbal learning as described by Equation (3) in the introductory section. The fit of Model VL3 
was excellent (see Table 2.5). Again, a χ2-difference comparison with the previous model 
(VL2) was impossible, but both the CFI and RMSEA showed a better fit of Model VL3. At 
the same time, the overlapping RMSEA confidence intervals indicated that the difference in 
model fit was not statistically significant. However, RMSEA confidence intervals in 
comparison with Model VL1 did not overlap, denoting that Model VL3 fitted significantly 
better than Model VL1. On average, 84% of variance were explained in the five manifest 
indicators of verbal learning. For the latent variable capturing initial performance level (βhy), a 
mean of 5.28 emerged. The latent variable representing potential maximum performance (αhy) 
had a mean of 26.58. Note that this estimate was much closer to the actual list length (27), 
that is, the maximum number of words that could be recalled, than in the exponential model 
(19.23). The mean rate of learning (γhy) was 0.251. Variances (with standard errors in 
parentheses) of the learning parameters were 4.23 (0.87) for initial level, 84.83 (28.78) for 
potential maximum performance, and 0.026 (0.012) for the rate of learning. Hence, with 
respect to all three parameters there were reliable interindividual differences. The 
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nonsignificant correlations of initial performance with potential maximum performance and 
with rate of learning were r = .25 and r = .10, respectively. The statistically significant 
correlation between potential maximum performance and rate of learning was r = −.65, 
indicating that those with a higher asymptotic performance had a slower rate of learning, that 
is, they needed more trials to achieve their potential maximum performance. In sum, the 
hyperbolic model of learning captured the data very well. 
Eventually, a power model of learning as given by Equation (2.4) was estimated. 
However, we were unable to arrive at a solution that led to a stable estimate of potential 
maximum performance (αpo), which was estimated as being 133. As a consequence of these 
estimation difficulties, a number of parameters became statistically nonsignificant. More 
specifically, upon inspection, the power curve fitted excellently within the range of the five 
trials providing data, but afterwards hardly changed its slope, which led to the although 
formally correct, but unstable estimate of αpo and its variance. Probably, with some more 
trials, we would have been able to estimate αpo consistently. Based on these difficulties in 
estimation, however, we decided to skip the power model of learning from further analyses. 
To summarize, it appeared that a hyperbolic model represented the ZULU verbal 
learning data best, because it showed the best point estimates of model fit. In addition, the fit 
of the hyperbolic model was significantly better than that of the quadratic model. Hence, we 
decided to accept and retain the hyperbolic model for the analyses to follow. Note, however, 
that due to the very similar form of the trajectories in the first five trials, we can not safely 
conclude that the hyperbolic model outperforms the exponential model. Thus, using the 
ZULU data, it was impossible to distinguish between the replacement and accumulation 
models of verbal learning, because neither one of them does clearly outperform the other in 
terms of model fit. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the predicted trajectories as based on Model VL3. Shown are seven 
randomly selected model-based trajectories (thin lines) and the mean trajectory (thick line), 
dots denote observed values, circles denote observed means. As can be seen, Model VL3 does 
very well in describing, of course, the mean learning curve, but also in capturing individual 
learning curves. 
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Figure 2.2: Shown are seven randomly selected model-based trajectories. The thick black line denotes the 
mean profile. Predicted values are based on the hyperbolic model (VL3), dots represent observed 
values. 
 
Covariates of Learning in Old Age 
As a first extension of the hyperbolic learning model, age was included as a predictor 
of individual differences in the three learning parameters initial level (βhy), potential 
maximum performance (αhy), and rate of learning (γhy). This extended model (AVL1) 
achieved an excellent model fit (see Table 2.5), which was virtually identical to that of Model 
VL3, implying that age effects on the manifest indicator variables of verbal learning were 
mediated completely by the three learning parameters. The standardized effect of age on βhy 
was −0.13 and statistically significant, accounting for approximately 2% of variance in initial 
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level—a small effect in terms of the standards recommended by Cohen (1988). By contrast, 
the standardized regression of αhy on age was 0.07, a value so small that it did not reach 
statistical significance. Accordingly, age explained approximately 0.5% of variance in 
potential maximum performance. The significant standardized age effect in γhy was estimated 
as −0.23, which amounted to 5% of explained variance (or an effect of medium size) in rate of 
learning. Thus, it appeared that age accounted mainly for individual differences in rate of 
learning, followed by the effect on initial performance level. Effects were in the medium to 
small range, however, indicating that individual differences among participants of the same 
age by far outweighed the age-related differences. 
In an attempt to more rigorously test for differences in the regression of the three 
learning parameters on age, in the next model (ALV2) the standardized regression coefficients 
were constrained to be equal. As shown in Table 2.5, imposing these constraints did hardly 
reduce model fit. Albeit the point estimates in Model AVL1 indicated different age-related 
effects, these differences were not reliable. The constrained standardized regression parameter 
was −0.08 and statistically significant. Based on the ZULU data one may not safely conclude 
that age had a differential effect on initial level, potential maximum performance, and rate of 
learning. An explanation for this lack of statistical power is that differences in age-related 
effects were small, which, after taking into account the sample size of 364, made it virtually 
impossible to differentiate Model AVL2 from AVL1—in fact, as calculated using the 
procedure suggested by McCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996), power was 0.02 only. 
Next, for Model SVL1, processing speed was included as an additional predictor of 
the three learning parameters into the AVL1 model. Processing Speed was measured by three 
manifest variables, namely Number Comparison, Identical Pictures, and Letter Digit 
Substitution. Standardized factor loadings on the common speed factor were .69 (Number 
Comparison), .70 (Identical Pictures), and .91 (Letter Digit Substitution), indicating large 
amounts of shared variance of the three indicator variables of speed of information 
processing. The standardized regression of processing speed on age was −.42, with the latter 
accounting for 17% of variance in the former. As displayed in Table 2.5, Model SVL1 fitted 
the data excellently. Processing speed showed statistically significant effects on initial 
performance level (βhy), followed by learning rate (γhy), with standardized regression 
coefficients of .34 and .25, respectively. That is, those who processed information more 
rapidly remembered more words at the beginning of the verbal learning test and showed a 
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more pronounced learning rate compared to individuals with low processing speed. By 
contrast, the effect of processing speed on potential maximum performance (αhy) was not 
significant (.13). At the same time, the effects of age on the three learning parameters were 
attenuated to statistical non-significance. Specifically, processing speed mediated 87% of the 
age-related effects in initial performance, 42% in potential maximum performance, and 43% 
in rate of learning. The correlation between potential maximum and learning rate increased 
slightly to r = −.66 and remained statistically significant. The amount of variance processing 
speed and age accounted for ranged, in terms of effect size, from small to medium, with 11% 
in βhy, 2% in αhy, and 10% in γhy. Together, processing speed and age thus exerted medium 
effects on initial performance level and learning rate, whereas potential maximum 
performance seemed largely unaffected. 
As with the effects of age (see Model AVL2), one may wonder whether the effects of 
processing speed on βhy, αhy, and γhy were significantly different. Hence, after removing the 
non-significant direct effects of age on initial level, potential maximum, and learning rate, we 
constrained the standardized effects of processing speed on the three learning parameters to be 
equal in Model SVL2. Table 2.5 shows that doing so did not lead to a substantial decrement 
in model fit. The constrained regression parameter was .31 and statistically significant. 
Processing speed explained approximately 9% of variance in initial performance level, 
potential maximum performance, and rate of learning. As a consequence, one should not 
consider the effects of processing speed on βhy, αhy, and γhy as being statistically different in 
the population. However, taking into account the small differences in model fit and the ZULU 
sample size, it was practically impossible to differentiate Model SVL2 from SVL1: Statistical 
power was only 0.05. 
The next step was to include memory as an outcome variable of verbal learning 
(SVLM1). Memory was assessed by three manifest variables: Paired Associates, Story Recall, 
and Picture Memory. The standardized factor loadings on the memory factor were .54 (Paired 
Associates), .42 (Story Recall), and .54 (Picture Memory), showing that memory indicators 
shared substantial amounts of variance, albeit less than the processing speed indicators did. 
Model SVLM1 evinced an excellent model fit (see Table 2.5). The strongest effect on 
memory was exerted by the learning rate, with a standardized regression coefficient of .84, 
followed closely by potential maximum performance (.83) and initial performance level (.21). 
Hence, those with a higher rate of learning showed better memory performance, which was 
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also true for those with a higher potential maximum of verbal learning and, albeit to a much 
lesser extent, for those high in initial performance level. Note that memory was assessed by 
three one-trial tests, from which one might have expected that initial verbal learning 
performance (β), which, in terms of its definition, is most similar to memory, should emerge 
as the strongest predictor. However, initial performance level turned out to be the least 
predictive learning parameter. The standardized effect of age on memory (−.11) did not reach 
statistical significance, neither did the effect of processing speed (.13). Note that Model 
SVLM1 can be regarded as a mediational model, in which verbal learning mediated the 
effects of processing speed on memory. More specifically, the three learning parameters 
mediated approximately 70% of the effect of processing speed on memory. Together, age, 
processing speed, and the three learning parameters βhy, αhy, and γhy accounted for sizable 
85% of variance in memory. 
Next, for Model SVLM2, the non-significant direct effects of age and processing 
speed on memory were removed. Table 2.5 shows that Model SVLM2 achieved an excellent 
fit, which, compared to Model SVLM1, was not statistically significant (∆χ2= 5.79, df = 2, p 
> .05). At the same time, the effects of processing speed on βhy, αhy, and γhy changed 
somewhat in proceeding from Model SVLM1 to SVLM2: While the explained variance in the 
three learning parameters remained virtually unchanged in initial level and potential 
maximum performance, it increased to 28% in the learning rate. That is, the three learning 
parameters acting as mediating variables affected also the association strength between 
processing speed and learning—a result that might appear counterintuitive, but represents as 
statistical necessity (cf. Pedhazur, 1982). The correlation between potential maximum and 
initial performance reached statistical significance (r = .29), whereas the correlation between 
potential maximum performance and learning rate was not significant any longer and 
decreased to r = −.43. In Model SVLM2, the standardized effect β on memory was unaltered, 
while the standardized effect of α decreased somewhat (.63) and that of the learning rate 
increased slightly (.85). The amount of explained variance in memory increased to 92%. 
We selected Model SVLM2 as representing the interrelations among age, processing 
speed, memory, and the three parameters of verbal learning adequately, while being as 
parsimonious as possible. Model SVLM2 is depicted in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: N = 364. All parameters are standardized. NC = Number Comparison, IP = Identical Pictures, 
LD = Letter Digit Substitution, L1–L5 = Verbal Learning Indicators, PA = Paired Associates, SR = 
Story Recall, PM = Picture Memory. 
 
2.2.3 Conclusions 
For the present investigation, we set out to bring the individual back into the verbal 
learning curve, an issue that has been neglected from our point of view. Focusing on the 
average learning curve only and, thus, relegating individual differences in verbal learning to a 
nuisance parameter appears to be antithetical to a science of development. Before we turn to 
the substantive implications of this individual-focused approach, a short discussion of 
methods for capturing individual learning curves seems in order. 
The fact that the average learning curve can be different and can even have a different 
functional form than the majority of individual curves represents a well-known result (e.g., 
Sidman, 1952). The situation becomes more complicated yet if one acknowledges that 
learning performance can be averaged across persons, across blocks of trials, or both, and that 
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each way of summarizing data gives rise to specific difficulties (Brown & Heathcote, 2003; 
Cousineau, Hélie, & Lefebvre, 2003).Hence, a curve that describes grouped data must not 
necessarily be representative of any individual person. One way to bring back the individual 
into learning curves is, thus, to focus on individual data, that is, model learning directly for 
single persons. Heathcote and colleagues (2000), for example, did so in investigating whether 
the exponential or the power function is more appropriate in describing learning data from a 
variety of studies. This approach, however, holds the shortcoming that standard errors of 
parameters may be biased. Also, in estimating individual parameters it does not use 
information provided by other individuals, whose trajectory is similar. A natural way to strike 
a balance between grouped data and individual data is to borrow strength from both sides. For 
this reason, we chose a structured growth curve approach. In this sense, our perspective on 
learning curves resembles nonlinear mixed effects models as described in Davidian and 
Giltinan (1995) or Molenberghs and Verbeke (2005, chap. 20), although for actually fitting 
curves to data we used structured latent curve models as developed by Browne (1993; Browne 
& Du Toit, 1991), which allows for fitting nonlinear growth curves belonging to the Richards 
(1959) family as structural equation models. From the perspective of developmental research 
in old age, extending the investigation of learning curves in old age to models incorporating 
individual effects is only natural. Developmental aging research has become aware of 
individuals again some years ago, based on the pioneering work of methodologists who, in the 
late 80s and early 90s, provided developmentalists with the tools needed to model individual 
differences (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; McArdle & Anderson, 1990). This 
has resulted in new insights into the process of aging and, at the same time, raised new 
questions about development that require theoretical elaboration. 
After having clarified these methodological points, we turn to the substantive issues 
regarding verbal learning in old age. What have we learned about verbal learning in old age 
by bringing back the individual into the learning curve? Among the four functions applied, 
the hyperbolic learning curve seemed to describe the evolvement of performance across the 
five trials best. Each of the three parameters of the hyperbolic curve can be interpreted in a 
different way: While βyh denotes the initial level in learning performance, αhy is a more 
theoretical value since it is formulated as the upper asymptote or limiting value. Hence, it can 
only be approached, but never achieved within a given range of trials. Finally, γhy defines the 
curvature of the learning trajectory, that is, a high learning rate leads to a steep increase in 
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learning performance across the first trials, whereas a low rate leads to a flatter trajectory and 
a more evenly distributed increase in learning (Browne, 1993; Browne & Du Toit, 1991; 
Meredith & Tisak, 1990). The hyperbolic function would, strictly speaking, also mean that the 
amount of accumulation per trial is a constant proportion relative to the trials completed 
(Mazur & Hastie, 1978). In the ZULU sample, however, fit of the hyperbolic and the 
exponential function was statistically indistinguishable, which leaves the question of whether 
learning follows an accumulative or a replacement process an open issue. 
Note that the excellent model fit implied that both the average learning curve and the 
individual ones were captured by the hyperbolic equation—albeit with varying parameter 
values. That is, in the verbal learning data we analyzed, the average curve and individual 
curves were of the same functional form. Fitting the hyperbolic model, thus, allowed 
confirming that verbal learning showed reliable interindividual differences in old age. In order 
to compare the magnitude of individual differences in the parameters βhy, αhy, and γhy, we 
calculated the coefficient of variation (CV) of each parameter. These amounted to CV(βhy) = 
0.39, CV(αhy) = 0.35, and CV(γhy) = 0.64, implying that individual differences were, 
relatively seen, most pronounced in rate of learning. Hence, older people tended to show more 
pronounced individual differences from each other in the rate of acquisition than in the initial 
level or total potential maximum performance. The random effects potential maximum 
performance (αhy), and rate of learning (γhy) were negatively correlated, implying that those 
with a higher upper limit of learning performance needed more trials to bridge the 
performance gap between initial performance level and maximum performance. We 
acknowledge, though, that this latter finding might also be indicative of a ceiling effect, 
although our list comprised 27 words, which, together with the fact that the mean number of 
recalled words was 16 at Trial 5 (see Table 2.5), renders strong ceiling effects unlikely. Still, 
more detailed analyses are required in this regard, for example, by excluding participants with 
a performance close to the maximum number of words. 
Next, we examined the relations between aging and the three verbal learning 
parameters. The finding that aging negatively affected verbal learning performance as a whole 
is not new (see Kausler, 1994), but due to the latent growth curve approach, we were able do 
refine Kausler’s observations in several respects. According to the point estimates of effects, 
aging mainly affects the verbal learning rate, followed by the effect on initial performance, 
while potential maximum performance was practically unrelated to age. Thus, with increasing 
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age, more learning experiences were needed to attain the same level of mastery. These 
findings would imply that age differences in verbal learning are due to a flattening of the 
learning curve as one grows older, which also has the effect that the (predicted) learning 
curves of some individuals look almost linear (see Figure 2.2). One has to take into account, 
however, that the ZULU sample consists of elderly persons only and that age-related effects 
were in the small-to-medium range. It remains an open issue, at present, whether larger age-
related effects in verbal learning parameters would have been found using a broader age 
range. We certainly would expect this to happen for initial performance level, because this 
parameter closely mirrors the typical one-trial memory assessments shown to follow a decline 
trajectory in old age (Craik, 1977; Davis et al., 2003; Hultsch et al., 1998; Kausler, 1994). 
But, at current, we do not know how much variance age might account for in α and γ in a 
lifespan sample. A more age-heterogeneous sample—and, thus, potentially stronger age-
related effects—might also help overcoming the lack of statistical power we faced in our 
analyses when age effects were constrained to be equal (cf. MacCallum, Browne, & 
Sugawara, 1996). Thus, we think that it is important to follow this research path further, 
because it might confirm what corresponds to a common lay impression of aging: Older 
persons take longer to learn, but can, given enough effort and time, reach the same level of 
mastery as younger adults do. Having said this, the small age-related effects in verbal learning 
necessarily mean that, in the ZULU data, individual differences among persons of the same 
age by far outweighed age-related differences in β, α and γ. As an alternative research 
avenue—and more in line with the focus of the present chapter—, we would thus like to 
encourage researchers to focus on individual differences orthogonal to cross-sectional age (cf. 
Zimprich et al., 2007). In line with this, another fruitful approach would be to analyze the 
development of the three parameters longitudinally (Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001, 2006). 
Subsequently, processing speed was included as an additional predictor of verbal 
learning. Based on the assumption that speed of information processing is more basic than 
other cognitive abilities and, hence, represents a resource for higher order cognitive functions 
(Salthouse, 1991), it appeared instructive to examine which of the three learning parameters 
was most strongly affected by speed. It turned out that processing speed had positive, 
medium-sized effects on initial performance level and learning rate, while the effect on 
potential maximum performance was small. Thus, those elderly persons higher in mental 
speed started out at a higher level and, more importantly, showed a steeper increase in their 
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verbal learning trajectories. These findings underline the importance of being able to process 
information rapidly for remembering new material after one trial—a finding that is well-
established in the literature on memory aging (e.g., Hultsch et al., 1998). In addition, 
processing speed appeared even more important for the number of trials needed to attain one’s 
potential maximum learning performance, that is, rate of learning. Although a more stringent 
test on the equality of processing speed effects on learning parameters showed that they were 
statistically indistinguishable, this might also be the consequence of our medium-sized 
sample. Hence, we believe that in a larger sample these effects may prove to be distinct. After 
including speed, the age effects on learning were no longer statistically significant, implying 
that the age effects in verbal learning were mediated by speed, which is in line with 
Salthouse’s (1996) processing speed theory. However, one has to keep in mind that, as Hofer 
and Sliwinski (2001) have argued, tests of mediational hypotheses in models of cognitive 
aging might be problematic if they rely on cross-sectional (between-person variance) methods 
instead of longitudinal (within-person variance) methods, because the provide only a weak 
basis for drawing conclusions about correlated within-person age changes (see also Cole & 
Maxwell, 2003). 
An important result we gained from the learning parameters was the finding that 
learning rate, followed by potential maximum performance, had the strongest effect on 
memory. In terms of its definition, one would have expected β to be the strongest predictor of 
memory because both are defined as the recall performance after one learning trial. Instead, 
initial learning displayed the smallest effect. This finding is even more intriguing if one 
considers the task proximity of the indicators for memory, especially Picture Memory or 
Paired Associates, which are procedurally and conceptually very similar to the verbal learning 
task (cf. Kausler, 1994). Unexpectedly, then, our results suggest that learning rate and 
potential maximum performance can be regarded as memory-inherent and highly predictive 
for memory performance. Regarding learning rate, a possible explanation might be that it is 
highly relevant for initial performance level as well, because learning, of course, already takes 
place before the first recall trial. Other parameterizations of the learning curve, which do not 
include a parameter for initial level, describe this situation of learning (with individually 
differing rates) right from the start more adequately than the ones we applied (see Mazur & 
Hastie, 1978). With respect to potential maximum performance, one might argue that verbal 
learning and testing-the-limits (see, e.g., Lindenberger & Baltes, 1995) share some 
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commonalities: Across trials, participants get closer to their specific performance limits, 
which increases individual differences. At the same time, these increasing individual 
differences can be mapped more exactly, because the full range of the measurement scale of 
27 words is better utilized from trial to trial. Together with the assumption that closer to the 
limit, chance or unsystematic influences on performance become smaller, the reliability of 
measuring interindividual differences should increase, which should lead to stronger 
correlations with other variables, for example, memory. We also demonstrated that verbal 
learning mediated the direct effect of processing speed on memory to a considerable extent 
(70%). This finding might, at first glance, appear surprising, but in light of the fact that verbal 
learning almost completely accounted for the variance in memory, this strong mediational 
effect represents nearly a necessity. 
Future Perspectives  
We think we have demonstrated the usefulness of an individual-centered analysis of 
verbal learning in the preceding sections. The analysis of short-term repeated measures data 
by means of the hyperbolic equation including random effects we presented, offers 
researchers new possibilities to examine seemingly well established relations between 
cognitive constructs as, for example, verbal learning, speed, and memory (cf. Cudeck & 
Harring, 2007). We would argue that individual differences in verbal learning parameters as 
provided by the hyperbolic function are psychologically meaningful in that they capture 
between-person variability in within-person performance changes occurring at different stages 
of learning. Moreover, all three learning parameters exhibited substantial individual 
differences, implying that individual learning trajectories should not be collapsed across 
individuals because this would discount both theoretically and practically relevant 
information. Of course, our understanding of learning in old age would also benefit from 
transferring the analyses presented herein to other types of material and other types of 
learning, for example, skill acquisition (Ackerman, 1988; Cerella, Onyper, & Hoyer, 2006; 
Wisher et al., 1995). 
The individual differences in verbal learning, however, require more elaborated 
conceptual models to explain and predict individual learning trajectories. We acknowledge 
that it is important to ask how and why people learn in old age (cf. Estes, 1950; Bush & 
Mosteller, 1955; Kausler, 1994), but would suggest complementing this question by asking of 
how and why people learn differentially in old age. Although we would expect that theoretical 
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approaches aiming to answer each question show a large overlap, they would still focus on 
different aspects. An advantage of a differential perspective on learning is that a number of 
explanatory variables, be it from the cognitive or from other domains, can easily be included 
as individual-differences variables. This also allows for a shift from ANOVA-type models to 
regression-type models. For example, one might expect that older persons high in typical 
intellectual engagement show superior learning compared to older adults being intellectually 
less active (Dellenbach & Zimprich, in press). Also, the investigation of learning bears the 
potential to bridge the gap between objective cognitive performance and subjective 
judgements of one’s cognitive performance since learning may constitute a more naturalistic 
measure of memory (Rast et al., submitted; Zimprich et al., 2003). 
The investigation of individual differences in learning is attractive also from a 
conceptual perspective of development: One might speculate that learning represents 
“microdevelopment,” that is, development within a short time frame, as opposed to 
“macrodevelopment,” which typically covers development over longer time spans. 
Lindenberger and Baltes (1995) conjectured that the mechanisms underlying learning might 
be the same or very similar to those underlying cognitive development, thus turning the study 
of learning into a showcase of examining cognitive development. Although development and 
learning are often treated as a dichotomy, they are both characterized by a persistent change 
of behavior over time, albeit time scales are different (cf. Newell et al., 2001). In accordance 
with such a link between learning and development, Zimprich, Hofer, and Aartsen (2004) 
have demonstrated that, in old age, learning at first measurement occasion is positively 
associated with the amount of longitudinal change in cognitive functioning. Integrating the 
examination of learning and development, thus, would bring together two research avenues 
that, once their different time horizons are taken into account, may turn out to be very similar. 
In the same context, the analysis of learning curves as presented in the present chapter 
may be useful in describing retest effects in longitudinal studies (cf. Hofer & Sliwinski, 
2006). To date, retest effects have oftentimes been taken into account in the form of 
comparatively unrealistic models, for example, by assuming that learning due to retest is 
linear or constant (e.g., Lövdén, Ghisletta, & Lindenberger, 2004). However, in order to 
disentangle two superimposed change processes in old age—one developmental process 
resulting in decline and one learning process leading to performance improvements—, one 
would either need specialized designs with, for example, independent samples, which 
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constitutes what has been done hitherto regarding retest effects. Alternatively, strong, testable 
hypotheses about the nature and form of the two processes at hand, development and learning, 
could be examined. To us, the latter approach now seems much more traceable: On the basis 
of the methods and analyses presented herein, it appears possible if not timely to revisit retest 
effects in longitudinal studies with a much stronger emphasis on learning than previously. 
Learning is not something to get rid off in longitudinal studies, but rather contains vital 
information about the cognitive aging process that awaits being utilized. 
In closing, if one considers the verbal learning and memory duality a pendulum, we 
would encourage researchers to give this pendulum a new momentum such that it swings back 
into the direction of verbal learning. In the end, remembering new material is a dynamic 
process that, oftentimes, involves more than just one static learning cycle (cf. Nelson & 
Narens, 1994). In a broader sense, the present study illustrated the capabilities of nonlinear 
growth curve models as an analytical framework for linking both theoretical and 
methodological considerations in examining verbal learning and memory. 
 
 Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 79 
2.3 Age differences in the underconfidence-with-practice effect11  
2.3.1 Introduction 
A pertinent issue of research on metamemory is the degree to which individuals can 
accurately predict their memory performance. An accurate appraisal of one’s own 
memorizing abilities seems desirable because, in subject to such an appraisal, more or less 
effort could be allocated to attain a certain level of mastery (Koriat et al., 2002; Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). That is, based on their metacognitive judgments, individuals might be able 
to use self-monitoring to more efficiently control and regulate their strategies for learning and 
retrieving information from memory (Schneider & Pressley, 1989). The importance of 
monitoring may gain even more weight when cognitive resources and memory performance is 
declining, as it is the case with older adults, because this requires an optimized allocation of 
memory resources. An accurate appraisal of one’s own memory functioning may essentially 
facilitate the appropriate allocation of cognitive resources in order to achieve a desired level 
of mastery and to avoid unnecessary overlearning. Findings regarding the changes in memory 
and metacognitive monitoring across the lifespan evidence that even though memory 
performance is impaired by aging, monitoring appears to be spared from cognitive decline 
(Connor et al., 1997; Hertzog et al., 2002; Shaw & Craik, 1989).  
With respect to assessing one’s own memorizing ability, two different kinds of 
predictions have frequently been elicited: Global predictions, in which people judge how 
many items of an entire study list they will subsequently recall, and item-by-item predictions, 
which requires people to predict the likelihood of subsequent recall separately for each item 
(Nelson et al., 1994; Perlmutter, 1978). These latter, so-called judgments of learning (JOLs), 
are typically elicited by presenting a set of paired associates, for example, Swahili cue words, 
and English translation equivalents as target words (e.g. Adha – Trouble). After the 
presentation of each word pair, participants are asked to give a JOL by judging the probability 
that they will remember the target word a few minutes later when prompted with the cue 
word.  
Metamemory accuracy is typically conceptualized in two ways: One way to define 
accuracy refers to relative accuracy or resolution (Koriat et al., 2002; Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991), which is commonly indexed by an average within-participant gamma correlation 
                                                 
11
 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Daniel Zimprich in preparing the manuscript. 
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between JOLs and actual memory performance (Nelson, 1984). By contrast to resolution, 
absolute accuracy or calibration pertains to the correspondence between mean JOLs and 
mean recall performance in a memory test (see Metcalfe, 1998). In both experiments 
described in the present paper, we will focus on absolute accuracy measures because we 
aimed at examining the underconfidence-with practice effect which will be described in some 
detail later and which is reported for this type of measure only (Koriat, 1997).  
Findings from studies using relative and absolute accuracy indicate that the ability to 
predict one’s own memory performance is moderate (Koriat, 1997; Koriat et al., 2002; 
Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Scheck et al., 2004; Schneider et al., 2000). These findings can be 
generalized across different age groups. A characteristic regarding older adults memory 
predictions, however, seems to be the finding that they “overpredict” their own memory 
performance (Bruce et al., 1982; Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Schneider et al., 2000). Although 
some researchers have found that older adults' predictions are accurate (e.g., McDonald-
Miszczak et al., 1994; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989), the predominant finding is that older adults 
overestimate their memory performance compared to younger adults (Bruce et al., 1982; 
Coyne, 1985; Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, & 
Schmitt, 1981; Perlmutter, 1978; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). Lovelace (1990) hypothesized 
that, in relation to younger adults, older persons are more prone to prediction errors, generally 
in the direction of overestimating memory performance because older adults may actually be 
expecting or demanding more of the memory system than younger adults are.  
It is, however, possible to raise the relative and absolute accuracy of JOLs in young 
and old substantially by eliciting JOLs with a certain delay after the presentation of the paired 
associates. The first to report this effect were Nelson and Dunlosky (1991), who asked 
participants to memorize paired associates. After a given delay (between 10 and 33 items), 
respondents were prompted with the cue word and were asked to give a JOL. Both, the 
absolute and relative accuracy of these delayed JOLs were found to be superior as opposed to 
that of immediate JOLs. Possibly, when JOLs are delayed, participants rely more heavily on 
cues pertaining to the ease with which the target can be retrieved from memory and, hence, 
the accuracy of predicting the recall probability is enhanced, that is, a delayed JOL 
instantiates a first recall attempt which offers the respondent a first impression of the 
subjective item difficulty (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994; Koriat, Ma'ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 
2006). This delayed-JOLs effect was consistently found in a number of studies and to 
 Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 81 
practically the same extent in younger and older adults (Connor et al., 1997; Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1992; Koriat, Ma'ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006; Scheck et al., 2004).  
 
Underconfidence-With-Practice effect 
Another way to increase the familiarity with the stimulus material is to present the 
items in more than one learning and recall trial. Giving participants more than one learning 
occasion leads to an increase in the relative accuracy of judgments, that is, the resolution 
typically increases over the trial course (Koriat et al., 2002). This finding, however, contrasts 
with the observation that calibration seems to be impaired with practice. Koriat (1997) 
reported a discrepancy between JOLs and recall performance which arose with repeated 
presentation of the stimuli: In two studies participants memorized a list of paired associates in 
several learn test cycles and, following the study of each pair, provided JOLs. A comparison 
of the effects of practice on JOLs and actual memory performance, in terms of absolute 
accuracy, disclosed a pattern the author referred to as the underconfidence-with-practice 
(UWP) effect: While the recall performance increased from the first to the second learning 
occasion, the effects of practice did not lead to more accurate predictions. Instead of 
improving calibration, that is, the difference between JOL and actual recall, average JOLs for 
the second occasion became markedly lower (underconfident) than recall performance. 
Briefly, UWP thus refers to a loss in accuracy in calibration across practice trials. This is also 
true for delayed JOLs, in which a smaller, but still relevant UWP effect was reported. In a 
subsequent review of several studies requiring participants to give JOLs, the UWP effect 
proved to be robust against a number of experimental manipulations (see, e.g., Koriat et al., 
2002). The UWP effect has also been replicated by other authors who investigated JOLs 
under different conditions (e.g., Meeter & Nelson, 2003; e.g., Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). 
Investigations of the UWP effect in older adults, however, have not been conducted up to 
date.  
Three theoretical perspectives have been discussed and presented in Chapter 1.3.1, 
which geared to explain the UWP effect: The cue-utilization framework, the anchoring-and-
adjustment effect, and the dual-factors hypothesis. In sum, the three explanatory accounts for 
the UWP effect appear to be complementary rather than disjunctive, as they describe similar 
processes from different perspectives. While the anchoring process and the dual-factor 
hypothesis are mainly geared to explain how JOLs are generated without prior task-related 
82      Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 
knowledge or cues about actual recall level, the cue-utilization approach explains the 
formation of JOLs including feedback from prior learning occasions. 
  
The present study 
Viewed from an aging perspective, the reported empirical data does not allow drawing 
strong conclusions about the UWP effect in older adults or about the impact of a 
psychological anchor on the formation of JOLs because the available data is mainly restricted 
to studies examining young adults. Hence, the presence of an UWP effect in absolute 
accuracy judgments remains to be tested in older adults, whereby, at the same time, we aimed 
at gauging the UWP effect. There is, however, evidence that the UWP effect observed in 
young persons is not necessarily replicable in older adults. Connor et al. (1997) pointed out 
that older persons tend to overestimate their memory performance to a greater extent than 
younger adults, which may also results from lower recall performance in older persons. 
Lower recall performance and larger overestimation might influence the UWP effect as well. 
Note that the UWP effect can only result from JOLs which are markedly lower than the actual 
recall performance, that is, in order to instantiate the effect, participants are required to 
underestimate the benefit from additional learning occasions. Older adults, however, recall 
fewer words and learn less during repeated presentation compared to young adults (Kausler, 
1994)  
Thus, the overarching goal of the present study was to examine the UWP effect in 
older persons and provide further empirical data to accuracy judgments in older and younger 
adults. More specifically, we (I) compared absolute accuracy judgments elicited by younger 
and older adults for easy and difficult stimulus material, and (II) compared the effects of 
immediate versus delayed JOLs in both age groups. Finally, we (III) addressed the UWP 
effect in older adults across two and five study test cycles.  
2.3.2 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate differences in the accuracy of immediate 
and delayed JOLs between young and older adults using easy and difficult word pairs across 
two trials.  
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2.3.2.1 Method 
Participants, Design, and Items. Thirty-six young adults (M = 25.7 years, SD = 3.9) 
and thirty-six older adults (M = 65.8 years, SD = 4.3) from the city of Zurich participated in 
this study. The experiment was a 2 (JOL timing: Immediate vs. delayed) × 2 (trial: Trial 1 vs. 
trial 2) × 2 (difficulty: Difficult vs. easy items) × 2 (age group: Young vs. old participants) × 2 
(measure: JOL vs. recall performance) design with age group as a between-subjects factor and 
JOL Timing, Trial, Difficulty, and Measure as within subjects factors. The difficulty of items 
was determined by combining a German cue word with another German target word (easy: 
Kitchen - Car) or a Turkish word with its German translation equivalent (difficult: Mesnet - 
Agency). Note that first the Turkish words were selected to control for word length and 
syllables and then the German equivalent was matched.  
Apparatus and Procedure. The experiment was programmed and executed in Inquisit 
(Version 1.33) on a Dell personal computer running Microsoft Windows XP Pro system 
software. Stimuli were presented on a 17” LCD display set at 1024 x 768 pixels. 
Participants saw, in the center of the screen, 18 German word pairs and 12 Turkish-
German word pairs for 3.5 s each. To rule out position effects, in each presentation cycle 
items were randomized anew for each participant, within six blocks containing five items 
(three easy and two difficult items). Half of the easy items and half of the difficult items were 
randomly allocated to the immediate or to the delayed JOL condition but the process of 
randomization was manipulated such that words from the first third remained in that third for 
the second presentation. The same manipulation was applied on words which were presented 
in the last third. This allocation remained the same across trials. The procedure for the second 
trial was the same as it was in trial one and word pairs remained in the same JOL-timing 
condition (immediate vs. delayed). Immediate JOLs were given after the presentation of the 
cue word by asking participants to answer the following question: “With what probability will 
you remember the target word in about five minutes from now if you see the cue word? (0 = 
will definitely not recall, 20 = 20% probability of recalling the word, 40 … 100 = will 
definitely recall.”). In the delayed JOLs condition, participants were asked to answer the same 
query as given for immediate JOLs, but the cue word appeared with a delay of, on average, 45 
s after the presentation of the word pair in question. All JOLs were self paced and the 
participants’ response prompted the next item. Finally, a self-paced recall test was 
administered, where the cue word was presented and the participants were asked to recall the 
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corresponding target word. After the recall test, the second trial started using the same items. 
The second presentation cycle was again completed with the self-paced recall test.   
2.3.2.2 Results 
Mean JOLs (dashed line) and mean recall levels (solid line) are depicted in Figure 2.4, 
where each JOL timing condition (immediate vs. delayed) paired with each item difficulty 
(easy vs. difficult) is plotted in four panels. Further, the two age groups are represented by 
gray (young) and black (old) lines. Over- and underconfidence, defined by the difference 
between JOLs and recall level, is shown in Figure 2.5 using the same scheme as in Figure 2.4. 
Overconfidence is represented by positive bars and underconfidence is represented by 
negative bars. In Table 2.6 means and standard deviations of JOLs and recalled words are 
reported. In what follows, we address each condition in turn.  
Anchoring. In order to test for the presence of an anchor in forming JOLs during the 
first trial, we compared JOLs from both age groups in all four conditions. Both groups were 
compared by independent t-tests in all four conditions.  
In the Easy × Immediate condition, both age groups showed comparable JOL levels 
(t(70) = 0.47, p > .05, η2 = .00, ∆JOLYoung - Old = 2.04) which differed from recall. At the same 
time, the recall performance was significantly lower in the older, compared to the younger 
group (t(70) = 2.53, p < .05, η2 = .08, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 9.88) implying more overconfidence 
in the older group. A similar pattern was found in the Difficult ×  Immediate condition: The 
mean JOL level was comparable in both groups (t(70) = 0.70, p > .05, η2 = .01, ∆JOLYoung - Old 
= 3.52) while the recall level was again markedly lower in older participants (t(70) = 3.76, p < 
.01, η2 = .17, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 9.88). The results seemed to support the notion of an anchor 
determining largely the location of the JOLs in the first trial. To test the assumption that 
participants were still able to differentiate between easy and difficult items in the immediate 
condition, an ANOVA with a 2 × 2 design (Difficulty × Age) was calculated. The main effect 
of difficulty was statistically significant (F(1, 70) = 46.86, p < .01, η2 = .40) while the main 
effect of age and the interaction of Measure × Age were not statistically significant, indicating 
that easy items received higher JOLs than difficult items, at approximately the same extent in 
both age groups at the first trial.  
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Table 2.6: Means and standard deviations of JOLs and recalled words in Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 
   JOL Timing 
   Immediate  Delayed 
   Easy  Difficult  Easy  Difficult 
Trial 1 JOLs 44.0 (18.3) 34.8 (20.2) 29.4 (18.1) 16.8 (15.2) 
 Recall 22.5 (16.9) 12.0 (14.9) 22.2 (17.4) 06.5 0(9.0) 
Trial 2 JOLs 41.6 (21.5) 30.6 (23.9) 44.1 (24.7) 28.9 (21.0) 
Young 
(n=36) 
 Recall 52.5 (24.0) 35.2 (27.4) 52.5 (25.1) 34.9 (22.6) 
Trial 1 JOLs 42.0 (18.6) 31.2 (22.6) 17.7 (11.6) 10.4 0(9.7) 
 Recall 12.7 (16.2) 02.2 0(5.2) 09.3 (11.1) 02.2 0(4.5) 
Trial 2 JOLs 29.8 (23.1) 16.9 (20.0) 19.3 (16.1) 10.6 (12.4) 
Old 
(n=36) 
 Recall 27.2 (26.4) 14.2 (20.8) 22.5 (19.4) 10.8 (14.2) 
Note.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
 
In the Easy × Delayed condition the two groups differed in both, the JOL and recall 
levels (JOL: t(70) = 3.25, p < .01, η2 = .13, ∆JOLYoung - Old = 11.67 ; Recall: t(70) = 3.77, p < 
.01, η2 = .17, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 12.96). Similar results were found in the Difficult × Delayed 
condition (JOL: t(70) = 2.14, p < .05, η2 = .06, ∆JOLYoung - Old = 6.42 ; Recall: t(70) = 2.59, p 
< .05, η2 = .09, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 4.32) where older participants showed both smaller JOLs 
and lower recall levels than young participants. The ANOVA with the factors difficulty and 
age yielded significant main effects of difficulty (F(1, 70) = 49.30, p < .01, η2 = .41) and age 
(F(1, 70) = 9.16, p < .01, η2 = .12), but not a significant interaction of both main effects. 
Hence, easy items received significantly higher JOLs compared to the difficult items and 
older participants showed in both difficulty levels lower JOLs than the young participants.  
Group analyses. In the following sections, the responses in JOLs and recall of both 
age groups were analyzed by means of repeated ANOVA and paired t-tests.  
Easy Immediate: The main effect of trial (F(1,70) = 18.85, p < .01, η2 = .21) was 
statistically significant, implying higher overall means in trial two, that is, higher means for 
JOLs and correctly recalled words in both groups compared to trial one. The main effect of 
measure (F(1,70) = 18.20, p < .01, η2 = .21) was statistically significant as well: On average, 
means of the JOLs were higher than the average number of correctly recalled words across 
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both trials and both groups. Further, the young age group generally showed higher means in 
JOLs and recalled words than the older group, which lead to a statistically significant main 
effect of age (F(1,70) = 11.34, p < .01, η2 = .14). In terms of effect sizes, both Trial and 
Measure explained virtually the same amount of the total variance, whereas Age contributed 
somewhat less to the explanation of the total variance. Relevant for the examination of the 
UWP effect are the interaction terms: A flatter or opposite slope for the JOLs, compared to 
the slope of correctly recalled words between the first and the second trial are a prerequisite 
for the UWP effect to occur. In fact, the two-way interaction effect of Trial × Measure (F(1, 
70) = 117.75, p < .01, η2 = .63) was significant. As can bee seen from Figure 2.4, top left 
panel, the mean JOLs in the first trial are higher than the correctly recalled words. This 
relationship is inverted in the second trial, where the mean of correctly recalled words is 
higher than the average JOL. However, it remains to be tested if mean JOLs are significantly 
lower than mean recall performance. Further, the interaction of Measure × Age (F(1, 70) = 
4.56, p < .05, η2 = .61) and the interaction of Trial × Age (F(1, 70) = 13.52, p < .01, η2 = .16) 
were significant as well, indicating that older participants showed a greater discrepancy 
between JOLs and recall level and a lower increase in response levels between Trial 1 and 
Trial 2, compared to the young group. Both interaction terms involving Measure yielded 
effect sizes over .60 (η2). 
T-tests of the relevant effects yielded different results for young and old participants 
regarding the UWP effect. This is shown in Figure 2.5, which depicts the differences between 
mean JOLs and mean recall performance. Compared to the average recall performance, both 
age groups overestimated the likelihood for recalling easy items receiving immediate JOLs at 
the first trial (Young: t(35) = 6.00, p < .01, η2 = .50, ∆JOL-Recall = 21.5; Old: t(35) = 7.55, p < 
.01, η2 = .62, ∆JOL-Recall = 29.3). Decisive for the UWP effect is the relation of mean JOLs and 
mean recall level in trial two. In order to instantiate the effect the mean of confidence 
judgments must be significantly lower than mean recall. In fact, the UWP effect was found in 
the younger (t(35) = -2.67, p < .05, η2 = .17, ∆JOL-Recall = -10.9), but not in the older group 
(t(35) = 0.58, p > .05, η2 = .01, ∆JOL-Recall = 2.6) where, on average, JOLs almost matched 
mean recall performance.  
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Figure 2.4: Means of JOLs and recalled words are depicted in four panels representing two difficulty 
conditions and two timing conditions. Hatched lines represent JOLs and solid lines represent recall 
performance; grey symbolizes young adults and black old adults. The anchoring effect in the immediate 
condition in trial 1 is apparent upon inspection, where both age groups start at almost identical levels. In the 
delayed conditions, the JOLs are closer to the recall level and the UWP effect is smaller in young 
participants.  
 
Difficult Immediate: All three main effects were statistically significant (Trial: F(1, 
70) = 5.98, p < .02, η2 = .08; Measure: F(1, 70) = 25.63, p < .01, η2 = .27; Age: F(1, 70) = 
11.86, p < .01, η2 = .15) implying that the means of the JOLs and recall performance were 
higher in the second trial. In addition, the JOLs were, on average, higher than the recall 
performance, and the young group judged their learning higher and recalled on average more 
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words than the older group. Both two-way interactions combined with Trial, Trial × Measure 
(F(1, 70) = 95.88, p < .01, η2 = .58) and Trial × Age ( F(1, 70) = 9.67, p < .01, η2 = .12) were 
statistically significant (see top right panel in Figure 2.4). 
In both age groups, the average JOLs were larger than the mean recall performance 
after the first trial (Young: t(35) = 6.86, p < .01, η2 = .57, ∆JOL-Recall = 22.7; Old: t(35) = 7.23, 
p < .01, η2 = .60, ∆JOL-Recall = 29.1). Effect sizes were comparable to the Easy × Immediate 
condition, implying that the difficulty of the items did not substantially affect the discrepancy 
between both measures in the first trial, that is, the JOLs at trial one seemed to be independent 
of item difficulty. In the second trial, however, the JOLs were not significantly different from 
the recall performance (Young: t(35) = -1.08, p > .05, η2 = .03, ∆JOL-Recall = -4.6; Old: t(35) = 
0.63, p > .05, η2 = .01, ∆JOL-Recall = 2.7). Hence, the UWP effect was observed for neither age 
group in this condition (see top right panel in Figure 2.5). 
Easy Delayed: In the condition where easy items received delayed JOLs, the main 
effects of trial (F(1,70) = 88.93, p < .01, η2 = .56) and of age (F(1,70) = 28.56, p < .01, η2 = 
.29) were statistically significant but not the main effect of measure (F(1,70) = 0.52, p > .47, 
η2 =  .01). This implied that, on average, the responses given by the participants were higher 
in the second trial than in the first trial. In addition, the young group had, on average, higher 
means than the older group which can be seen from Figure 2.4, lower right panel. In addition, 
the interaction effect of Trial × Measure (F(1, 70) = 50.88, p < .01, η2 = .42) was statistically 
significant. The interaction can be seen from Figure 2.4, where the increase in mean JOLs 
from trial one to trial two was not as steep as the increase in correctly recalled words. The 
interaction term of Age × Trial (F(1, 70) = 22.51, p < .01, η2 = .24) was statistically 
significant as well, the explained variance, however, was lower compared to the previously 
described interaction. The increase in the mean responses (JOLs and recalled words) was less 
pronounced for the older group compared to the younger group indicating a greater change for 
the younger between both trials.  
Next, mean JOLs and recall performance was compared by means of t-tests. In Trial 
one both age groups significantly overestimated the mean of recalled words (Young: t(35) = 
2.51, p < .05, η2 = .15, ∆JOL-Recall = 7.2; Old: t(35) = 4.31, p < .01, η
2
 = .35, ∆JOL-Recall = 8.5). 
Note, however, that effect sizes were considerably smaller than they were in the Easy × 
Immediate condition.  
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Figure 2.5: In order to make the UWP effect more apparent, the difference between JOLs and recall 
performance are displayed in all four conditions, represented by grey (young group) and black (old group) 
bars. Black stars represent statistically significant differences, at the p < .05 level, between JOLs and recall 
performance. The UWP effect is present if in trial 2 the average JOL level is significantly lower than the 
recall level, which is the case for young participants in both easy, and in the easy x difficult condition.  
 
In Trial two, only the young group underestimated the actually recalled level of the target 
words (t(35) = -3.25, p < .01, η2 = .23, ∆JOL-Recall = -8.3), the JOLs of the older persons were, 
on average, not significantly different from their mean recall performance (t(35) = -1.47, p > 
.05, η2 = .06, ∆JOL-Recall = -3.2). Hence, the UWP effect was found for the young group only. 
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Difficult Delayed: The ANOVA for items receiving delayed JOLs yielded statistically 
significant main effects (Trial: F(1, 70) = 65.39, p < .01, η2 = .48; Measure: F(1, 70) = 5.64, p 
< .02, η2 = .08; Age: F(1, 70) = 24.63, p < .01, η2 = .26). The two way interactions of Trial × 
Measure (F(1, 70) = 44.47, p < .01, η2 = .39) and of Trial × Age (F(1, 70) = 26.96, p < .01, η2 
= .28) as well as the triple interaction of Trial × Measure × Age (F(1, 70) = 4.46, p < .05, η2 = 
.06) were all statistically significant. The significant two-way interaction of Trial × Measure 
indicates a possible UWP effect due to less steep slopes between the first and the second trial 
for JOLs compared to the slopes of the correct recall performance (see Figure 2.4, lower left 
panel).  
In Trial one, both age groups overestimated the average recall performance (Young: 
t(35) = 4.81, p < .01, η2 = .40, ∆JOL-Recall = 10.3; Old: t(35) = 5.09, p < .01, η
2
 = .43, ∆JOL-Recall 
= 8.2), in Trial two, however, only the younger participants showed the UWP effect (t(35) = -
2.44, p < .01, η2 = .15, ∆JOL-Recall = -6.0). For the older participants, on average, the JOLs were 
virtually identical to the mean of actually recalled words (t(35) = -0.09, p > .05, η2 = .00, 
∆JOL-Recall = -0.2).  
2.3.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate and compare the UWP effect in younger and 
older adults. The young and the older group showed comparable immediate JOLs in the first 
trial within both difficulty levels, hence, analogous to the findings from Scheck and Nelson 
(2005), mean JOLs were within the range of a psychological anchor of 30% to 50% correct 
recall. At the same time, the recall level in both groups was lower than 30%, which lead to 
substantially overconfident JOLs. Note that older adults recalled markedly fewer items than 
young participants and, consequently, the predictions of the older participants were more 
overconfident than those of the young. These findings are in line with results from earlier 
studies where older adults accuracy judgments were more biased toward overconfidence than 
those of the younger adults (Connor et al., 1997; Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, & Schmitt, 
1981; Touron & Hertzog, 2004). In sum, the JOLs in the first trial across both groups seemed 
to be influenced by a psychological anchor because these judgments appeared to be 
unaffected by actual recall performance, that is, it appears that if the respondents have no 
information about item difficulty they seem to rely on an anchor when giving JOLs (Scheck 
& Nelson, 2005). 
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 For delayed JOLs in the first trial, we expected JOLs to be more accurate (Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). In fact, participants were able to give more precise JOLs compared to the 
immediate condition. Accordingly, JOLs differed between both age groups and also across 
both difficulty conditions, that is, other than immediate JOLs, delayed JOLs were influenced 
by item difficulty. Even though JOLs were closer to the recall level, they still did not predict 
the recall probability correctly. Hence, delayed JOLs seemed to rely on monitoring processes, 
which delivered more precise informations about the probability of recalling a specific item, 
and on anchoring mechanisms, which upward-biased the judgements to some degree. These 
findings fit in well with the results from Scheck et al. (2004) who investigated the dual-factors 
hypothesis and reasoned that immediate JOLs are based on an anchor while delayed JOLs rely 
also on informations about item difficulty stemming from monitoring processes.  
In the second trial, the accuracy of JOLs seemed to be boosted by the additional 
learning trial with JOLs being fairly close to the actually recalled words. The increasing 
influence of monitoring on the formation of immediate JOLs relative to that of an anchor most 
probably enhanced the accuracy of judgments. However, there was a difference regarding the 
pattern of accuracy judgments between both age groups: The young group displayed the UWP 
effect for easy word-pairs, as described by Koriat (1997), even though the effect size of the 
underconfident judgements was just a third compared to the overconfidence effect reported in 
the first trial. The older group, in turn, predicted the recall level correctly. Hence, items given 
in the second trial were judged by both groups more precisely but older participants seemed to 
be more successful in rating their recall performance accurately. In the delayed condition, a 
similar pattern was observed for older participants. The second learning trial increased the 
accuracy of JOLs, which then matched the actual recall level. The young group, in 
comparison, did not benefit to the same extent from the additional presentation. For both 
difficulty levels, the young displayed the UWP effect, that is, the overconfidence from Trial 
one turned into underconfidence in Trial two. This effect was greater for easy items than it 
was for difficult items. An apparent difference between both groups was the level of memory 
performance, also in terms of learning effects across both trials: Apart from the higher initial 
level, younger participants seemed to benefit more from the additional learning trial than 
older participants. As a consequence, older participants’ performance did not exceed the level 
expected from their JOLs. 
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Thus, with respect to the UWP effect, the results from both age groups were disparate. 
Young participants showed an UWP effect in most conditions, except for immediate JOLs 
given for difficult word pairs. Overall, the UWP effect in the young group can be explained 
by anchoring and monitoring processes (Koriat et al., 2002; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). Results 
from the older group yielded a different pattern: Both age groups overestimated their 
performance in the first trial, but the older group differed from the young group mainly in the 
second trial, where JOLs given by older participants matched, on average, the correctly 
recalled words. In fact, the UWP effect was not observed in any of the four conditions in 
older participants. The complete absence of the UWP effect in the older age group appears 
remarkable when considering that the effect has been shown to withstand several 
manipulations and, thus, was thought to be very robust (see Koriat et al., 2002). Several 
reasons may have contributed to the non-occurrence of the effect in the older group: In the 
immediate condition, the initial overconfidence in older participants was larger than in the 
young group which, in turn, implies that older participants would have needed to downgrade 
their judgements in the second trial to a larger amount than young participants in order to 
underestimate their performance in the second trial. In fact, the older group showed an 
interaction effect between JOLs and recall performance and downgraded substantially their 
JOLs in the second trial, but probably the relatively flat learning trajectory prevented 
judgments from being underconfident. In the delayed condition, again, older adults were 
almost perfect at predicting their recall performance. As in the immediate condition they 
showed a very flat learning trajectory which may have contributed to the absence of the UWP 
effect. What distinguished older adults clearly from younger adults was the smaller benefit in 
learning performance resulting from the second trial, which lead to a low mean recall 
performance that is problematic in light of the UWP effect: If recall performance is low, 
underconfidence in JOLs can hardly be achieved. A straightforward approach to deal with the 
problem of low mean performance in recalled words in older participants would be to increase 
the number of learning occasions in order to raise the recall performance above the JOL level 
and finally elicit the UWP effect also in older adults. As a consequence, we conducted a 
second experiment by administering five, instead of two, learning trials. 
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2.3.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 can be seen as an expansion of Experiment 1. Hence, it was mainly 
designed to maintain the first two trials comparable with Experiment 1 but give participants 
the possibility to learn and recall the paired associates in five trials – instead of two. The 
primary aim was test the assumption made in Experiment 1 that the absence of the UWP 
effect in the older group stems from too few presentation cycles, that is, older participants 
may need more than two learning trials until their recall level exceeds their JOLs. We 
expected the UWP effect in younger participants to be unaffected by extending the number of 
learning trials.  
The general hypotheses remain the same as in Experiment 1: If the recall level is 
lower than the anchor, overconfidence is expected in the first trial. For each consecutive trial, 
we expect an increasing approximation of JOLs and previous recall performance. In older 
adults, underconfidence, and the UWP effect, may result after the second trial.  
2.3.3.1 Method 
Participants, Design, and Items. Thirty-four young (M = 26.1 years, SD = 3.1) and 
thirty-four older persons (M = 68.6 years, SD = 3.6) participated in Experiment 2. The design 
of the study was basically the same as in Experiment 1 with the difference that participants 
were given five learning occasions instead of two. This lead to a 2 (JOL timing: Immediate 
vs. delayed) × 5 (trial: Trial 1 to trial 5) × 2 (difficulty: Difficult vs. easy items) × 2 (age 
group: Young vs. old participants) × 2 (measure: JOL vs. recall performance) design.  
Apparatus and Procedure. The apparatus and the procedure used here were the same 
as in Experiment 1. To increase precision of measurement, the number of stimuli was doubled 
to 36 German word pairs and 24 German – Turkish word pairs. Hence, the randomization 
procedure was extended to five presentation cycles consisting of six blocks containing ten 
items (six easy and four difficult items).  
2.3.3.2 Results 
As in Study 1, a repeated measures ANOVA with the between-subject factor age 
(young vs. old group) was computed. Here, participants were given five trials which lead to a 
5 × 2 × 2 (trial, measure, age group) design.  
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Table 2.7: Means and standard deviations of JOLs and recalled words across both 
experiments 
Experiment 2 
   JOL Timing 
   Immediate  Delayed 
   Easy  Difficult  Easy  Difficult 
Trial 1 JOLs 47.8 (21.0) 33.4 (22.0) 36.4 (20.5) 17.2 (18.4) Young 
(n=34)  Recall 28.6 (16.6) 08.1 (10.9) 26.1 (18.5) 08.3 (10.9) 
 Trial 2 JOLs 53.2 (20.3) 32.1 (17.4) 51.5 (21.5) 31.4 (18.5) 
  Recall 60.1 (21.2) 38.9 (22.3) 55.4 (23.2) 32.1 (21.1) 
 Trial 3 JOLs 72.3 (18.7) 54.5 (21.3) 67.8 (20.6) 
 Recall 75.3 (20.2) 66.9 (19.6) 72.2 (20.2) 60.0 (23.9) 55.8 (24.4) 
 Trial 4 JOLs 81.3 (17.1) 75.5 (18.8) 78.2 (18.3) 
  Recall 84.5 (16.0) 82.8 (19.1) 82.0 (17.1) 71.7 (22.9) 
 Trial 5 JOLs 88.3 (12.6) 85.9 (16.1) 85.6 (14.0) 77.9 (19.2) 
  Recall 89.4 (11.8) 90.4 (14.1) 88.1 (13.6) 81.4 (19.1) 
Old 
(n=34) 
Trial 1 JOLs 48.6 (26.9) 38.4 (31.3) 23.6 (22.8) 85.3 (17.5) 
 Recall 07.8 0(8.7) 00.7 0(2.4) 06.0 0(7.7) 14.9 (21.2)  
 Trial 2 JOLs 36.5 (27.6) 26.3 (30.7) 23.7 (20.0) 00.5 0(2.0) 
  Recall 22.9 (16.7) 07.4 (11.0) 20.4 (14.1) 12.5 (13.8) 
 Trial 3 JOLs 45.7 (29.2) 30.5 (30.6) 32.7 (22.9) 06.4 0(8.5) 
  Recall 34.3 (19.3) 15.2 (18.5) 31.4 (19.5) 17.5 (18.0) 
 Trial 4 JOLs 52.2 (29.5) 37.8 (33.4) 37.9 (25.4) 12.0 (13.5) 
  Recall 42.6 (22.0) 24.3 (24.2) 39.2 (21.6) 22.6 (21.2) 
 Trial 5 JOLs 55.9 (29.2) 43.8 (33.0) 42.3 (25.7) 21.3 (18.4) 
  Recall 47.2 (21.5) 34.1 (26.6) 44.1 (20.6) 29.6 (26.3) 
Note.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
 
The mean JOLs and the mean recall performance are shown in Figure 2.6 and the difference 
between JOLs and the recalled words is illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
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First, we start with combined analyses to examine whether an anchor is affecting JOLs 
in the first trial. In Table 2.7 mean JOLs and recalled items are reported with standard 
deviations in parentheses. Then we turn to the group analyses in each condition to examine 
the UWP effect and the trajectories of JOLs and recall levels in both age groups. 
Anchoring. Independent t-tests in the Easy × Immediate condition yielded almost 
identical JOL levels in both age groups (t(66) = -0.14, p > .05, η2 = .00, ∆JOLYoung - Old =  
-0.82) but a significantly lower recall level in older adults (t(66) = 6.46, p < .01, η2 = .39, 
∆RecallYoung - Old = 20.78). For difficult items judged immediately a similar pattern was found. 
The JOLs between both groups did not differ significantly (t(66) = -0.75, p > .05, η2 = .01, 
∆JOLYoung - Old = -4.95), on the same time, older adults recalled substantially fewer words than 
the young group (t(66) = 3.82, p < .01, η2 = .18, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 7.35). These results 
corroborated the findings from Experiment 1 and supported the notion of a psychological 
anchor which biases responses in the first trial. Further, it was tested if participants were able 
to differentiate between difficult and easy items. As in Experiment 1, an ANOVA with a 2 × 2 
design (Difficulty × Age) yielded a significant main effect of difficulty (F(1, 66) = 63.33, p < 
.01, η2 = .49). The main effect of age and the interaction of Difficulty × Age were not 
statistically significant, indicating that participants in both age groups judged the probability 
of recalling difficult items lower than the probability of recalling easy items.  
In the Easy × Delayed condition the age groups differed both, in mean JOLs (t(66) = 
2.44, p < .05, η2 = .08, ∆JOLYoung - Old = 12.84) and in mean recall (t(66) = 5.85, p < .01, η
2
 = 
.34, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 20.10), indicating that older adults JOLs and recall performance was 
significantly lower than those from the young group. These findings replicated largely the 
results from Experiment 1 which signify that, besides anchoring, monitoring processes are 
also involved in the formation of delayed JOLs. In the Difficult × Delayed condition, 
however, the JOLs did not differ between the age groups (t(66) = 0.48, p > .05, η2 = .00, 
∆JOLYoung - Old = 2.30) although older adults recalled significantly fewer words compared to 
the young group (t(66) = 4.14, p < .01, η2 = .21, ∆RecallYoung - Old = 7.84). The ANOVA 
yielded a significant main effect of difficulty (F(1,66) = 93.15, p < .01, η2 = .59) and a 
significant interaction of Difficulty × Age (F(1,66) = 13.23, p < .01, η2 = .17) indicating that 
participants differentiated between difficult and easy items, by giving easy items higher JOLs. 
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The young group, however, appeared to react more sensitively on the increased difficulty of 
items by lowering the mean JOLs to a greater extent compared to the old group.  
Group analyses. In each condition, JOLs and recall levels were analyzed by means of 
repeated measures ANOVA.  
Easy Immediate: The main effects for easy word pairs receiving immediate JOLs were 
all significant (Trial: F(4, 264) = 208.99, p < .01, η2 = .76; Measure: F(1,66) = 14.08, p < .01, 
η2 = .18 ; Age: F(1, 66) = 55.28, p < .01, η2 = .46 ). As can be seen from Figure 2.6, the mean 
JOLs and the average recall performance increased from trial to trial. The level of the mean 
responses (JOLs and recall performance) of the young group was, on average, higher as the 
one from the old group and, in addition, the main effect of measure was significant, because 
the participants overestimated their performance markedly in the first trial. Older participants 
judged, on average, their recall performance lower and remembered on average fewer words 
than the younger group did. As can be seen from Figure 2.6, the greatest changes in level and 
slope of the mean JOLs and the mean recall performance occurred between trial one and trial 
two. The interaction effect of Measure (JOL vs. recall performance) and Trial was statistically 
significant (F(4, 264) = 53.31, p < .01, η2 = .45) indicating different trajectories for mean 
JOLs compared to mean recall, which is a prerequisite for the UWP effect. Furthermore, the 
two-way interaction of Trial × Age (F(4, 264) = 27.66, p < .01, η2 = .30) as well as the 
interaction of Measure × Age (F(1, 66) = 11.10, p < .01, η2 = .14) were statistically 
significant.  
The next step was to compare the mean JOLs with the mean recall performance in 
each trial, differentiated by age group, to verify if the significant interaction term of Measure 
× Trial was due to the UWP effect. Figure 2.7, top left panel, offers an overview of the mean 
discrepancy between JOLs minus correctly recalled words across all four Timing × Difficulty 
conditions for both age groups. Effect sizes were largest after the first two trials, and then an 
attenuation of the effects occurred across the five trials. This is also a typical finding from 
research on verbal learning, that is, the return in recall performance from every additional trial 
is continually diminishing, leading to growth curves with an asymptotic trajectory (Zimprich, 
Rast, & Martin, in press).  
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Figure 2.6: Means of JOLs and recalled words from Experiment 2 with five trials across all four conditions. 
Hatched lines represent JOLs and solid lines represent recall performance. The learning curves for older 
participants (black) are markedly lower compared to the young group (grey). Nonetheless, the average JOL 
in the first trial is practically identical in both groups for immediate JOLs which corroborates the notion of 
an anchoring mechanism. Delayed JOLs are much more accurate and the anchoring effect is smaller in the 
first trial compared to immediately elicited JOLs.  
The young group showed a statistically significant overconfidence in the first trial (t(33) = 
4.73, p < .01, η2 = .40, ∆JOL-Recall = 19.2) and underconfident judgments in the second trial 
(t(33) = -2.27, p < .05, η2 = .14, ∆JOL-Recall = 6.9) which indicated the presence of the UWP 
effect. From trial three on, the mean JOLs were not statistically different from the mean of 
recalled words anymore. 
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The older group showed a large and statistically significant overconfidence effect in 
the first trial (t(33)= 8.52, p < .01, η2 = .69, ∆JOL-Recall = 40.8) which persisted in trial two 
(t(33)= 2.51, p < .05, η2 = .16, ∆JOL-Recall = 13.7), three (t(33)= 2.28, p < .05, η
2
 = .14, ∆JOL-
Recall = 11.4), and five (t(33)= 2.10, p < .05, η
2
 = .12, ∆JOL-Recall = 8.7). Older adults thus 
seemed to overestimate their recall performance across most of the trials. The effect sizes 
emphasized this finding with a large effect for the first trial and smaller effect sizes for trials 
two to five. The UWP effect was not found in the older group at all.  
Easy Delayed: The ANOVA for easy word pairs receiving delayed judgments yielded 
significant main effects of trial (F(4, 264) = 242.74, p < .01, η2 = .79) and of age (F(1, 66) = 
82.31, p < .01, η2 = .56). Due to lower JOLs in the first trial, the main effect of measure was 
not statistically significant (see Figure 2.6, lower left panel). The interactions with Trial (Trial 
× Measure: F(4, 264) = 18.53, p < .01, η2 = .22; Trial × Age: F(4, 264) = 25.23, p < .01, η2 = 
.28 ) were both statistically significant indicating a possible UWP effect and different 
trajectories across the five trials for both age groups.  
In the following, paired t-tests for each trial, computed separately for both age groups, 
are reported. As can be seen from Figure 2.7 (lower left panel), the young group significantly 
overestimated the recall performance after the first trial (t(33) = 2.85, p < .01, η2 = .20, ∆JOL-
Recall = 10.3), but underestimated the performance in trials three (t(33) = -2.42, p < .05, η
2
 = 
.15, ∆JOL-Recall = -4.4) and four (t(33) = -2.47, p < .05, η
2
 = .16, ∆JOL-Recall = -3.9). Compared to 
the preceding (Easy × Immediate) condition the effect size in trial one was half as large which 
implies that the discrepancy between JOLs and recall performance was attenuated by the 
delayed judgments. In the young group, the criterion for an UWP effect was met in the third 
trial. The older group, on average, also overestimated the recall performance after the first 
trial (t(33) = 4.18, p < .01, η2 = .35, ∆JOL-Recall = 17.5). The effect size was half as large as in 
the preceding immediate condition which indicated that delayed judgments were more precise 
than immediate. In the consecutive trials, however, mean JOLs all matched mean recall 
performance which was not compatible with the requirements for the UWP effect. Again, the 
young group showed the UWP effect, but not the old group. 
Difficult Immediate: The main effects for difficult word pairs receiving immediate 
JOLs were all statistically significant (Trial: F(4, 264) = 193.60, p < .01, η2 = .75; Measure: 
F(1, 66) = 10.81, p < .01, η2 = .14; Age: F(1, 66) = 67.95, p < .01, η2 = .51). The same was 
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true for the interaction terms: All two-way interactions (Trial × Measure: F(4, 264) = 43.91, p 
< .01, η2 = .40; Trial × Age: F(4, 264) = 60.75, p < .01, η2 = .48; Measure × Age: F(1, 66) = 
13.77, p < .01, η2 = .17) as well as the tree-way interaction were statistically significant (Trial 
× Measure × Age: F(4, 264) = 3.14, p < .05, η2 = .05).  
Young participants overestimated the performance after the first trial (t(33) = 5.76, p < 
.01, η2 = .50, ∆JOL-Recall = 27.5) and, like in the previously described Easy × Immediate 
condition, they underestimated their recall performance in the second trial (t(33) = -2.10, p < 
.05, η2 = .12, ∆JOL-Recall = 6.8). Underconfidence persisted throughout trial three (t(33) = -4.14, 
p < .01, η2 = .34, ∆JOL-Recall = 12.4), four (t(33) = -3.05, p < .01, η
2
 = .22, ∆JOL-Recall = 7.4) and 
five (t(33) = -2.09, p < .05, η2 = .12, ∆JOL-Recall = 4.5). Accordingly, the criteria for the UWP 
effect was met and the underconfidence grew largest in trial three. The effect size in the first 
trial was larger compared to the preceding delayed condition indicating a dependency on the 
timing of the JOL, that is, when JOLs were given immediately, the effect size of the 
difference between JOLs and recall performance in the first trial was markedly higher 
compared to the delayed condition.  The older group overestimated its performance in the first 
four trials (Trial 1: t(33) = 7.07, p < .01, η2 = .60, ∆JOL-Recall = 37.6; Trial 2: t(33) = 3.13, p < 
.01, η2 = .23, ∆JOL-Recall = 18.9; Trial 3: t(33) = 2.59, p < .05, η
2
 = .17, ∆JOL-Recall = 15.3; Trial 
4: t(33) = 2.43, p < .05, η2 = .15, ∆JOL-Recall = 13.6), in the fifth trial, however, the JOLs did 
not differ from the actual recall performance any more. The amount of the difference between 
mean JOLs and the mean of correctly recalled words diminished from trial to trial, up to trial 
five where it was not significant any more. The same was true for the effect sizes, being the 
largest in the first trial, and continually diminishing in the consecutive three trials. The older 
group increased its absolute accuracy with every additional trial and did not display the UWP 
effect.  
Difficult Delayed: In the fourth condition, where difficult word pairs received delayed 
JOLs, the main effect of trial (F(4,264) = 202.73, p < .01, η2 = .75) and of age (F(1,66) = 
108.50, p < .01, η2 = .62) were both statistically significant. The two-way interactions were 
all statistically significant (Trial × Measure: F(4, 264) = 12.46, p < .01, η2 = .16; Trial × Age: 
F(4, 264) = 61.23, p < .01, η2 = .48; Measure × Age: F(1, 66) = 4.93, p < .05, η2 = .07), but 
not the three-way interaction. In Figure 2.6 the reported interactions are depicted in the lower 
right panel.  
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Figure 2.7: The difference between mean JOLs and mean recall performance is represented by black and 
grey bars. Black stars represent statistically significant differences, at the p < .05 level, between JOLs and 
recall performance. Older adults did not show an UWP effect in any of the four conditions. Young adults, in 
contrast, displayed the UWP effect in the second trial, for immediately elicited JOLs and in the third or 
fourth trial for delayed judgments.  
 
As in all previous conditions, both age groups overestimated significantly their recall 
performance after the first trial (Young: t(33) = 2.68, p < .05, η2 = .18, ∆JOL-Recall = 8.8; Old: 
t(33) = 3.92, p < .01, η2 = .32, ∆JOL-Recall = 14.4). In addition, the young group underestimated 
their performance in the fourth trial (t(33) = -2.18, p < .05, η2 = .13, ∆JOL-Recall = -6.2), in all 
other trials, however, the mean JOLs were not significantly different from the mean of 
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correctly recalled words: An UWP effect in the young group was not detected in this 
condition. Apart from the first trial, the older group overestimated the recall performance in 
the second trial as well (t(33) = 2.28, p < .05, η2 = .14, ∆JOL-Recall = 6.1). The older group, once 
again, did not show the UWP effect. As noted before, the effect sizes were smaller, compared 
to the condition where JOLs were given immediately indicating that delaying judgment of 
learning enhances absolute accuracy. 
2.3.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate and compare the trajectories of JOLs and 
recall performance in two age groups across five learning occasions. In Experiment 1 we 
hypothesized that older adults would need more than two learning trials to achieve a recall 
level that might instantiate the UWP effect, hence, we required participants to complet five 
learning occasions. The difficulty for both types of items (easy and difficult) was comparable 
to the difficulty in Experiment 1. Note, however, that the amount of items in Experiment 2 
was doubled to a total of 36 easy and 24 difficult word pairs to avoid ceiling effects.  
As in Experiment 1, in the immediate condition both age groups started out at almost 
identical JOL levels, while their average recall performance was very different which lead to 
substantial overconfidence in JOLs. In the first trial the mean JOLs were within 30% to 50% 
predicted recall, which replicated findings from Experiment 1 and from earlier studies 
(Scheck & Nelson, 2005) and substantiated the anchoring hypothesis that the magnitude of 
mean JOLs in the first trial depends largely on a psychological anchor if no prior information 
about the item difficulty is available. At the same time, the larger overconfidence in JOLs of 
older adults probably stemmed from the anchoring mechanism, that is, if young and old 
participants judged items almost independently of their difficulty, this led to larger 
overconfidence in older adults simply because their recall level is lower.  
In the first trial of the delayed condition we also expected to find results similar to 
Experiment 1. In fact, delayed JOLs were generally more accurate compared to the immediate 
condition. Accordingly, JOLs given for easy items by older adults were smaller than JOLs 
from young participants. This again substantiated the notion of enhanced accuracy in delayed 
judgments, probably due to monitoring processes, which was also reported in Experiment 1 
and in earlier studies (Koriat, 1997; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). An exception seemed to be 
JOLs given for difficult items, where both age groups had comparable levels. 
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Regarding the UWP effect, in the young group the results from Experiment 1 were 
only in part replicated. Participants showed the UWP effect in the Easy × Immediate 
condition but, contrary to the previous experiment, they also underestimated the difficult 
words in the Difficult × Immediate condition, which corroborates findings from Scheck and 
Nelson (2005). In the delayed condition, results from the first two trials did not elicit the 
UWP effect neither for easy nor for difficult word pairs. Hence, when considering only the 
first two trials, the UWP effect was found in the immediate but not in the delayed condition. 
However, if all five trials are taken into consideration, underconfidence can also be observed 
for word pairs in the delayed condition (see Figure 2.7, Easy × Delayed and Difficult × 
Delayed). Note that young participants were overconfident only in the first trial. From the 
second trial on, the mean JOLs remained underconfident or correct throughout consecutive 
trials. 
In the old group, JOLs elicited in the last three trials still did not underscore the recall 
level and, hence, the UWP effect could not be found: As in Experiment 1, the older group did 
not show the UWP effect in any of the four conditions and in none of the five learning trials. 
Our assumptions that older adults would need more trials to display the UWP effect could not 
be verified in Experiment 2, in this respect, adding three trials did not lead to the expected 
underconfident judgments in later trials. For immediate JOLs, older participants 
overestimated their recall performance in most of the trials. Apart from the initial and large 
overconfidence, in the consecutive four trials older participants seemed to overrate their 
performance by a rather stable amount. When giving delayed judgments, the estimated recall 
probability was generally closer to the actual recall performance compared to immediate 
JOLs. Contrary to the young group, the older participants never underestimated their recall 
level. Even at the second trial, where the UWP effect typically is found, older adults still 
overestimated or judged correctly their recall level. Note, however, that the recall 
performance in the delayed × difficult condition was very low in the first trials. Hence, 
overconfidence might also be in part due to a floor effect in recall performance, that is, recall 
levels lower than 10% almost inevitably led to overconfident judgments, because participants 
hardly downgraded their judgments lower than 10%.  
To sum up, in both groups the greatest changes in JOLs took place in the first two 
trials. Independent of item difficulty or timing of the JOL, the overconfidence effect was 
always largest in the first trial, followed by a marked decrease in the second trial. This 
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corroborates the notion of a strong influence of an anchor in the first trial which decreases in 
favor of monitoring in consecutive trials. In the second trial, young participants downgraded 
JOLs to underconfidence but older adults adjusted JOLs to be slightly overconfident or 
correct. In the consecutive three trials the trajectories of both measures (JOLs vs. correct 
recall performance) appeared to converge, that is, the absolute accuracy increased across all 
trials. Note that the shape of the subjective accuracy trajectories was comparable across both 
age groups. Only in relation to the objective learning trajectory the pattern of over- and 
underconfidence differed across groups, that is, the tendency of younger adults to remain 
underconfident and of older adults to remain overconfident from the second trial on persisted 
throughout almost all conditions. 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
The UWP effect has been examined exclusively in young populations (see, e.g., Koriat 
et al., 2002) and, hence, it remained an open issue if this effect could be replicated in older 
adults. As has been hypothesized by Scheck and Nelson (2005), part of the UWP effect might 
be due to the impact of anchoring on the formation of JOLs. First of all, our results seem to 
support the notion of a psychological anchor which determines JOLs at the first trial. The 
anchoring effect appeared to be very pronounced when no prior information was available, as 
it was the case for immediate JOLs: Both age groups rated the probability of recalling the 
same items at almost identical levels. Simultaneously, the difficulty of items was very 
different for both groups as young recalled up to four times more items than older participants 
(as seen in Experiment 2 with easy words after the first trial). We interpret this in favour of an 
anchoring mechanism which determined largely the location of JOLs – almost independent of 
item difficulty. Note that the higher accuracy of delayed JOLs is not contradictory to this 
view. When judgments are delayed, JOLs are, presumably, based on a retrieval attempt, 
which provides a mnemonic cue that might be utilized in forming a more accurate JOL 
(Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). A similar mechanism leads to increasingly accurate judgments 
when participants are given more than one trial, that is, the monitoring process following the 
first trial reduces the bias toward the anchor to a considerable extent and results in an increase 
in absolute accuracy (Koriat et al., 2002; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). 
Earlier studies have shown that repeated practice leads to an average JOL level which 
typically falls below the level of memory performance in the second trial and consequently 
104      Memory self-reports and memory performance in old age 
instantiates the UWP effect. In fact, in these earlier studies the UWP effect appeared to be 
very robust, at least against several experimental manipulations, and we therefore expected it 
to appear in older adults as well (for a summary, see Koriat et al., 2002). The most striking 
finding from both our experiments was the non-appearance of the UWP effect in older adults 
at all, while the results in the younger group replicated earlier findings (Scheck & Nelson, 
2005). As both groups received the same stimulus material and the same procedure, it seemed 
unlikely that methodological differences were responsible for the unexpected results in the 
older group. The presented paired-associates, however, appeared to be much more difficult for 
older than for younger participants. Still, we concluded that older adults do not display the 
UWP effect as found in young people.  
Several factors may be responsible for the non-occurrence of the effect: As mentioned 
earlier, throughout both experiments and across all learning trials younger adults remembered 
more items than older adults implying that for older adults the same items were more difficult. 
This is not an unusual finding in laboratory test situations when paired associates are 
presented in non-self paced learning trials. If older and younger adults are compared in their 
recall performance, young participants generally recall more words than older participants 
and, moreover, they tend to learn faster than older adults (Kausler, 1994). This was also 
observed in both our experiments where younger adults recalled more items and learned faster 
which resulted in steeper learning trajectories compared to older participants’ performance. 
Even though the stimulus was the same for both age groups, the difficulty appeared to be 
highly elevated for older adults. The older group started at very low recall levels and did not 
benefit much from additional learning trials. Given these circumstances, the preconditions for 
the UWP effect were not exactly the same for young and old participants. Equal JOL levels 
across both groups but lower recall levels in the older lead to a larger overconfidence effect in 
the old group after the first trial. Further, young participants benefited more from additional 
learning trials than older, resulting in steeper learning trajectories. Note that the UWP effect 
requires an interaction between the average JOL and recall trajectories, implying JOLs in the 
second trial to be significantly underconfident, which, altogether, increases the demands with 
respect to the UWP effect for older adults: Older adults would have been required to adapt 
their JOLs in the second trial to a greater extent compared to younger adults in order to elicit 
underconfident judgments. In fact, older adults adjusted their JOLs, from the first to the 
second trial, to a greater extent than younger, but still not enough to fall below the recall level. 
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Why did older adults not adapt their JOLs to a greater extent? There might be two 
explanations: One is that JOLs can not be adapted arbitrarily away from a given level but only 
to a certain degree due to a persistence or inertia of JOLs. That is, if the average JOL in the 
first trial was at 40% one will not simply downgrade it by 35 points to 5% but, for example, 
maximally by 15 points to 25%. Hence, the adaptation of JOLs from the first to the second 
trial maybe tapped the full range in older adults adjustment possibilities. Even with the 
maximal downward adaptation of JOLs, this was not enough to elicit the UWP effect because 
recall was still lower. The second explanation bears on earlier findings where older adults 
tended to generally overestimate their cognitive performance (Connor et al., 1997; Murphy et 
al., 1981; Touron & Hertzog, 2004). If this was the case for JOLs in both of our studies, the 
instantiation of the UWP effect must have been additionally impeded simply because the 
required underconfident judgements are all biased with the general tendency to overestimate 
one’s own performance and, finally, lead to higher average JOLs.  
Instead of just focusing on the presence or absence of the UWP effect in older adults, 
our experiments have shown that it might be also fruitful to concentrate on (dis-)similarities in 
JOLs in young and old participants across all learning trials to learn more about monitoring. 
The JOL trajectories in older and younger adults were fairly similar in their shape: Young and 
old adults both showed the largest adaptation in JOLs from the first to the second trial, which 
was also underlined by significant interaction terms of Trial × Measure. From the second trial 
on, the adjustment of JOLs was much smaller but still lead to increasingly accurate 
judgments. By and large, the adaptation process in JOLs was comparable in young and old 
participants. Furthermore both groups started out, in the immediate condition, at almost 
exactly the same level which suggests that the anchor is not underlying much change in two 
very different cohorts. One might speculate if younger adults would have shown an UWP 
effect if their learning performance had been as low as in older adults, but the basic process of 
JOLs adjustment over a number of trials appeared to be basically the same in the young and 
the old group. On the other hand, the relation between JOLs and recall performance from 
trials two to five was very different between both groups. As the young underestimated their 
performance, older adults systematically overestimated their recall level, especially when 
JOLs were given immediately. These results are similar to findings from global memory 
predictions where older adults tend to overestimate their memory performance as well. 
Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, and Schmitt (1981), for example, had younger and older 
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adults estimate their memory span for the number of common objects that they thought they 
could remember, followed by a recall task in which this span was actually measured. They 
found that younger adults tended to underestimate their memory span, whereas older adults 
tended to overestimate their memory span.  
In view of the three explanatory approaches described in the introduction, the dual-
factor hypothesis (Scheck et al., 2004) appeared to best catch the interplay between a strong 
anchor in the first trial and increasing importance of monitoring throughout the following 
trials. The higher accuracy for JOLs in the delayed condition can be deducted by the dual 
factors hypothesis as well: Delayed presentation of the cue word initiates a first retrieval 
attempt which delivers valuable information on the probability of recalling the item later. 
Consequently, monitoring outweighs the arbitrary anchor in the formation of the delayed JOL 
and leads to greater accuracy. Note, however, that in all three approaches, in the cue-
utilization framework, in the anchoring hypothesis, and in the dual-factors hypothesis, the 
weighing of different cues is crucial for the outcome of a response. Hence, if one considers 
the anchor to represent an internal cue which may be used in absence of any other relevant 
cue of item difficulty, the anchoring hypothesis and the dual-task hypothesis may be recast in 
terms of the cue-utilization approach.  
In the introduction to this paper we emphasized the importance of monitoring 
memory, especially in old age, and argued that monitoring is spared from cognitive decline. 
In fact, the process of memory monitoring did not seem to be different from monitoring in the 
younger group except for its tendency to be overconfident. This, however, puts into 
perspective the advantage of an intact monitoring in older persons. If one overestimates his 
own memory performance, the effort invested in future learning trials is probably smaller 
compared to someone who underestimates his or her performance. Unfortunately, the older 
group with low recall performance and small learning rates overestimated their performance 
and, maybe, this contributed to even lower recall levels. If monitoring is to be used in future, 
as an intact resource for memory enhancement, older adults may benefit from it when their 
judgments become underconfident. Hence, the presence of the UWP effect could be seen as 
an indicator of an intact and self-propelling memory system. 
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3 General discussion 
The aim of the present thesis was to find new theoretical and empirical accounts for 
the low correspondence between memory self-reports and memory performance. More 
specifically, the present work adressed three research questions regarding (1) the invariance in 
the measurement of memory self-reports, (2) the relation between self-reports and learning, 
and (3) the relation between monitoring and learning. The research on these three questions 
was motivated by the role metamemory could play in the context of aging and diminishing 
cognitive resources. It is well documented that, on average, memory performance declines  
into old age (cf. Kausler, 1994; Rönnlund et al., 2005) but there is also evidence that decline 
can be compensated at a biological (Grady & Craik, 2000; McIntosh et al., 1999) as well as at 
the psychological level (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2006). At the psychological level, 
metamemory could represent the key to both, a successful self-diagnosis of the general 
memory ability and, consequently as the basis for an optimal allocation of remaining 
cognitive resources to memory processes. The scientific investigation of the interplay between 
memory self-reports and memory performance, however, did not support the expectations 
placed on metamemory. The strongest argument against the designated role metamemory 
could assume is the low accuracy of its reports. That is, metamemory judgments are typically 
found to correlate only moderately with their respective behavioral counterpart, namely, 
memory performance (see Chapter 1.3). In that case it is questionable if metamemory can 
effectively compensate memory decline because only a realistic estimation of ones’ own 
memory entails that people are able to adopt appropriate memory strategies. However, it 
remains uncertain if the low accuracy in metamemory judgements reflects a true incapacity to 
introspect about one’s own memory or if it is rather due to inadequate operationalization of 
memory self-reports or memory performance.  
As a consequence of the low relation between self-report and memory performance, 
research on metamemory has turned away from the initial straightforward hypothesis that 
memory self-reports actually reflects memory performance (Kail, 1990; Schneider, 1985) and 
has moved its focus to the investigation of the low correspondence between subjective and 
objective memory measures. The focus in this thesis is also on possible reasons for the low 
relation between subjective and objective memory, however, I explicitly intended to revaluate 
the straightforward hypothesis by examining three open research questions. The first research 
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question addressed possible sources of bias in the memory self-report measures and the 
second in the operationalization of memory. The third question pertained to age differences in 
monitoring in a multitrial (i.e., learning) setting and, hence, it addressed the effect of aging on 
the accuracy of monitoring.  
3.1 Summary and discussion of the results 
3.1.1 Measurement invariance of the cognitive failures questionnaire 
across the adult lifespan 
The first research question pertained to whether the measures used to operationalize 
memory self-reports are invariant across age, and thus measure the same constructs in each 
age group. In order to test for measurement invariance (MI) the commonly used Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) was chosen because it not only taps 
memory failures but also other areas of cognitive failures which might be less prone to 
implicit theories about aging (Cavanaugh et al., 1998). Invariance hypotheses were 
systematically tested across six age groups ranging in age from 24 to 83 years. Although the 
CFQ is a widely used instrument, its factor structure remained an issue of scientific debate. 
The study reported in Chapter 2.1 used data of a representative sample (N = 1,303) from the 
Maastricht Aging Study (MAAS) to test and compare factor solutions for the CFQ previously 
reported in the literature by means of confirmatory factor analysis. Additionally, a three-factor 
model of the CFQ that emerged from an exploratory factor analysis was examined. In order to 
minimize biased parameter estimates from treating Likert-type scale items as continuous, the 
factor analyses and the consecutive investigation of MI was based on ordered categorical 
variables (DiStefano, 2002; Lubke & Muthén, 2004; O'Brien, 1985). The three-factor model 
was tested for increasing levels of measurement invariance across six age groups. The CFQ 
proved to be measurement invariant across all age groups and, hence, the mean trajectories as 
well as the variances and covariances of the three factors were meaningfully interpretable 
across age. Even though all three factors represent cognitive domains, they showed very 
different trajectories across age groups. The mean of the memory factor termed Forgetfulness 
increased throughout the six agegroups almost linearly, that is, older adults reported more 
forgetfulness compared to younger adults. This is a classic finding which corroborates results 
from earlier studies (cf. Kausler, 1994). The factor measuring Distractibility, in turn, followed 
a different trajectory. Namely, the two oldest groups reported significantly less distractibility 
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than the four younger groups. For the third factor, False Triggering, no age-related increase 
or decline resulted in the means. Interestingly, factor (co-)variances remained stable across 
the age groups. This indicates that the relation between the three factors does not depend on 
the age of the respondent. The same can be concluded for the variability of the three factors. It 
further implies that, even if contextual influences including history-graded and non-normative 
influences (Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980) affect cognition, its effects do not influence the 
measurement properties of the measures, that is, the constructs’ measurement functions 
equivalently for each age group. This finding, however, does not exclude that contextual 
influences may affect mean-levels of memory self-reports or other types of change and 
continuity.  
The present findings regarding MI of the CFQ explicitly demonstrated what was 
implicitly assumed in earlier studies – but not being tested systematically – namely, that strict 
MI would hold across age. That is, factor loadings, intercepts and residual variances in one 
group are equal to corresponding loadings, intercepts and residuals in other groups and, 
hence, factor mean differences are unambiguously interpretable. Even though the CFQ proved 
to be strictly measurement invariant, this can not be taken as a grant for other self-report 
questionnaires of cognitive failures or for the CFQ in other samples. MI depends largely on 
the quality of items purported to measure a certain latent construct (Lubke et al., 2003). 
Hence, different scales may show different degrees of MI which affects interpretation of, for 
example, age differences in another questionnaire so that the analysis of MI across a given 
selection variable has to be newly tested. In the case of the CFQ one might conclude that age 
differences are meaningfully interpretable and that differences in factor means are not 
artificial, but represent truly experienced change in the underlying factors (e.g., 
Forgetfulness). With the examination of MI, one has a tool at hand which allows controlling 
for bias in the case where groups are compared by means of questionnaire data. In this 
respect, the first research question might never be fully answered but rather represents an 
issue which is always present when different groups are compared. Hence, the procedure of 
assessing MI of a given measure should be part of the normal scientific workflow. 
3.1.2 Verbal learning as an alternative memory measure 
The second research question addressed the relation between memory self-reports and 
memory performance with the focus on learning as, possibly, a more informative memory 
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measure. The results presented herein bear only indirectly on the issue of low correspondence 
between memory self-reports and memory measures as they were mainly used to demonstrate 
the methodological approach to formalize and relate learning to other variables of interest. 
However, they suggest one line of research that might be pursued to scratch the surface of the 
intricate and long-standing issue of the correspondence between subjective and objective 
memory reports. In Chapter 1.4.2, I argued that data from learning experiments would deliver 
a closer relation to memory self-reports elicited in memory questionnaires. Hence, other than 
the first research question, here, the focus was on the objective memory measure. There were 
two reasons for focusing on the memory measure: First, the approach to modify self-report 
questionnaires with respect to behavioral specificity (cf. Hertzog et al., 2000) did not seem to 
be a very compelling alternative because the increase in the correlation between subjective 
and objective memory measure was only marginal and, at the same time, it was outweighed 
by the loss in generalizability with respect to the subjective measure. Second, in expanding 
the memory measure from a single trial recall task to a learning experiment with several study 
and test trials, yielded a more broad and differentiated view on memory. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 1.4.2, I argued that memory is probably apprehend by lay persons in a more 
generalized way, that is, in a naturalistic situation memory is not reduced to a single recall 
event but the whole process of information acquisition and recall is considered to represent 
memory. Consequently, if subjects are asked to give reports about their memory performance 
the behavioral correlate which is measured in a memory test must coincide to the largest 
possible amount with the subjective measure. In this respect, learning experiments seem to be 
better suited than one-trial memory tests. 
The approach presented in Chapters 1.4.2.1 and 1.4.2.2 was demonstrated by means of 
data from 364 persons from the Zurich Longitudinal Study on Cognitive Aging (ZULU; 
Zimprich et al., in revision). Part of the testing protocol was the Metamemory in Adulthood 
(MIA) questionnaire, three measures assessing processing speed, and a verbal learning 
measure that comprised five study and recall cycles. The study was mainly geared to 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of the individually-centered approach on verbal learning in old 
age. In a first step the best representation of verbal learning was assessed by testing three 
different nonlinear functions, namely, the quadratic, the exponential, and the hyperbolic 
growth curve. The latter turned out to fit the data best and the linkages of the learning 
parameters initial performance (β), potential maximum performance (α), and rate of learning 
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(γ) to age and processing speed were modelled. The inclusion of the latter cognitive ability 
was motivated by the fact that processing speed represents a major explanatory variable of 
cognitive aging (Salthouse, 1991, 1996). Subsequently, we included memory as an outcome 
variable, that is, verbal learning parameters (β, α, γ) were used as predictor variables of 
memory performance in old age. In light of the duality of learning and memory phenomena, 
memory performance represents an obvious and, moreover, extensively studied outcome 
variable in cognitive aging research (Craik, 1977; Hultsch et al., 1998; Kausler, 1994). In the 
complete model, the verbal learning parameters initial performance level (β), potential 
maximum performance (α), and rate of learning (γ) thus acted as mediating variables between 
processing speed and memory. 
The variations in the three learning parameters indicating individual differences were 
highest in the learning rate (γ) which suggests that older persons tend to show more 
pronounced individual differences from each other in the rate of acquisition than in initial 
performance or potential maximum performance. Further, the learning rate seemed to be 
mostly affected by age, whereas initial performance was less and potential maximum 
performance was almost not affect by age. That is, older participants needed more trials to 
reach their maximum performance, which, in turn, was not affected by the participants’ age. 
This supports the idea formulated in Chapter 1.4.2 where I argued that the recall performance 
might remain stable, but the cognitive effort to maintain a given level increases in older 
adults. The influence of age, however, was in part mediated by processing speed, which is in 
line with Salthouse’s (1996) processing speed theory. Eventually, memory, measured in 
single trial recall tests, was added as an outcome variable of the three learning parameters. 
Interestingly the learning rate and the potential maximum performance exerted the largest 
effect on the memory measures, which implies that these two parameters are determining and 
inherent factors in memory.  
In sum, the study presented in Chapter 2.2 demonstrated the benefit one gains from 
administering several learning and recall trials over the commonly used single trial 
experiments. That is, at least two more parameters related to memory performance are 
estimable which appear to be memory-inherent. Further, due to increasing individual 
differences the parameters can be mapped more exactly and unsystematic influences on 
performance become smaller which should increase reliability of the measure. The question 
whether the relatedness between self-referent memory beliefs and learning parameters are 
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higher compared to single trial memory measures, however, has not directly been tested and 
can not be answered at this point. 
3.1.3 Monitoring and learning in young and old adults 
The third research question concerned age differences in the relation between 
monitoring and learning by means of a cross-sectional design. Monitoring might be 
considered as a process which functions on-line, that is, which delivers information to the 
meta-level about the current state a monitored object is in. On the basis of the information 
delivered by monitoring, controlling processes may take place to alter the state of the object, 
which, again, will be subject to monitoring. The importance of such monitoring processes 
may gain even more weight when memory performance is declining, as it is the case with 
older adults. One way to operationalize monitoring is by eliciting Judgments-of-Learning 
(JOLs) (see Chap 1.2.1 or refer to Nelson & Narens, 1994). Apart from the finding that JOLs 
are only moderately accurate, Koriat (1997) reported a discrepancy between JOLs and recall 
performance which he termed underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect (see Chapter 
1.4.3): As recall performance increased from the first to the second trial, the effects of 
practice did not lead to more accurate predictions. Instead of improving calibration, average 
JOLs for the second occasion became markedly lower (underconfident) than recall 
performance. 
An open issue is whether the UWP effect could also be found in older adults. To that 
end, two experiments were conducted in order to shed light on age differences in JOLs and 
more specifically to estimate the susceptibility in older adults regarding the UWP effect. In 
the first experiment, both younger and older adults overestimated their memory performance 
in a first trial, in fact, the JOLs seemed to be determined largely by an anchoring effect. In the 
second trial, the older group differed from the young group. The JOLs given by the younger 
participants underestimated significantly the recall performance whereas JOLs given by older 
participants matched, on average, the correctly recalled words. Actually, the UWP effect was 
not observed in any of several conditions in older participants. The complete absence of the 
UWP effect in the older age group seemed even more remarkable if one considers that the 
effect has been shown to withstand several manipulations and, thus, was thought to be very 
robust (cf. Koriat et al., 2002). In the second experiment involving five study-test cycles, the 
same basic pattern of results was present: Young and old participants’ first JOLs appeared to 
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be largely biased by an anchor. In the consecutive trials younger showed the UWP effect but 
older adults still overestimated or predicted correctly their recall performance. The findings 
appeared to fit into a framework of dual factors affecting JOLs, which posits that the 
magnitude of JOLs derives both from an anchoring point and from on-line monitoring of the 
items.  
In respect of the research question formulated in Chapter 1.4.3, which pertained to age 
differences in monitoring, the findings indicate both similarities and differences between age 
groups. That is, if no prior information about item difficulty was available older and younger 
adults started off at almost identical JOL levels. This is remarkable given that the same 
stimuli were significantly more difficult for older than for younger adults. Hence, JOLs 
provided in the first trial appeared to be independent from true item-difficulty and the effect 
of the anchor was almost identical in both age groups. With every additional trial, however, 
the discrepancy between JOLs and recall performance diminished and, overall, accuracy 
increased at the same time. Note that this finding also underlines the need for multitrial 
memory tasks when monitoring is examined because monitoring accuracy obviously is not a 
static measure, but changes significantly over time. A further similarity between young and 
old participants concerned the shape of the mean JOLs curve: At first, participants largely 
overestimated their recall performance. After the initial overconfidence, the average JOLs in 
the second trial were corrected largely toward a lower mean. In the consecutive trials the form 
of the mean JOLs curve was increasing and the correction in JOLs from one trial to the other 
were smaller compared to the adjustment between the first and the second trial (see, for 
example, Figure 2.6). 
The main difference between both age groups became obvious only when JOLs were 
contrasted to the actual recall performance. That is, young adults displayed the UWP effect 
and approximated the recall performance from underconfident judgments. In turn, older adults 
were, on average, never underconfident and, hence, did not display the UWP effect, and 
approximated the performance in recall from overconfident judgments. Note that in terms of 
absolute accuracy both groups were similar, in fact, older adults tended to predict their recall 
performance on average more accurately than younger. This might highlight a crucial 
difference in older adults monitoring functioning: If older adults judge their recall 
performance too optimistically, or correctly, a consequence might be that they invest less 
cognitive resources in memory-related tasks and, hence, their memory performance is lower 
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as it could be. Hence, one might speculate that a certain amount of underconfidence keeps up 
the learning effort and has a positive effect on memory performance. 
3.2 Coda and outlook 
The unifying element in the three research questions was the issue of correspondence 
between memory self-reports and memory performance. The questions aimed at three 
neglected topics in metamemory research ranging from methodological considerations about 
the application of memory questionnaires, over an alternative operationalization of memory, 
to age differences in monitoring. Admittedly, the range of these questions was very broad as 
they covered different methodological issues, but also with regard to content the 
metacognitive functions subsumed under the term “memory self-reports” turned out to be 
very heterogeneous. That is, self-referent memory beliefs are probably part of a persons’ self-
concept (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001), hence, they are rather stable across the adult lifespan and 
are retrievable from memory upon request. JOLs, in turn, are part of monitoring which is best 
considered as a process and, hence, JOLs can differ considerably in a very short period of 
time. Still, the initial question about the low relation between subjective and objective 
memory measures is so ubiquitous in metamemory research that it concerns almost all studies 
in this field. Hence, the present thesis did not intend to find conclusive answers to the open 
research questions.  
The first two research questions pertaining to MI and the relation between self-reports 
and learning remained open but they might be incorporated in future research. That is, by 
determining the degree of MI the risk of misinterpreting group differences can be minimized 
to a manageable degree. This does not necessarily imply that results from older studies need 
to be rewritten. For example, the investigation of the CFQ yielded a strictly measurement 
invariant scale which also implies that inferences drawn with that instrument, regarding age 
differences are not biased by differential item functioning. Note, however, that MI is tied to a 
specific factor structure and, as a consequence, the same set of items in a different factor 
solution can not be measurement invariant because MI relies on the assumption that the model 
is “true”. That is, with regard to the CFQ, earlier solutions, for example the four factors 
solution presented by Wallace and colleagues (2002), might not be MI and conclusions 
regarding group differences drawn upon this basis of factors might not be meaningfully 
interpretable. This is a limitation which mainly concerns questionnaires with debatable factor 
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solutions (e.g., the CFQ). However, it does not necessarily apply for other 
questionnaires/scales as well. The MIA, for example, is composed of seven subscales which, 
simultaneously, represent the factor structure of the measure. Unlike in the case of the CFQ, 
the factor structure of the MIA is theoretically derived which also implies two things: First, if 
the MIA proves to be measurement invariant across groups, this probably holds for other 
similar samples as well and research based on that questionnaire might be corroborated ex 
post. Second, a confirmatory factor solution based on a theoretical instead of an empirical 
classification of factors may be more difficult to verify than an item solution which emerged 
from an exploratory factor solution which is gauged on a specific sample. This, however, may 
also imply that self-report questionnaires, such as the MIA, are more prone to differential item 
functioning because items may not load high enough on the respective factors and, hence, 
high degrees of MI can not be achieved.  
Similar to the first, also the second research question remains an open issue. By 
introducing learning as a broader memory measure the focus is shifted away from the self-
reports to the objective measure. The main aim of the present thesis was to find additional 
accounts for the low relation between subjective memory reports and the respective memory 
performance. Previous research on this low relation has mainly focused on the subjective 
measure; in contrast, the measures of memory performance did not receive much attention. 
This neglected topic should be dealt with in the future in order to gain a broader 
understanding of the relation between subjective and objective memory performance. 
Therefore in Chapter.1.4.2 an approach was presented which might give additional accounts 
of the interplay between self-reports and memory performance. By identifying additional 
memory inherent parameters, apart form the recall performance after one trial, the process of 
learning can be recast in its relevant elements, that is, initial performance, learning rate, and 
potential maximum performance. As shown in the second study, these parameters proved to 
be differentially affected by age-related decline in processing speed. Furthermore, these 
parameters appear to also have differential impact on recall performance in other memory 
tests. This offers a much more differentiated view on memory functioning and the strength in 
age-related change in memory performance can be identified for each parameter separately. If 
different memory parameters are affected by decline in cognitive resources unequally this also 
has implications for other areas in metamemory research. As pointed out in Chapter 1.2.1 
accurate self-reports could be used as self-diagnosis for memory complaints. But, as shown in 
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a number of studies (Hänninen et al., 1994; Niederehe & Yoder, 1989; Zimprich & Kliegel, in 
press) memory complaints do not correlate highly with memory performance. It would be 
premature, however, to conclude that people are generally not good at introspecting and 
reporting their memory. Maybe, experienced change in memory performance is better 
captured by the learning rate, instead of the initial performance. And if people report about 
their memory capacities they might refer to potential maximum performance, which is not 
captured by a single-trial memory task. Further, note that, for example, the correlation 
between potential maximum performance and initial memory performance is r = .29 (cf. 
Figure 2.3), which is similarly low compared to the correlations found between memory self-
reports and the recall performance in single-trial memory tasks. Hence, correlating self-
reports with initial memory performance may lead to low values because the true 
correspondence is between the self-report and potential maximum performance. In the future, 
it might prove worthwhile to investigate and clarify the relations between different types of 
memory self-reports and memory parameters. A further implication drawn from these results 
concerns the aspect of memory improvement or compensation with declining cognitive 
resources. Instead of improving memory in general, it might be more fruitful to focus on the 
most relevant memory parameters. This has the advantage that cognitive resources are 
invested where they have the greatest impact. For example, improving the learning rate has a 
greater effect on memory performance than improving recall performance after one trial. 
Hence, a deeper and more differentiated understanding of memory self-reports and memory 
performance is not only of scientific interest but could also avail other domains as, for 
example, mnemonic training. In summarizing, future research on metamemory should be 
open to new developments in methodology to measure micro- and macrodevelopment in 
memory and self-reports by utilizing latent curve models which allow modelling both fixed 
effects and individual departures from these average effects (Blozis, 2004; Browne, 1993).  
The third topic which remained neglected in the scientific investigation of 
metamemory was age-related differences in memory monitoring. Other than self-referent 
memory beliefs, monitoring is a process which delivers on-line information about a current 
memory-state and, hence, it can have a direct and immediate influence on memory 
performance (see Chapter.1.2.1). Hence, monitoring is better captured with multi-trial 
experiments which regard for changes in the monitoring process. The third study presented in 
this thesis revealed differences in monitoring, mainly in the pattern of over- and 
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underconfidence. Most importantly, older adults appeared to overestimate the probability of 
recalling a given set of items, not only in the first, but also in the consecutive learning trials. 
Younger adults, in turn, displayed the UWP effect and, hence, underrated their recall 
performance from the second trial on. Note that both experiments bridged an important gap: 
The UWP effect was thought to be very robust and omnipresent (Koriat et al., 2002), instead, 
older adults did not display the effect at all. It appeared that the formation of JOLs did not 
change markedly across the adult lifespan, that is, the first monitoring attempt is guided by an 
anchoring process which represents the best guess about the probability of later recalling 
successfully a given item. With every additional trial, however, the accuracy of monitoring 
increased until a very close correspondence was achieved. This implies that people are able to 
monitor correctly their memory performance if sufficient trials are provided. Apparently, the 
main difference between older and younger adults is not the accuracy, but the pattern of over- 
and underconfidence. This difference is captured by the UWP effect which, as argued in 
Chapter 2.3.4, may be an indicator of a well functioning and self-propelling memory system: 
The effort to invest cognitive resources is best kept up if the goal feels always a little out of 
reach. Older adults appear to be too confident about their memory performance so that they 
have no reason to intensify their cognitive effort. This assumption, however, needs to be 
tested in future studies investigating the effect of being over- or underconfident on memory 
performance.  
In sum, apart from the three discussed research questions, the correspondence between 
metamemory and memory performance remains to large portions a research field with a 
number of uncertainties, especially in the lifespan view. Apart from highlighting three open 
research questions this thesis also demonstrated that metamemory still has the potential to be 
the most important psychological mechanism to compensate age-related memory decline. 
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Appendix 
Modelling Description 
In what follows, we will shortly describe the factor model of ordered-categorical 
variables and how, based on this model, measurement invariance of ordered-categorical 
variables across groups may be examined. 
Let Yijk denote the score on the jth ordered-categorical measure for the ith person in 
the kth group. In the factor model for ordered-categorical data, the observed scores Yijk are 
assumed to be determined by unobserved scores on latent response variates *ijkY . Other than 
the observed measures Yijk, these latent response variates are continuous in scale (Millsap & 
Yun-Tein, 2004). The observed measures can be viewed as discretized versions of the latent 
response variates, given that scores on the observed measures are determined through  
 
)1(
*      if      +<≤= mijijkjkmijk vYvmY , (1) 
  
where m = 0, 1, ..., c categories are confined by c + 1 } ..., , ,{ )1(10 +cjkjkjk vvv  latent threshold 
parameters for the jth variable as measured on persons from the kth group. The items of the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), after having collapsed the category “often” and 
“very often,” discretize the latent responses into c = 4 four categories. The two extreme 
thresholds are pre-defined: vjk0 = –∞ and vjk(c + 1) = +∞. The remaining c threshold parameters 
may vary across variables and across groups (Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004).  
The probabilities associated with observed values for Yijk are determined by the 
probability distribution of latent response variate *ijkY . Let } ..., , ,{ 21 ipkkiki
T
ik YYY=Y  be the  
1 × p vector of observed scores on the p variables for the ith person in the kth group, with Tik
*
Y  
the analogous vector of scores on the latent response variates. It is typically assumed that 
 
),,(~ ** kkik MVN ΣµY  (2) 
 
where *kµ  is a p × 1 vector of means on the latent response variates, and 
*
kΣ  is a p × p 
covariance matrix for the latent response variates, each subscripted to permit differences in 
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these parameters between groups. Note that the multivariate normal distribution is assumed 
for the latent response variates and not for the observed ordered categorical variables. Given 
the latent response variates *ijkY , the factor model is specified for these variates as  
 
ijkik
T
jkjkijk eY ++= ηλτ
* , (3) 
 
where jkτ  is a latent intercept parameter, jkλ  is an r × 1 vector of factor loadings for the jth 
variate on r factors, ikη  is the r × 1 vector of factor scores for the ith person in the kth group, 
and eijk is the jth unique factor score for that person. Letting } ..., , ,{ 21 ipkkiki
T
ik eee=e  be the 1 × 
p vector of unique factor scores, we assume that  
 
),,(~    ),,(~ kikkkik MVNMVN Θ0eΨαη  (4) 
 
with kα an r × 1 vector of factor means, kΨ  an r × r factor covariance matrix, and kΘ  
a p × p diagonal covariance matrix for the unique factors. We also assume that 
0eη =),( ikikCov  for all i, k (Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004). These assumptions lead to the 
structure 
 
,)(   ,)( **** k
T
kkkkikkkkkik CovE ΘΛΨΛΣYαΛτµY +==+==  (5) 
 
where } ..., , ,{ 21 pkkk
T
k τττ=τ  and kΛ  is a p × r factor pattern matrix whose jth row is 
T
jk
*
λ . All 
factor model parameters are subscripted to permit differences. In sum, the analysis of ordered 
categorical variables results in finding an adequate structure, which is assumed to stem from a 
multivariate normal distribution, underlying the ordered categorical variables. The main 
problem is one of model identification, because the scores on measured variables are only 
indirectly determined, and typically *kµ  and 
*
kΣ  are not themselves identified. 
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Factorial invariance and model identification 
As Millsap and Yun-Tein (2004) stated, the relevant parameters for factorial 
invariance in multiple groups with ordered-categorical measures, are the thresholds 
} ..., , ,{ )1(10 +cjkjkjk vvv  and the factor model parameters ) , ,( kkk ΘΛτ .  
To identify factor models based on ordered-categorical measures in multiple groups, 
an additional set of constraints on the model parameters is needed, compared to the ordinary 
factor analysis model for continuous measures. Millsap and Yun-Tein (2004) proposed to 
approach the identification problem by two steps: First, constraints are needed on the latent 
responses and on the variate parameters ),( ** kk Σµ  within each group. If they are identified and 
estimable, constraints are imposed on the factor model parameters } , , , ,{ k kkkk αΨΘΛτ . 
Furthermore two cases are to be distinguished when models are to be identified. Models can 
be of a congeneric or of a noncongeneric structure. In the first case, suppose that in the factor 
model in equation 5, each row of kΛ  has only one nonzero element. This would indicate that 
each latent response variate loads only on one factor. In the second, more complex case, 
variables load on multiple factors, for example, the three factor solution we presented here 
allows Item 2 of the CFQ to load on all factors. Millsap and Yun-Tein (2004) proposed five 
constraints which are sufficient to achieve identification of a noncongeneric model in multiple 
groups when c > 1 and r >1 (for the congeneric case see Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004). To 
identify all threshold parameters in one group it is sufficient to fix 0µ =*k  and IΣ =)(
*
kDiag . 
Next, 0α =k  is to be fixed in this same group. Then, in all groups the latent intercept 
parameters are fixed to 0τ =k . Additionally, constraints are imposed on kΛ  to be rendered 
rotationally unique within each group. In the fourth step two values of m are to be chosen, and 
for each of the chosen values jmjkm vv =  for all k, with j = 1, …, p. These constraints force two 
thresholds per measurement variable to be invariant. These constraints are sufficient to render 
the baseline model of configural invariance identifiable. Because the subsequent models of 
measurement invariance impose more constraints, they are also identified. 
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